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Essays on Macroeconomics and Business Cycles
Hyunseung Oh
This dissertation consists of three essays on macroeconomics and business cycles. In the
first chapter, written with Nicolas Crouzet, we ask whether news shocks, which change
agents’ expectations about future fundamentals, are an important source of business-cycle
fluctuations. The existing literature has provided a wide range of answers, finding that news
shocks can account for 10 percent to 60 percent of the volatility of output. We show that
looking at the dynamics of inventories, so far neglected in this literature, cleanly isolates
the role of news shocks in driving business cycles. In particular, inventory dynamics provide
an upper bound on the explanatory power of news shocks. We show, for a broad class
of theoretical models, that finished-good inventories must fall when there is an increase
in consumption and investment induced by news shocks. When good news about future
fundamentals lowers expected future marginal costs, firms delay current production and
satisfy the increase in demand by selling from existing inventories. This result is robust across
the nature of the news and the presence of different types of adjustment costs. We therefore
propose a novel empirical identification strategy for news shocks: negative comovement
between inventories and components of private spending. Estimating a structural VAR with
sign restrictions on inventories, consumption and investment, our identified shock explains at
most 20 percent of output variations. Intuitively, since inventories are procyclical in the data,
shocks that generate negative comovement between inventories and sales cannot account for
the bulk of business-cycle fluctuations.
The second chapter looks into the dynamics of durables over the business cycle. Although
transactions of used durables are large and cyclical, their interaction with purchases of new
durables has been neglected in the study of business cycles. I fill in this gap by introducing a
new model of durables replacement and second-hand markets. The model generates a discre-
tionary replacement demand function, it nests a standard business-cycle model of durables,
and it verifies the Coase conjecture. The model delivers three conclusions: markups are
smaller for goods that are more durable and more frequently replaced; markups are counter-
cyclical for durables, resolving the comovement puzzle of Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007);
and procyclical replacement demand amplifies durable consumption.
In the third chapter, written with Ricardo Reis, we study the macroeconomic implications
of government transfers. Between 2007 and 2009, government expenditures increased rapidly
across the OECD countries. While economic research on the impact of government purchases
has flourished, in the data, about three quarters of the increase in expenditures in the United
States (and more in other countries) was in government transfers. We document this fact,
and show that the increase in U.S. spending on retirement, disability, and medical care
has been as high as the increase in government purchases. We argue that future research
should focus on the positive impact of transfers. Towards this, we present a model in
which there is no representative agent and Ricardian equivalence does not hold because of
uncertainty, imperfect credit markets, and nominal rigidities. Targeted lump-sum transfers
are expansionary both because of a neoclassical wealth effect and because of a Keynesian
aggregate demand effect.
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Chapter 1




The sources of business cycles are an enduring subject of debate among macroeconomists.
Recently, the literature has focused on news shocks — shocks that change agents’ expecta-
tions about future economic fundamentals, without affecting current fundamentals — as a
potential driving force of aggregate fluctuations. Starting with Beaudry and Portier (2006),
this literature has argued that news shocks may provide a good account of expansions and
recessions, stressing episodes such as the US and Asian investment booms and busts of the
late 1990s as examples.
In the news view of business cycles, booms and busts come through changes in expec-
tations and investment (Beaudry and Portier, 2013). For example, when productivity is
expected to increase in the future, investment increases to build up the capital stock to take
advantage of the lower marginal costs in the future. This boom in investment raises wages
and hours worked, and the additional income leads to a consumption boom. Hence good
news about future productivity leads to a current boom in output, and investment is a key
channel. Recent theories of the business cycle based on news shocks are successful in cap-
turing this mechanism. A prominent example is Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) where they
show that, in a neoclassical growth model with investment adjustment costs, variable capac-
ity utilization, and weak wealth effects on hours worked, an expected rise in the marginal
product of capital leads to a boom in investment today. Adding variable capacity and weak
wealth effects on hours worked allows output to rise on impact and satisfy current demand,
while investment adjustment costs lead firms to smooth the desired increase in the stock of
capital over time and start investing today.
However, the empirical literature on estimating the role of news shocks over the business
cycle has yet to come to a consensus. While some estimate that news shocks account for
3as high as 60 percent of output variations, others with equally plausible methods end up
with as low numbers as 10 percent.1 This indicates that the literature is still in need of
additional information to precisely characterize the importance of news shocks. The goal of
this paper is to bring in new insight that could improve on our empirical characterization
of news shocks over the business cycle. To be specific, we focus on a variable that is highly
informative about news shocks, but so far has been neglected in the literature: investment
in finished-good inventories.
Investment in finished-good inventories is informative in the context of news shocks for
the following reasons. First, finished-good inventories are a forward-looking variable that re-
sponds to changes in expectations about future economic conditions. For instance, Kesavan,
Gaur, and Raman (2010) find that finished-good inventory data are valuable for forecasting
sales. Since expectations and investment behavior are at the center of the economic mech-
anism for how news shocks work, investment in finished-good inventories should be a good
source of identification. Second, finished-good inventories provide us a clear differentiation
between shocks that happen today and shocks that are expected to happen in the future. A
straightforward illustration is when the economy faces temporary changes in productivity.
When productivity increases today, then higher income today will raise sales. Firms at the
same time will bunch production to make the most out of the productivity increase and
finished-good inventories will also rise. Hence with a change in productivity today, there
will be positive comovement between inventories and sales.2 When productivity is expected
to increase tomorrow, then higher income in the future will also raise sales today. How-
1For example, Beaudry and Portier (2006) and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2012) estimate that the con-
tribution of news shocks to output variations is above 50 percent, while Barsky and Sims (2011) and Khan
and Tsoukalas (2012) is small. This will be discussed in detail in later sections.
2From now on, we will use the term “inventories” to indicate finished-good inventories when there is no
confusion.
4ever, since firms expect future production to be cheaper than current production, they will
satisfy this increase in sales by depleting inventories. Hence with a change in productivity
tomorrow, there will be negative comovement between inventories and sales.
In section 1.2, we start our analysis by introducing inventories as in Bils and Kahn
(2000) into a news-driven business-cycle model. In section 1.3, we use this model to show
that good news about the future leads to a boom in consumption and investment, but a fall
in inventories. The intuition at the heart of our result is that news shocks lead to strong
intertemporal substitution in production. With good news about the future, marginal cost
is expected to be lower in the future than today. Optimal inventory investment behavior
then dictates that firms should delay production, and satisfy current demand by drawing
down on existing inventories. Thus, news-induced booms lead to inventory disinvestment,
that is, news shocks generate negative comovement between inventories and sales.
In section 1.4, we show that our result holds in many directions under the baseline model.
First, we show that the fall in inventories after a positive news shock is deep and protracted.
Second, we establish that our result holds for other types of news, especially news on demand.
Third, we introduce various types of adjustment costs to check whether our result is robust.
In section 1.5, we show that our result also holds in alternative inventory models, such
as the stockout-avoidance model of Kahn (1992), Kryvtsov and Midrigan (2013) and Wen
(2011) or the (S,s) inventory model of Khan and Thomas (2007b). Although each class of
models introduce inventories for different reasons, it is important to note that the strong
intertemporal substitution channel is a general feature.
Having established that the negative comovement of inventories and sales is a solid out-
come of news shocks, we propose to use this prediction as a means to identify news shocks.
In section 1.6, we describe an empirical strategy based on this idea, a structural VAR with
sign restrictions. We show that a range of shocks identified in this manner explain less than
520 percent of output variations over the business cycle. The reason we get a small and precise
contribution of news shocks is because inventories are procyclical in the data. Hence a shock
that generates negative comovement between inventories and sales have limited importance
over the business cycle. In section 1.7, we show that our results also hold in an estimated
DSGE model with inventories. Using a stock-elastic demand inventory model and including
a wide range of shocks studied in the literature, we estimate news shocks to account for less
than 20 percent of output growth variations. Section 1.8 concludes.
Our work relates to a number of papers that examine the behavior of investment with
news shocks. Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), Christiano, Ilut, Motto, and Rostagno (2008), as
well as Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2012) document the importance of investment adjustment
cost for news shocks to generate an immediate boom in investment and output. However,
inventory investment has been mostly neglected in this literature. One exception is Vukotic
(2013) where inventories are introduced as a factor of production in the durable sector. Our
approach is quite different from hers since we examine inventories that are stored as finished
goods. These type of inventories do not enter the production function, and therefore the
previous channels through which investment operates under news shocks no longer applies.
Our contribution to the news literature then is to illustrate a new channel through which
news shocks operate by focusing on the investment behavior of finished-good inventories that
is distinctive from capital investment.
Our work also relates to the recent literature on inventories that matches the stylized
business-cycle facts of inventories with micro foundations at the firm level. The main differ-
ence across these models is how they generate a positive level of inventories at the steady
state. To be specific, one branch of the literature argues that inventories exist since they
facilitate sales either by their use for displaying and advertising purposes (Bils and Kahn,
2000), or by their use for buffer against stockouts (Wen, 2011; Kryvtsov and Midrigan, 2013).
6Another branch of the literature argues that inventories exist due to bunching behavior in-
duced by fixed ordering costs (Fisher and Hornstein, 2000; Khan and Thomas, 2007b). Since
our focus is on finished-good inventories, we fit better into the former approach.3 Neverthe-
less, our result also applies to the latter approach, since a common feature of all these models
is that inventories are producers’ means of intertemporal substitution. Our contribution to
this literature is highlighting this common mechanism of a wide range of inventory models
when business cycles are driven by news shocks.
Lastly, our empirical approach is based on the sign restriction literature in a vector au-
toregression (VAR) framework. These approaches have been applied in identifying monetary
policy shocks (Faust, 1998; Uhlig, 2005), fiscal policy shocks (Mountford and Uhlig, 2009;
Caldara and Kamps, 2012) and also news shocks (Beaudry, Nam, and Wang, 2011).
1.2 A finished-good inventory model
In this section, we lay out a general equilibrium model of inventory dynamics based on the
work of Pindyck (1994), Bils and Kahn (2000), and Jung and Yun (2006). The tractability
of this model delivers us a clear intuition on how inventories work in the economy in response
to news shocks. Other models will be discussed in later sections.
The key feature of the stock-elastic demand model we analyze in this section is the
assumption that sales of a firm are elastic to the amount of goods available for sale, which
we term “on-shelf goods.” This assumption finds empirical support for many categories
of goods, as documented by Pindyck (1994) or Copeland, Dunn, and Hall (2011). The
positive elasticity of sales to on-shelf goods captures the idea that with more on-shelf goods,
customers are more likely to find a good match and purchase the product. This may arise
3See Khan and Thomas (2007a) for a comparison between the two approaches.
7either because of greater availability of goods, or because more on-shelf goods may provide
a wider variety within the same product. For example, a shoe store with more colors and
size of all kinds are likely to attract more customers and sell more goods.
1.2.1 Description of the stock-elastic demand model
The economy consists of a representative household and monopolistically competitive
firms. The output of the firms are storable goods, of which they keep a positive inventory.
We start with the household problem.








where ct is the consumption of the final good, nt denotes the supply of labor services, and
ψt is a exogenous variable that introduces a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure, and the real wage, and which we call a “labor wedge”
shock. We assume that the household’s period utility function takes the form proposed by










where ξ is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and σ denotes the inverse of the elasticity
of the household’s intertemporal substitution. This preference specification has been widely
used in the literature on news shocks, and it implies zero wealth effects on labor supply.
8The household’s maximization problem is subject to the following constraints:
∫ 1
0











+ (1− δk)kt, (1.3)
ct + it ≤ xt. (1.4)
Equation (1.2) is the household budget constraint. The household earns income each
period by providing labor nt at a given wage Wt, lending capital kt at a rate Rt, claiming
the profit pit(j) from each firm j ∈ [0, 1], and receiving bond payments Bt. It spends its
income in purchases of each variety in the amount st(j) at a price pt(j), and in purchases of
the state-contingent one-period bonds Bt+1. The probability-adjusted price of each of these
bonds is Qt,t+1, for each state in period t+ 1.
Equation (1.3) is the accumulation rule of capital with adjustment costs to investment.
The adjustment cost function φ(·) is twice-differentiable with φ(1) = φ′(1) = 0, and φ′′(1) >
0. Adjustment costs of this form generate an immediate build-up motive for capital when
the desired level of capital is high in the future.
Equation (1.4) states that the household’s consumption and investment cannot exceed
its total absorption of final goods, xt, which is constructed by aggregating their purchase
of intermediate goods {st(j)}j∈[0,1]. The aggregation of the intermediate goods {st(j)}j∈[0,1]












where vt(j) is the taste-shifter for each product j and θ is the elasticity of substitution across
intermediate goods. It follows from expenditure minimization that the demand function for














In the stock-elastic demand model, the taste shifter for variety j is assumed to depend on the








where the normalization by at, defined as the the economy-wide average of on-shelf goods,
ensures that the mean of νt(j) across goods is equal to 1. The parameter ζ > 0 controls the
degree of the shift in taste due to the relative amount of goods on-shelf.
Finally, the household is given an initial level of capital k0 and bonds B0, and its opti-
mization problem is subject to a no-Ponzi condition for both capital and stage-contingent
bond holdings.
Firm problem Each monopolistically competitive firm j ∈ [0, 1] maximizes the expected








pit(j) = pt(j)st(j)−Wtnt(j)−Rtkt(j). (1.8)
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Note that profit in each period is the revenue from sales net of the cost from hiring labor nt(j)
and renting capital kt(j) at their respective prices Wt and Rt. The term Q0,t is the discount
factor of bonds between period 0 and t, so that Q0,t =
∏t−1
T=0QT,T+1. This discount factor
is consistent with households being the final owners of firms. The firm faces the following
constraints:
at(j) = (1− δi)invt−1(j) + yt(j), (1.9)















Equation (1.9) is the stock accumulation equation. The stock (on-shelf goods) of the
firm, at(j), consists of the undepreciated stock of inventories from the previous period (1−
δi)invt−1(j) and current production yt(j). The parameter δi denotes the depreciation rate
of inventories. Equation (1.10) states that on-shelf goods that are unsold are accounted as
inventories.4 Equation (1.11) is the production function. Firms use a constant returns to
scale production function, with capital and labor as inputs. The variable zt represents total
factor productivity and is exogenous. Finally, monopolistically competitive firms face the
demand function (1.12) stemming from the household problem.
4In the data, this is recorded as the end-of-period inventory stock in each period.
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Bt+1 = 0. (1.15)
Sales of goods for each variety j also clears by the demand function described above. The






A market equilibrium of this economy is defined as follows.
Definition 1.1 (Market equilibrium of the stock-elastic demand model). A market equilib-
rium of the stock-elastic demand model is a set of stochastic processes for aggregate variables
ct, nt, kt+1, it, Bt+1, xt, at,Wt, Rt, Pt, Qt,t+1,
and firm-level variables
{at(j)}, {nt(j)}, {kt(j)}, {vt(j)}, {st(j)}, {yt(j)}, {invt(j)}, {pt(j)},
such that, given the exogenous stochastic processes zt, ψt, as well as initial conditions k0, B0
and {inv−1(j)}:
 households maximize (1.1) subject to (1.2) - (1.6) and a no-Ponzi condition,
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 each firm j ∈ [0, 1] maximizes (1.7) subject to (1.8) - (1.12),
 markets clear according to (1.13) - (1.16).
The two exogenous processes in our economy are total factor productivity zt and the
labor wedge ψt. The news component to these two shocks are the primary contributors to
aggregate fluctuations in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2012).5
1.2.3 The optimal choice of inventories
The full set of equilibrium conditions are provided in the appendix. As we show there,
a market equilibrium of the stock-elastic demand model is symmetric, so that at(j) = at,
st(j) = st, invt(j) = invt, yt(j) = yt, and pt(j) = pt for all j. Here, we discuss the optimal
stock choice of firms.
















The left hand side of this equation represents the cost of adding an extra unit of goods to
the stock of goods on sale, at, which equals the current marginal cost of production. The
right hand side represents the two benefits of adding this extra unit. First, by producing
5Other types of shocks will be discussed in later sections.
6Here, qt,t+1 = Qt,t+1Pt+1/Pt denotes the real stochastic discount factor of the household.
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and stocking an extra unit, the firm is able generate an additional fraction (∂st/∂at) of sales.
Second, since some of these additional stock of goods will not be sold and will be stored as
inventories for the next period, future production cost reduces.
It is important to notice that at the nonstochastic steady state of the economy, the stock
of inventories are positive. Since the real interest rate and the inventory depreciation rate are
both positive at the steady state, holding inventories over time is a loss. However, consistent
with the first term on the right hand side of (1.18), there is a convenience yield in holding
a positive amount of inventories in each period. In the model, the convenience yield is the
additional sales created by holding a positive level of stock. Therefore, even with the cost
over time, the economy will hold a positive level of inventories at the steady state to maintain
their level of sales.





µt − 1 , (1.19)
where:
µt ≡ 1






The variable µt is the markup of price over expected discounted marginal cost. This is the
relevant markup concept in an economy where firms produce to stock: indeed, the true cost of
sales is not current but future marginal cost, since selling an extra unit reduces tomorrow’s
stock of goods. The variable γt is the expected discounted growth rate of marginal cost,
which summarizes the firm’s opportunity cost of producing today. The optimal stocking
behavior of a firm balances these 3 margins: markup, discounted growth rate of marginal
cost, and the benefit of stocking in generating sales.
In equilibrium, the optimal choice of inventories expressed in a first-order log-linear ap-
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proximation around its steady state is:7
învt = sˆt + ηγˆt,
where hatted variables represent log-deviations from its steady-state. This condition states
that two factors determine the dynamics of inventories.
First, sˆt represents the demand channel, where firms in this economy build in their
inventories when sales are high. For example, when there is an increase in aggregate demand,
then firms make the most out of it by stocking more goods on shelf to generate additional
sales. However, since the additional unit on stock will not lead to a full amount of realized
sales, (end-of-period) inventories also increase.
Second, ηγˆt represents the intertemporal substitution channel, where η > 0 is a combina-
tion of structural parameters that will be specified in proposition 1.1. Intuitively, η represents
the degree of intertemporal substitution of production in this economy. For example, when
there is an increase in future expected discounted marginal cost relative to current marginal
cost, then γˆt is positive and firms will increase their inventories. This happens because firms
realize that it is cheaper to produce today than in the future and they now bunch their pro-
duction today and store more inventories. When the value of η is infinitely large, then the
degree of intertemporal substitution is so large that even a small change in the perception
of the marginal cost will result in a massive change in inventories.
Hence the optimal decision of inventories in our model depends on the relative strength
between the demand channel and the intertemporal substitution channel.
7This equation is derived by combining (1.10), (1.19) and the optimal pricing condition µˆt = 0.
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1.3 The impact effect of news shocks
We now turn to studying the effect of news shocks in this model economy. In this
section, we focus on impact responses. We derive analytical conditions under which news
shocks result in positive comovement on impact between sales and inventories, assess whether
those conditions are likely to hold in reasonable calibrations of the model, and inspect the
mechanisms underpinning them.
1.3.1 A log-linearized framework
We analyze a first-order log-linear approximation of the model around its steady-state.
The following framework summarizes the equilibrium conditions needed for the purpose of
our analysis on inventories and news shocks.
Proposition 1.1 (Stock-elastic demand model). On impact and with only news shocks, so
that zˆt = 0 and ψˆt = 0, the following equations represent the log-linearized market equilibrium
of definition 1.1:
m̂ct = ωyˆt, (1.20)
κyˆt = sˆt +
κ− 1
δi
[învt − (1− δi)învt−1], (1.21)
învt = sˆt + τ µˆt + ηγˆt, (1.22)
µˆt = 0, (1.23)
µˆt + γˆt + m̂ct = 0. (1.24)
The mapping from the structural model parameters to the parameters of the reduced-form
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equations is given by:
ω =
1 + (1− α)ξ
αξ
, (1.25)










where IS is the steady-state inventory-sales ratio, given by
IS =
(θ − 1)(1− β(1− δi))
ζβ(1− δi)− (θ − 1)(1− β(1− δi)) .
Equation (1.20) relates marginal cost to output, which is derived by combining the labor
supply and demand conditions, and the production function. Importantly, this equation is
not connected to the introduction of inventories in our model. With ω > 0, the equation
states that real marginal cost increases with output. The parameter ω is the elasticity of
marginal cost with respect to output, keeping constant total factor productivity. In other
words, ω represents the degree of decreasing returns in the economy due to predetermined
capital in the short run represented by α and the disutility of labor supply represented by ξ.
The value of ω itself has been at the center of debate in the monetary economics literature
and we consider a range of values. In fact, Woodford (2003) contrasts two values of ω: 1.25,
from Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000), and 0.47, from Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).
Moreover, Dotsey and King (2006) suggest a lower bound of 0.33 for ω. A conservative lower
bound for ω is thus:
ω ≥ 0.3.
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Equation (1.21) is the law of motion for the stock of inventories, obtained from combining
equations (1.9) and (1.10). This law of motion states that output should equal sales plus
inventory investment. In its log-linearized form, κ in (1.21) denotes the steady-state output
to sales ratio. In NIPA, the time series average of inventory investment over output is around
0.5 percent, so that:
κ = 1.005.
Equations (1.22) and (1.23) are the optimal stocking and pricing conditions, respectively.
Combining these two equations, we see that inventories are determined by the demand
channel (sˆt) and the intertemporal substitution channel (ηγˆt), as we discussed in section
1.2. Here we focus on the numerical value of η, the degree of intertemporal substitution in
production. Equation (1.27) indicates that a lower bound of η is (1 − β(1 − δi))−1. The
lower bound depends on two parameters β and δi. First, the household discount factor
β governs the opportunity cost of holding inventories. In the extreme case where β = 1,
there is no opportunity cost of holding inventories since the real interest rate 1/β − 1 is
0. Second, the depreciation rate of inventories δi represent the physical cost of holding
inventories. Therefore, the value 1 − β(1 − δi) represents the overall intertemporal cost of
adjusting inventories. In the extreme case when both the opportunity cost and the physical
cost of inventories are zero, then the lower bound of η is infinity. At quarterly frequency, we
set β = 0.99, which is standard. For δi, the logistics literature estimates the carrying cost to
be around 12–15 percent in annual terms.8 With a rather high value of δi = 0.04, the lower
bound is
η > 20.
8The overall carrying cost suggested in the literature is on average 25 percent in annual terms (Stock
and Lambert, 2001). However, these include interest payments and clerical costs of managing inventories.
Excluding those costs gives our numbers.
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Lastly, equation (1.24) follows from the definition of µt and γt in section 1.2.
1.3.2 The impact response of inventories to good news about the
future
Given sales sˆt, equations (1.20) - (1.24) relate the following four variables: output yˆt,
inventories ˆinvt, the discounted growth rate of marginal cost γˆt, and markups µˆt. We adopt
the following definition of a news shock in the context of this reduced-form framework: a news
shock has no impact on current fundamentals (zˆt = 0 and ψˆt = 0), but future fundamentals
are expected to change (Etzˆt+k 6= 0 or Etψˆt+k 6= 0 for some k > 0).
Proposition 1.2 (The impact response of inventories to a good news about the future).





This proposition indicates that the positive comovement between inventories and sales
depend on three parameters: κ, ω and η. With κ = 1.005, the two parameters ω and η need
to be sufficiently small for positive comovement between inventories and sales. Following
our previous discussion on numerical values, a conservative upper bound on κ/ω is 3.3.
However, given that our lower bound of η with a large carrying cost of inventories is still
20, the condition of proposition 1.2 is not met and fails by an order of magnitude. Thus,
our framework indicates that following the arrival of good news about the future, the boom
in sales associated to a news shock is accompanied by a fall in inventories. In other words,
there is negative comovement between inventories and sales in response to news shocks.
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1.3.3 Discussion
The numerical discussion of proposition 1.2 concludes that inventories must fall when
good news about the future generates a current boom in sales. The two key parameters that
drive this result are ω and η.
First, when ω is small, then a sales boom will also correspond to an inventory boom.
This is because with a small ω, marginal cost barely responds to changes in production of
the firm. Therefore, inventories are less important as means of intertemporal substitution
of production. In this economy, inventories are mostly used to affect demand, and with a
sufficient increase in demand, firms will optimally accumulate inventories.
Second, when η is small, the intertemporal substitution channel itself becomes weak.
This is the case when the firm faces large costs in storing goods for the future. When the
interest rate is high or the depreciation of inventories are high, then it is costly for firms
to hold inventories. In this economy, even though marginal cost may respond sensitively to
production, firms will be less willing to smooth this out by adjusting inventories. Therefore
a sufficient increase in demand will also lead to an accumulation of inventories.
To be more precise on this connection between η and the cost of storing goods, recall that
the lower bound of η is negatively related to the intertemporal cost of adjusting inventories,
1 − β(1 − δi). In fact, we also find that the value of η itself is negatively related with the
intertemporal cost. In figure 1.1, we fix the other structural parameters and change the value
of 1 − β(1 − δi) to show this relation.9 In the extreme case with zero intertemporal cost
of adjusting inventories, we see that the degree of intertemporal substitution, η, reaching
infinity. With higher intertemporal cost imposed, the value of η becomes smaller, but far
from satisfying the positive comovement condition of proposition 1.2 even for the upper
9The value of η is a function of β and δi only in the form of 1 − β(1 − δi). Hence there is no need to
consider β and δi separately.
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bound of κ/ω, which is 3.3.
To summarize, since standard calibrations suggest a small cost of adjusting goods across
time, the model does not predict an inventory boom when there is a sales boom in response
to news shocks.
1.4 Dynamic analysis
The analysis of the previous section focused on the impact responses to news shocks, in
an effort to understand forces underlying the joint response of inventories and sales. We
found that news shocks generate negative comovement between inventories and sales. We
now turn to several extensions of this result. We first show that the negative comovement
between inventories and sales holds beyond impact and whether allowing variable capacity
utilization changes our result. Second, we study inventory behavior with surprise shocks
to confirm that the negative comovement property is an identifying feature of news shocks.
Third, we study the comovement property with other types of news shocks. Fourth, we check
the robustness of our result by introducing different types of adjustment costs.
Since the analysis will be numerical, we start with a brief discussion on the calibration
of parameters.
1.4.1 Calibration
The numerical values for the parameters are summarized in table 1.1. Standard model
parameters are calibrated using estimates from the business-cycle literature. Parameters
specific to the inventory blocks of the models are calibrated to match sample averages of the
inventory-sales ratio. For the exogenous variables we assume that the realization of these
shocks follow AR(1) processes. For the persistence of each shocks, ρz = 0.99 and ρψ = 0.95
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are assumed.10
Our calibration implies that η = 67.15, ω = 1.09 and κ = 1.02, so that applying propo-
sition 1.2, inventories respond negatively to news shocks on impact.
1.4.2 Impulse response to news shocks and variable capacity uti-
lization
We first study the impulse responses of output, sales and inventories to 4-period positive
news shocks to productivity and labor wedge. That is, at period 0, agents get signals that
future productivity (E0z4) will increase or future labor wedge (E0ψ4) will decrease.11
Figure 1.2 reports the impulse responses. Note first that consumption and investment,
which are components of sales, increase immediately, and throughout the realization of the
shock. Consumption increases because of the wealth effect associated and investment in-
creases because of the presence of investment adjustment costs.
In line with our discussion of the previous sections, inventories fall. The fall is large and
persistent, and reaches its trough in the period preceding the realization of the shock. At
the same time, output remains mostly unchanged until period 4, when the shock realizes.
That is, the increase in sales during the news period is almost entirely met by inventory
disinvestment. To build further intuition for the responses of inventories, note that the









10These estimates of persistence are close to the empirical findings in the literature.
11We define a positive news shock by a shock that generates an increase in sales. When labor wedge is
expected to decrease, then households expect to face less disutility of working in the future and this will also
boost current sales.
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so that marginal cost is given by:
m̂ct = ωyˆt − zˆt + ψˆt − (ω + 1) (1− α)kˆt. (1.29)
This marginal cost equation tells us that both news about an increase in future productivity
and news about a decrease in future labor wedge are declining forces to the future marginal
cost. In general equilibrium, this downward pressure in the marginal cost profile is reflected
in the negative impulse response of the expected discounted marginal cost γt, which we report
in the upper right panel of figure 1.2. Since inventories are used to smooth out the difference
in marginal cost of production over time, this fall in the expected discounted marginal cost
leads to a fall in inventories which is sufficient to overcome the effect of the increase in sales,
as we see from equation (1.22).
Note that we are not forcing output to be fixed during the news period and that there
still is a small increase in output for the first four periods. Although capital is fixed in the
short run, and both productivity and labor wedge are unchanged during the news period, the
labor demand schedule of firms may still shift with changes in marginal cost, as we see from
the right hand side of equation (1.28). Indeed, in contrast to models without inventories,
the optimal pricing policy of firms does not imply that marginal cost is fixed — instead,
it is the expected discounted marginal cost that is constant. Through equation (1.28), the
increase in demand is associated to a rise in marginal cost which shifts out the labor demand
curve, resulting in a small increase in hours worked. However, since the marginal cost is
effectively smoothed out by the strong inventory substitution channel in our economy, the
actual movement in marginal cost is small and therefore labor only slightly increases in
equilibrium. Therefore the small change in output is an optimal response of the economy
with inventories.
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To make this point more clear, we allow capacity utilization to vary and see whether our
result remains. Denoting ut as the utilization of capital at period t, the production function
and the captial accumulation function are modified respectively as follows:
yt = zt(utkt)
1−αnαt ,








where δ′(·) > 0 and δ′′(·) > 0. In words, higher utilization of capital increases output, but
this comes at a cost of higher depreciation of capital. In a model without inventories as in
Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), capacity utilization increases with news about a future rise in
productivity. This is because with a future rise in productivity, the presence of investment
adjustment costs leads to an increase in capital investment today. The increase in capital
investment generates a fall in the value of installed capital. At the same time, the positive
income effect from the household generates a fall in the marginal value of income due to the
concavity of the utility function. Overall, the fall in the value of installed capital is steeper
than the fall in the marginal value of income, and therefore capacity is utilized more to
satisfy the additional demand.
In figure 1.3, we plot the impulse responses for the inventory model with variable capacity
utilization. As we see, the quantitative response of capacity utilization during the news
period is modest. Utilization significantly increases only after the shock realizes.
The small response of capacity utilization during the news period comes directly from
the household preference and the role of inventories in the economy. The marginal value of
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With inventories, the increase in consumption and investment can be matched by depleting
inventories rather than working more. Therefore, n does not go up with an increase in c,
which generates a steeper fall in the marginal value of income. Hence even with capacity
utilization, the economy does not ask for more production at the expense of depreciating
installed capital since their utility level is already high. Again, we confirm that our negative
comovement between inventories and sales in response to news shocks is an equilibrium
outcome even with sufficient channels for production to increase.
1.4.3 Do surprise shocks generate positive comovement?
While news shocks generate a persistent negative comovement between inventories and
sales, one may wonder whether this also occurs after surprise innovations to fundamentals.
The impulse responses reported in figure 1.4 show that this is not the case. Inventories,
consumption, investment and output all increase in response to surprise innovations to pro-
ductivity and the labor wedge. The short-run response of the inventory-sales ratio is also
consistent with its observed countercyclicality at business-cycle frequencies, in line with the
findings of Khan and Thomas (2007a) and Wen (2011).12 The model prediction is thus
12The countercyclicality of the inventory-sales ratio is not completely robust to the calibration of the
shock, as it depends partly on the magnitude of the initial increase in sales. For a smaller persistence
of productivity shocks of ρz = 0.8, for example, the response of sales is more muted, and the IS ratio
becomes procyclical. This behavior of the inventory-sales ratio has motivated Kryvtsov and Midrigan (2013)
to investigate the ability of countercyclical markup movements to mute inventory increases in response to
demand-side shocks, since in the data, the inventory-sales ratio is countercyclical. However, in response to
both productivity and demand shocks, the procyclicality of inventories holds regardless of the values of the
persistence parameters ρz and ρψ.
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broadly consistent with the observed behavior of inventories and sales over the business cy-
cle. Thus, the negative comovement of inventories and sales is an identifying feature of news
shocks to fundamentals.
1.4.4 Other types of news shocks
Although the two types of shocks we have considered up to now are argued as significant
sources of news in the literature (Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2012), we do not need to limit
our result to these shocks. In fact proposition 1.2 implies that the negative comovement
holds for any type of news shocks, since on impact, all news shocks share the feature that
no fundamentals change.
In this section, we consider two other types of news shocks: discount factor shocks and
government spending shocks. First, consider a news shock to the discount factor. When
the discount factor is expected to increase in the future, then households expect that in the
future they will consume more and save less. Then they will consume less today since they
now discount the future less. Moreover since savings and hence investment will decrease in
the future, with investment adjustment costs, investment will also start decreasing today.
Therefore, news about an increase in future discount factor generates a fall in sales. At the
same time, the fall in investment leads to an decrease in future capital, which generates an
increase in the future marginal cost. Therefore, inventories will increase, confirming that the
negative comovement property holds with this type of news shock.
Second, when there is a future increase in government spending, then inventories will
increase to build up for the demand from government spending, since marginal cost is ex-
pected to rise in the future with the additional demand from the government. At the same
time, since the households in the end take the burden of this spending, consumption and
investment falls. Again, there is negative comovement between inventories and sales with
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this type of news shock as well.
Figure 1.5 shows the impulse responses to the two shocks discussed.13 As discussed, the
negative comovement property is also true with these two types of shocks.
1.4.5 Adding adjustment costs
Adding adjustment costs to capital investment has been a key element for generating
an investment boom with news shocks (Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2009). Capital is slow to
adjust, and with this form of adjustment cost, investment decisions depend solely on the
discounted sum of future marginal values of capital, or future Tobin’s Q. News shocks affect
the marginal productivity of future capital, and thus raise future Tobin’s Q, which directly
translates into an increase in current investment.
This logic does not extend to inventory investment, in particular for finished-good in-
ventories. First, whereas building a factory or machinery takes time and hence requires
adjustment periods, stocking or depleting an already existing product should be the most
flexible adjustment that firms can take. Second, as we discussed in the previous sections, it
is not the level, but the growth rate of marginal cost that is important for finished-good in-
ventory investment decisions. Therefore, adding adjustment cost to finished-good inventory
investment is a less appealing approach.
However, adjustment cost to the stock of inventories may have a better justification:
total stock of inventories do seem large and slowly moving. Moreover, our intuition tells
us that with a positive news shock, we need additional channels for production to increase
and adjustment costs may help us. We consider three possible types of adjustment costs:
adjustment costs to inventories, output and on-shelf goods. Adjustment cost to inventories
13The persistence of each process are 0.17 for the discount factor and 0.95 for the spending. These values
come from Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2012).
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penalizes immediate inventory depletion and thus weakens the intertemporal substitution
motive. Adjustment cost to output force firms to smooth out the response of output to the
shock, and in turn reduce the incentive to deplete inventories to satisfy sales. Finally, adjust-
ment cost to goods on shelf are the sum of output and past inventories. Making adjustment
costs bear on this variable might have effects that combine both types of adjustment costs
described above.
These adjustment costs are introduced by assuming that the law of motion for inventories
are modified as follows:
invt = (1− δi)invt−1 + yt − st − ADJt,






xt, x ∈ {inv, y, a},
where φx(1) = φ
′
x(1) = 0 and φ
′′
x(1) > 0. In figure 1.6, we show the responses of the
model with and without adjustment costs, where output adjustment cost is assumed. We
experiment with different levels of adjustment costs, and for all values, we observe that the
initial fall in inventories are smaller in both models with adjustment costs, but not close
to being positive. We conclude that adjustment costs to inventories and output are not
sufficient to generate a procyclical response of inventories.
The logic behind this result is that with adjustment costs to inventories or production,
firms are now more willing to smoothly adjust their stock of inventories, and hence produce
more today when there is good news. However, to make this happen, wages must increase to
induce households to work more. With an increase in wages, households have more income,
and consumers will increase their current consumption level not only to compensate for the
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current loss of utility by working more, but also to increase their level of utility with their
higher income.
1.5 Robustness: Other inventory models
A natural question is whether our result is specific to the particular inventory model
we have chosen to analyze. In this section, we discuss these other models that illustrate
important margins of inventory adjustment discussed in the business-cycle literature. In the
leading business-cycle models, inventories are introduced either as buffers to uncertainties
in demand at the firm level (stockout-avoidance models), or as economies of scale due to
nonconvex delivery costs at the firm level (Ss inventory models). We will focus more on the
first approach since they fit better for finished-good inventories (Khan and Thomas, 2007a).
Nevertheless, we also discuss the second approach for completeness.
For a preview, it turns out that our result remains for all other models as well. This is
because one important role for inventories in all of these models is the intertemporal substi-
tution channel. With inventories, producers are allowed to flexibly change their production
schedule based on their perception on the marginal cost profile. Since news shocks directly
affect this perception, the other margins which differ across models matter less, in particular
close to the moment when the news shock is expected to realize in the next period.
1.5.1 Stockout-avoidance model
One branch of the literature on finished-good inventories motivates inventories by intro-
ducing a lag in production and the realization of sales. Since production decisions are made
with uncertainty in demand, inventories are buffers to the possibility of stocking out. In
these stockout-avoidance models, firms are assumed to have imperfect information on the
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demand schedule for their variety at the time they make decisions. When demand for their
product is unusually high, firms may run out of available product — a “stockout” — and
lose potential sales. This motivates firms to put, on average, more on-shelf goods than they
expect to sell, and carry over excess goods as inventory into the next period.14
In the appendix, we study the effects of news shocks in this class of models in detail.
We show that a reduced-form framework similar to that of proposition 1.1 obtains, and
moreover that our main result carries through: in response to good news about the future,
under standard calibrations of the model, sales increase while inventories fall. This follows
from obtaining analytical restrictions on reduced-form parameters to precisely quantify the
conditions under which this result holds. Additionally, we argue that, as in the stock-elastic
demand model, the main mechanism dominating the response of inventories to news shocks
is intertemporal substitution in production. In figure 1.7, we plot the value of η, the degree
of intertemporal substitution, as a function of the intertemporal cost. Again, we see that
even with large intertemporal cost, the degree of intertemporal substitution is strong.
The similarity of the two classes of models comes from the fact that the optimal stocking
condition (1.18) also holds in the stockout-avoidance model. The cost of stocking is the
marginal cost. The benefits of stocking are twofold: (i) In the case that sales turn out high,
then the firm can increase its sales by producing an additional product. (ii) In the case
that sales turn out low, then the firm can save its future production cost by stocking it as
inventories. It turns out that even in this class, the intertemporal substitution motive is
quantitatively stronger for news shocks.
14This mechanism is consistent with existing evidence that stockouts occur relatively frequently at the
firm level. Bils (2004) uses data from the BLS survey underlying the CPI and estimates that stockout
probabilities in this dataset are roughly 5 percent. More recently, using supermarket-level data for a large
retailer, Matsa (2011) suggests that stockout probabilities are in the range of 5 − 10 percent. See Kahn
(1987, 1992), Kryvtsov and Midrigan (2010, 2013), and Wen (2011) for detailed analysis of the properties of
this class of models.
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1.5.2 (S,s) inventory model
Although the focus has been more on input inventories, the existence of nonconvex de-
livery costs at the firm level has also been claimed as an important reason for the presence
of inventories. In the model of Khan and Thomas (2007b), the firm pays a fixed cost when
placing an order for inputs. This cost comes at a random manner, and there is a distribution
of firms with different levels of inventories. In this model, the optimal stocking condition for
stock adjusting firms is also a balance between the cost and benefit of ordering goods as we
discussed in (1.18). To be precise, the cost of stocking is the total cost of goods and a fixed
delivery cost. The benefits of stocking are twofold: (i) In the case when future delivery cost
turns out high, then firms will not order at that time. Then the total production capacity
of the firm is constrained by the amount of input inventories it holds. Hence, more input
inventories allow the firm to produce more goods when demand is high but delivery cost
becomes too high. (ii) In the case when future delivery cost turns out low, then firms can
order at that time as well. In this case, the firm will save its total cost if they expect that
the unit cost of good will be expensive in the future.
In response to news about an increase in future productivity, firms understand that
future demand will increase. At the same time, they understand that future unit cost of
input inventories is also cheaper. We solve for the perfect foresight transition dynamics with
a news shock to productivity in Khan and Thomas (2007b).15 All models share in common
that inventories fall, especially right before the realization of the shock. Therefore, we
conclude that the strong intertemporal substitution channel with news shocks is a common
feature across all models.
15Refer to Khan and Thomas (2007b) for the solution algorithm.
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1.6 Estimating the importance of news shocks I: SVAR
approach
Our analysis of inventory models suggests that the negative comovement of inventories
and sales is a defining feature of news shocks. Indeed, as we have discussed at length, it holds
for all plausible calibrations of the models. In this section, we use this structural restriction
to estimate the importance of news shocks.
The approach we take in this section is estimating a structural VAR with sign restrictions.
Since the robust prediction of our theoretical analysis is that news shocks generate negative
comovement between inventories and sales, we will use this prediction directly to estimate
the explanatory power of news shocks. The appealing aspect of our sign restriction VAR
approach is that we could remain agnostic in other aspects, and therefore robustly identify
shocks without other misspecification concerns. On the other hand, the loss of this approach
is that identification is weak since we may be including non-news shocks that could also
drive negative comovement between inventories and sales.
1.6.1 Data
We use four observables in our exercise: inventories, consumption, investment and output.
Consumption includes nondurables and services, investment includes fixed investment and
durables, and output is GDP. For inventories, we use nonfarm private inventories as a whole,
or only retail trade inventories to focus on finished-good inventories. However, our results
are not sensitive to the type of inventories used for estimation. Therefore, in this section,
we present results for nonfarm private inventories. All data are seasonally adjusted, and
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expressed in real per capita terms. Our sample period is 1955Q1–2006Q4.16
1.6.2 Baseline specification and estimation
Our baseline identification strategy imposes that on impact, there is disinvestment in
inventories, whereas consumption and fixed investment increases.17 The VAR model we
estimate is the following:
Xt = A+B(L)Xt−1 + Ut.
For Xt, we use log levels of each variable to be robust to cointegrating relations. We estimate
with a constant term and four lags.18 We estimate the model using Bayesian methods, with
a a diffuse prior for both the coefficients of the autoregressive structure and the variance-
covariance matrix of the error terms. Each draw from the posterior identifies a set of possible
impulse responses satisfying our impact restriction, and we use a uniform conditional prior
on the identified set to draw from the posterior of the impulse responses, following Moon,
Schorfheide, and Granziera (2013). Using 20000 draws, the posterior distribution of the fore-
cast error variance (FEV) of output accounted for by these identified shocks is computed.19
16The source of the data is NIPA table 1.1.5 and 5.7.6.
17On impact, a fall in inventories is equivalent to a fall in inventory investment, since the impulse response
is from the steady state. The joint restriction on consumption and investment is not restrictive since in the
data, the two series are highly correlated.
18The Schwartz information criterion suggests two lags but our results are not sensitive to the number of
lags.
19Our result to follow is not sensitive to adding more draws.
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1.6.3 Baseline result
Figure 1.8 reports the posterior distribution of the FEV of our identified shocks on output,
for different horizons.20 The posterior has a sharp mode close to zero, and the median is close
to 20 percent in most horizons. In figure 1.9, we plot the set of identified impulse responses.
We see that the median characteristic of our identified shock generates a persistent boom in
consumption and investment, and a moderate boom in output. The fall in inventories is short
lived; on average, inventory investment occurs immediately after the initial disinvestment,
and the stock inventories become positive after 3 quarters. Notice that in our model, this
is also the case when good news is expected to realize in the near future. Therefore, the
average characteristic of our identified shock resembles short-horizon news, with news lasting
for only 1 period.
Our identification strategy only imposes impact restrictions, and therefore we are not
able to distinguish among short and long-horizon news shocks. Since the focus of the news
literature is not on one or two quarter news shocks, but rather on the long horizon, our next
step is to impose restrictions beyond impact.
1.6.4 Extension: Dynamic restriction
An immediate extension from our identification strategy is imposing that inventory in-
vestment falls for two periods whereas consumption and investment increase for two periods.
In doing so, we claim that short-horizon news shocks are excluded from our identification
and hence we will be able to focus on long-horizon news shocks.
To verify this claim, we test our identification strategy by simulated data from an esti-
20As noted above, we plot the case for nonfarm private inventories but the plot is similar with retail trade
inventories as well.
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mated medium-scale DSGE model.21 In particular, we add a standard inventory approach to
an estimated model of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2012), and simulate the impulse responses
for different horizons of news shocks. For each horizon of the news shocks, we test whether
our identification strategy is satisfied or not. We take a probabilistic approach since the
newly introduced parameters related to inventories are not estimated in the model.
In table 1.2, we specify the distribution of the three new parameters. These are δi, the
depreciation rate of inventories, ζ, the elasticity of sales to stock of goods, and φy, the output
adjustment cost. For ζ, specifying a distribution directly on this parameter is difficult since
the value has a theoretical lower bound at
ζ =
1− β(1− δi)
β(1− δi) (θ − 1),
so that the lower bound changes with different draws of δi. Rather than directly forming
a distribution on ζ, we specify a distribution of the transformed parameter τ = (ζ − ζ)/ζ,
which is the steady-state inventory-sales ratio.
In table 1.3, we show the success probability of our identification approach with different
horizons of news shocks.22 For the shocks we consider, our dynamic restriction is successful
in identifying longer horizon news shocks.
21This part may be skipped if the reader finds the claim to be straightforward.
22We focus on the stationary shocks in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2012). We exclude investment specific
shock since with our model has two types of investment, and the meaning of this shock is less clear. For
example, one important change in productivity specific to inventory investment is the introduction of just-
in-time technology, and this will also have affected capital goods.
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1.6.5 Estimation result and discussion
Figure 1.10 reports the posterior distribution of the FEV of our identified shocks on
output, where inventory disinvestment occurs for 2 periods, and at the same time both
consumption and investment are above the steady state for 2 periods. We see that the
posterior has a sharp mode close to zero, and the median is now close to 10 percent in all
horizons, about half smaller than the result with impact restrictions only. To get a sense of
the information that inventories deliver, figure 1.10 also plots the posterior distribution of
the FEV when only consumption and investment are above the steady state for 2 periods. As
we see, without the inventory restriction, the distribution is disperse and the median share
of FEV for the set of shocks that drive positive comovement of consumption and investment
is 30 percent overall. Hence with inventories, the posterior density becomes much tighter,
and the median share of the shock falls by about 67 percent.
Figure 1.11 reports the impulse responses of the identified shock with 2 period restric-
tions. Inventory disinvestment occurs for 2 periods, but after that, there is again investment
in inventories. Consumption and investment increases, but the increase in output is now
modest.
We also extend our dynamic restriction to 3 periods, that is 3 period inventory disin-
vestment and at the same time 3 period increase in consumption and fixed investment. As
in figure 1.12, the median share of FEV explained by the identified shock is now below 5
percent in most horizons, and tight with basically no probability assigned above 20 percent.
Therefore, our news shocks identified with 3 period restrictions at most account for 20 per-
cent of output variations. Figure 1.13 reports the impulse responses of the identified shock
with 3 period restrictions. Although the movement in output is modest, it actually declines
on impact.
We summarize the key points of our empirical results as follows: (i) the identified impulse
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response with impact restrictions suggest that most news shocks are short-lived, with an
immediate investment in inventories after the impact disinvestment; (ii) the identified news
shock based on impact restrictions explain on average 20 percent of output variations in all
horizons; (iii) restrictions beyond impact generate a tighter posterior distribution of output
variations; (iv) long-horizon news shocks explain on average 5 percent, and at most 20
percent of output variations in all horizons.
The reason why FEV turns out small is because inventories are a procyclical variable.
In the data, the unconditional contemporaneous correlation between inventories and sales
(consumption plut investment) is 0.50.23 Since our identification is based on negative co-
movement of these comoving variables, there is a limit to which the contribution of these
shocks would be able to generate a large bulk of business cycles.
1.6.6 Robustness
Since our identifying assumption is only on the sign responses of inventories and compo-
nents of sales, it is robust to changes in specification. However to make sure that our result
does not break down under some conditions, we have nevertheless performed robustness
checks in several dimensions. First, we used different priors for the coefficients such as the
Minnesota prior or the Normal-Wishart prior. Non of these specifications have significant
effects.24 Second, when imposing our dynamic restriction, we also tried to be less restrictive
by not imposing the negative comovement on impact or second period, to control for any
23This is based on HP filtered data but the result is not sensitive to filtering methods.
24Since our focus is mainly on the forecast error variance, it might be more desirable to set a uniform
prior directly on this moment. However, forecast error variance is a highly nonlinear transformation of the
VAR coefficients, hence existing methodologies do not allow us easily solve the inverse problem to back out
the implied prior for the coefficients. As a way to overcome this issue, we are showing our result with and
without the negative comovement assumption to control for the prior.
37
demand effects that may remain in the short run with long-horizon news shocks. The result
is not sensitive to this change since the stock of inventories move in a persistent manner. For
example, by imposing that inventories are below average only at the third period, it mostly
follows that inventories are below average for the first and second period as well. Third, as
we mentioned above, our result is not sensitive to using different types of inventory data.
Fourth, as studied in detail by McCarthy and Zakrajˇsek (2007), inventory dynamics have
changed since the 1980s: while the procyclicality of inventories remains, the volatility of total
inventory investment has fallen, possibly because of improvements in inventory management,
contributing to the fall in output volatility. To address this issue, we take into account the
possibility of different “inventory regimes” in the data by creating two separate samples,
before and after 1984, and conduct our empirical exercise on each of the sub-samples. Our
result is not sensitive to this. This suggests that the cyclical property of inventories and
sales in terms of the sign responses did not change a lot around this period.
1.6.7 Other VAR approaches
Existing methods of identifying news shocks in a VAR setup have typically used data
on productivity (Barsky and Sims, 2011), or combining them also with data on stock price
(Beaudry and Portier, 2006; Beaudry and Lucke, 2010). Our new piece of information could
also be incorporated into these existing approaches. For example, one standard approach
in identifying news shocks is by looking into movements in stock prices orthogonal to any
changes in current productivity. To understand the movements of inventories in this esti-
mation strategy, we ran a 3 variable VAR with utilization-adjusted productivity, S&P 500
index as stock prices, and inventories. We imposed impact zero restriction on productivity,
and saw the dynamics of inventories when stock prices increase, which is consistent with a
boom in consumption and investment (Beaudry and Portier, 2006). In response to a range
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of shocks, we found that the sign of the impact and short-run responses of inventories are
inconclusive.25 This suggests that existing methods are not fully incorporating the informa-
tion inventories provide in response to news shocks.26 This is linked to the fact that existing
literatures provide a wide range of numbers for the contribution to output volatility. For
instance, while Beaudry and Portier (2006), Beaudry and Lucke (2010) all find that news
shocks contribute to 50–60 percent of output variation, a similar approach by Barsky and
Sims (2011) find that news shocks only contribute to 10 percent of output volatility in the
short run (1–4 quarters), and about 40 percent in the long run. Our finding is closer to the
latter approach, although we find that news shocks should explain less than 20 percent of
output volatility even in the long run.
1.7 Estimating the importance of news shocks II: DSGE
approach
In this section, we estimate a structural DSGE model by Bayesian methods to test
whether news shocks are important. The purpose of this section is first, while the agnostic
VAR method uses the necessary inventory information in capturing news shocks, they are
still partial identification strategies. Using additional information based on the structure of
our economy is in principle helpful in identifying news shocks more precisely. Second, our
discussion is so far limited to shocks that are stationary. However, an important component
of news shocks may be nonstationary and the importance of these nonstationary components
are better understood when we directly model them.
25This plot is in the appendix.
26A similar point is made in Arias, Rubio-Ramirez, and Waggoner (2013) with regards to the penalty
function approach in Beaudry, Nam, and Wang (2011). Our information could add to this debate as well.
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With these desirable aspects, it is still important to keep in mind that estimating a
structural DSGE model has its own limitations. Our theoretical analysis did not require us
to take a stand on a specific view of the structure of the economy, since the key prediction
of our theory was robust to several specifications. However, to estimate a DSGE model, we
need to select a specific model to estimate. Hence the results coming out of this section are
subject to higher misspecification issues.
1.7.1 Model specification
The model we estimate in this section is an extended version of Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Uribe (2012) with inventories introduced as in Bils and Kahn (2000). Hence the model
we estimate is similar to that of section 1.2, and details of the model are described in the
appendix. However, there are several differences that are worthwhile to mention here.
First, we allow for two sources of nonstationary shocks in the model which are nonsta-
tionary productivity and nonstationary investment-specific productivity shocks. By allowing
these shocks, we will be able to separately estimate the importance of stationary and non-
stationary news shocks.
Second, we allow for the price markup to change over time. That is, the demand function










where θt are assumed to be AR(1) processes.
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Third, on top of the seven observables used in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2012), we also
use the inventory series described in the previous section as an additional observable.
27For θt, we transform it into the markup µt = θt/(θt − 1) and assume this as an AR(1) process.
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1.7.2 Estimation result
Table 1.4 summaries the variance decomposition of the estimated model. While the
prior median parameter values imply that the contribution of news shocks to account for 37
percent of output variations, we find that with the posterior median values, it reduces to 17
percent. This contrasts the result in a model without inventories where 41 percent of output
variations were accounted for by news shocks (Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2012). Therefore,
when firms are allowed to adjust inventories in the model, news shocks now play a smaller
role. This small contribution of news shocks also holds for fixed investment and inventory
investment. For all these variables, news shocks now account for around 10 percent of total
variations. However, for other variables such as consumption, government spending, and
hours, we still see a large role played by news shocks consistent with Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Uribe (2012).
To sum up, we confirm that less than 20 percent of output variations are accounted for
by news shocks when inventory management is also explicitly structured in the economy.
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the response of inventories to news shocks. We established
conditions on model parameters under which inventories and sales will positively comove
in response to news shocks. We showed that these conditions are violated by standard
calibrations of the classes of models we study, resulting in negative comovement between
inventories and sales. Our analysis highlighted the key mechanism behind this result: news
shocks generate a strong intertemporal substitution motive in production. Moreover, we
showed that this mechanism persists during the “news period”, even after introducing various
frictions analyzed by the news literature, such as variable capacity utilization and adjustment
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costs. Lastly, we used the negative comovement between inventories and sales to identify
news shocks in postwar US data. We find that news shocks play a small role in aggregate
fluctuations, for two reasons: the identified “news period” is short, on average 1 quarter; and
the long-horizon shock contributes less than 20 percent of output variations. The insight
behind this result is that inventories are procyclical at business-cycle frequencies.
Our work suggests two future directions for progress. First, one contribution of our anal-
ysis was to highlight that a key parameter governing the response of inventories to news
shocks is the elasticity of inventories to the discounted growth rate of marginal cost. The
approach we have taken in this paper is to compute the elasticity implied by existing models
of finished-good inventories. An alternative approach is to obtain empirical estimates of this
elasticity, and explore modifications of existing models that may match those estimates. Sec-
ond, we proposed a new way of identifying news shocks, using aggregate data on inventories
and sales. An interesting question is whether our theoretical and empirical results could be
modified if we were to take a more disaggregated view of inventories, with different sectors
having different inventory intensities (Chang, Hornstein, and Sarte, 2009). Theoretically,
news shocks in one particular sector may lead to negative comovement of inventories and
sales in that sector, but this need not be so in the aggregate. Empirically, differences in the
comovement of sales and inventories across sectors, using industry-level data, could be used
to identify these sectoral news shocks. We leave this to future research.
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Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 Subjective discount factor
σ 1 Inverse elasticity of household intertemporal substitution
δk 0.025 Depreciation rate of capital
φ′′(1) 9.11 Investment adjustment costs
ξ 2.5 Frisch elasticity of labor supply
ψ 6.72 Steady-state hours worked 0.2
α 0.67 Labor elasticity of production function
θ 5 Elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods
δi 0.025 Depreciation rate of inventories
ζ 0.25 Steady-state inventory-sales ratio 0.75
ρz 0.99 Persistence of the productivity process
ρψ 0.95 Persistence of the labor wedge process
Table 1.1: Calibration of the stock-elastic demand model.
Parameter Distribution Median 95% 5%
δi Beta 0.01 0.05 0.00
τ(ζ) Gamma 0.7 3 0.05
φy Gamma 3 6 0.60
Table 1.2: Distribution assumed for the inventory parameters. The parameter τ is the steady-state inventory-
sales ratio.
2 period restriction 4Q news 2Q news surprise
productivity 1 1 0
labor wedge 1 1 0
discount factor 1 1 0
spending 1 1 0
3 period restriction 4Q news 2Q news surprise
productivity 1 0 0
labor wedge 1 0 0
discount factor 1 0 0
spending 1 0 0
Table 1.3: Success probability of identifying assumption
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Innovation Y C I N G INV
Prior News Total 37 47 48 39 49 40
Posterior News Total 17 49 10 38 52 14
Stationary Productivity Shock
News 1 0 0 1 0 1
Current 16 3 8 10 0 14
Nonstationary Productivity Shock
News 1 1 0 0 0 0
Current 15 10 6 3 4 7
Stationary Investment-Specific Shock
News 1 1 5 1 0 2
Current 22 4 63 9 0 8
Nonstationary Investment-Specific Shock
News 0 0 0 0 0 0
Current 0 0 1 0 0 0
Government Spending Shock
News 1 0 0 1 51 0
Current 1 0 0 1 44 0
Household Preference Shock
News 4 41 0 6 0 1
Current 3 28 0 5 0 1
Labor Wedge Shock
News 8 6 3 27 0 4
Current 7 5 3 28 0 4
Price Markup Shock
News 1 0 1 0 0 6
Current 18 1 9 7 0 47
Table 1.4: Variance decomposition from estimated model
Notes: All values are rounded and are in percentage terms. Y, C, I, N, G, INV refer to the
growth rates of output, consumption, fixed investment, hours worked, government spending and
inventories, respectively.
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upper bound of κ/ω
Figure 1.1: Value of η as a function of 1− β(1− δi)
Notes: Stock-elastic demand model; Holding fixed all the other structural parameters
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Figure 1.2: Impulse responses to news shocks in the stock-elastic demand model
Notes: Solid line: 4 period news on productivity; dashed line: 4 period news on labor wedge. The
time unit is a quarter. Impulse responses are reported in terms of percent deviation from
steady-state values.
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Figure 1.3: Impulse responses to news shocks in the stock-elastic demand model with variable capacity uti-
lization
Notes: Utilization parameter: δ′′k(1) = 0.34; solid line: 4 period news on productivity; dashed line:
4 period news on labor wedge. The time unit is a quarter. Impulse responses are reported in
terms of percent deviation from steady-state values.
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Figure 1.4: Impulse responses to surprise shocks in the stock-elastic demand model
Notes: Solid line: productivity; dashed line: labor wedge. The time unit is a quarter. Impulse
responses are reported in terms of percent deviation from steady-state values.
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Figure 1.5: Impulse responses to other news shocks in the stock-elastic demand model
Notes: Solid line: 4 period discount factor; dashed line: 4 period government spending. The time
unit is a quarter. Impulse responses are reported in terms of percent deviation from steady-state
values.
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Figure 1.6: Robustness of impulse responses to output adjustment cost
Notes: Impulse responses to 4 period productivity news shock. Solid line: without output
adjustment cost; dashed line: with output adjustment cost. The time unit is a quarter. Impulse
responses are reported in terms of percent deviation from steady-state values.
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Figure 1.7: Value of η as a function of 1− β(1− δi)
Notes: Stockout-avoidance model. Holding fixed all the other structural parameters. For
comparison, η for the stock-elastic demand model, same as figure 1.1, is also plotted.
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Figure 1.8: Output variation accounted for by identified shocks with impact restriction
Notes: Posterior probability density and the median (vertical line) for the share of forecast error




































Figure 1.9: Impulse responses of identified shock with impact restriction
Notes: Median (solid line) and 80% credible set
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Figure 1.10: Output variation accounted for by identified shocks with 2 period restriction
Notes: Posterior probability density and the median (vertical line) for the share of forecast error
variance at each horizon. Solid line: 2 period negative comovement between ∆invt and (ct, it).

































Figure 1.11: Impulse responses of identified shock with 2 period restriction
Notes: Median (solid line) and 80% credible set
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Figure 1.12: Output variation accounted for by identified shocks with 3 period restriction
Notes: Posterior probability density and the median (vertical line) for the share of forecast error
variance at each horizon. Solid line: 3 period negative comovement between ∆invt and (ct, it).



































Figure 1.13: Impulse responses of identified shock with 3 period restriction
Notes: Median (solid line) and 80% credible set
Chapter 2
The Role of Durables Replacement




Standard models of business cycles and monetary policy abstract from durables and
assume that agents consume only nondurables and services.1 While there have been many
attempts to introduce durables in these models, none of them included an active second-hand
market where used durables can be sold. The models assume that used-durable transactions
play no value-added role in the market and in equilibrium, households consume their durables
until they fully depreciate.2
This paper introduces a new model for durable consumption with an active second-
hand market, and shows that this feature significantly enhances the model to fit the data
on new-durable purchases. Section 2.2 starts by documenting statistics for used durables,
focussing on car sales data which is the largest and the most cyclical component of durable
purchases. Used-durable purchases are a high portion of durable spending in the U.S. data.
For example, about half of the size of new-durable purchases are net purchases of used
durables in this category. Moreover, they are cyclical and highly volatile compared to both
nondurable and durable consumption expenditures. In response to a 25 basis point increase
in the interest rate, used car sales fall by 0.4 percent, compared to only 0.1 percent for
nondurables. Finally, used car sales are quite procyclical, despite the general presumption
that second-hand purchases rise during recessions.3
Based on these observations, sections 2.3 and 2.4 embed household resale of used durables
and second-hand markets in an otherwise standard business-cycle model of durables as in
1Woodford (2003) gives a thorough analysis of these type of models.
2Parker (2001) and Caplin and Leahy (2006) are exceptions since they consider durables replacement,
but the models are partial equilibrium and the replaced goods are assumed to be scrapped.
3“In tough times, auto-parts firms receive a countercyclical boost - Scrapped consumers buy used or fix
the old.” Wall Street Journal, Feb 20, 2009.
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Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007, BHK henceforth). On the household side, the model
connects to the old idea of “discretionary replacement demand” for durables which has been
claimed as a better empirical fit over the traditional stock-adjustment model (Westin, 1975;
Smith, 1974). On the firm side, the model generalizes the “Coase conjecture” by deriving a
negative relation between markup and durability.
Section 2.5 highlights some of the key features that the model predicts: time-varying
markups, negative relation between markups and durability, and the price-elasticity effect
of cyclical replacement.
Sections 2.6 and 2.7 show that these features provide answers to two long-standing ques-
tions with regards to durables in business cycles. First, BHK point out that with relatively
flexible prices in the durable sector, a standard new Keynesian model with durables does not
generate comovement of durable and nondurable consumption expenditures with regards to
a monetary shock. Second, Baxter (1996) notes that a standard business-cycle model with
durables does not generate the high volatility of durable spending that we observe in the
data.
In my model, cyclical replacement is the key channel. Replacements are procyclical due
to a positive wealth effect and replacing durables provides future utility benefit to house-
holds. Since procyclical replacement results in higher second-hand market transactions dur-
ing booms, there is higher competition in the market for durable production. Hence desired
markups for durables are countercyclical, resolving the comovement puzzle. Moreover, pro-
cyclical replacement amplifies the volatility of durable spending.
Transactions in the second-hand market have expanded over time. Applying my model
to the Great Moderation, I show that the expansion of the second-hand market would lead
to a decline in the persistence of durable spending, which is consistent with Ramey and Vine
(2006).
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The other prediction of my model is the negative relation between price markups and
durability. In section 2.8, I test the validity of this prediction by conducting an industry-level
empirical exercise using the NBER manufacturing productivity database. The data do not
reject the prediction of my model. Lastly, section 2.9 concludes.
That durability opens up households’ dynamic considerations and affects firms’ behavior
in the presence of second-hand markets have been at the heart of the industrial organization
literature. Hendel and Nevo (2006) explain the observed high elasticity of storable goods to
temporary sales as evidence of consumers holding inventories. Schiraldi (2011) studies the
consumer behavior of automobile replacement and show that transaction costs play a key
role. For durable goods firms in the presence of second-hand markets, Swan (1980) analyzes
the 1945 Alcoa case.More recently, Esteban and Shum (2007) analyze firm behavior in a
used car market.
In the macroeconomic literature, however, second-hand markets have been mostly ignored
since they were claimed to not affect the general equilibrium when all agents are identical.4
My model shows that this is only true when second-hand markets are assumed to have no
value-added role when used goods are sold back to households, implying a zero margin for
dealers. To the contrary, the data supports that this margin is not only high in levels, but
also cyclical and highly volatile in its movements.
Parker (2001) is closest to my motivation where he studies the case when sellers have
market power and buyers can time their purchases subject to search costs. This leads him to
generate countercyclical markups with regards to demand-driven movements in sales. Besides
being a partial equilibrium model, the economy is limited in two dimensions: consumers
are not allowed to purchase nondurables and importantly, consumers cannot re-sell their
4Although specific to his model, Bernanke (1983) notes the following: Second-hand markets are important
only if beliefs or preferences are so heterogeneous that there is no agreement on what constitutes good or bad
news for a particular investment.
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used goods and must discard them when they make a replacement. My model is a general
equilibrium allowing for consumer behavior along these dimensions.
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006) suggest an alternative solution to the comovement puzzle
by assuming equal wage stickiness in both sectors.5 Although being a plausible channel, the
sectoral symmetry of wage rigidities is not well established in the literature. For example,
a recent survey by Klenow and Malin (2011) explain that wage and price adjustments are
likely to be synchronized, citing survey evidence showing a correlation between wage and
price flexibility. Hence without further empirical evidence on the degree of wage stickiness
in the two sectors, this story remains debatable. Moreover, due to price flexibility in the
durables sector, their model predicts a countercyclical response of real wages, which contrasts
the mildly procyclical response documented in empirical studies.6
2.2 Some facts on used durables
This section documents business-cycle facts on the movements in the second-hand market
for durables. Given its large second-hand market, I will focus on the motor vehicle industry.
2.2.1 Used durable transactions are large
Time series for motor vehicle consumption are taken from the quarterly personal con-
sumption expenditure (PCE) data in NIPA (Table 7.2.4B. and 7.2.5B.). Within PCE,
5Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006) also have a section with credit constraints to solve the puzzle, but argue
that wage stickiness is a more plausible resolution. Monacelli (2009) addresses the comovement puzzle by
adding credit-constrained households into the model and making these households borrow from the patient
savers. However, Sterk (2010) points out that Monacelli (2009)’s result is not robust to the degree of the price
flexibility in the durable sector. In some cases, Monacelli (2009) might actually exacerbate the comovement
puzzle compared to the model without credit frictions.
6See p.220 of Woodford (2003) for the empirical response of real wages as well as other references.
62
durable spending consists of 4 categories: Motor vehicles and parts; Furnishing and durable
household equipment; Recreational goods and vehicles; Other durables.7 The category ‘Mo-
tor vehicles and parts’ is historically the largest component of durable spending, consisting
of 40%, followed by furnishing (26%), recreational goods (23%), and the others (12%).
‘Motor vehicles and parts’ consists of three subcategories: New vehicles; Net purchases
of used vehicles; Motor vehicle parts and accessories. Net purchases of used vehicles consist
of both dealers’ margin and net transactions from business and government to households.
Figure 2.1 compares the composition of new and net used motor purchases relative to the
overall durable spending. We observe that net used vehicle purchases are large. Since 1990,
net used motor purchases are on average 11 percent of durable spending, while new motor
purchases are 22 percent.8
Looking into the actual number of sales of new and used vehicles, the high level of second-
hand transactions is even more apparent. Figure 2.2 plots the annual sales of new and used
passenger vehicles from 1990 to 2010.9 Transactions are much higher in the second-hand
market compared to new vehicle sales.10
2.2.2 Replacement is procyclical
Many observed purchases of consumer durables are motivated by the replacement of
used goods. Based on the Survey of Consumer Finances, Aizcorbe, Starr, and Hickman
7Other durables includes 5 components: Jewelry and watches; Therapeutic appliances and equipment;
Educational books; Luggage and similar personal items; Telephone and facsimile equipments.
8Net purchases of used goods besides motor vehicles are not separately available in the PCE category,
since they are combined together with new goods.
9This data is taken from the National Transportation Statistics 2011, issued by the Department of
Transportation.
10Transactions of used vehicle sales include sales from franchised dealers, independent dealers, and casual
sales. In 2011, the shares of each category are 35.5%, 35.5%, and 29%, respectively.
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(2003) argue that most of the demand for motor vehicles comes from replacement demand.11
Marketing studies also show that for many other consumer durables, the observed sales are
mostly due to replacement purchases. Bayus (1988) presents evidence that replacement
sales of refrigerators and washers are 88% and 78% respectively in the 1980s, and other
items also show high levels of replacement. He further shows statistical results to claim that
replacements are discretionary and not merely forced by product failure.
The recognition that postponable replacement of consumer durables might be an im-
portant source of business-cycle fluctuations goes back to the Great Depression (George
(1939); Tippetts (1939)). However, there are limited studies in measuring the cyclicality of
replacements. The most relevant is Greenspan and Cohen (1999) where they study the cycli-
cal scrappage of automobiles. Netting out the physical or “built-in” scrappage of vehicles,
Greenspan and Cohen (1999) construct a measure of cyclical scrappage and show that this
measure is procyclical.
Although scrappage is one measure of replacement, cautions must be taken on it as
well. Households need not scrap their vehicles when making a replacement, in particular if
their automobile is relatively new and in good shape. They can rather sell the vehicle to a
used auto dealer. At the same time, Aizcorbe, Starr, and Hickman (2003) argue that when
vehicle replacements occur, more than half of the new purchases are used cars.12 Hence the
cyclicality of replacement could also be measured by transaction activities in the second-hand
market. In the next two sections, I check whether movements in the second-hand market
are also procyclical, unconditionally and conditional on a monetary shock.
11They show that the share of households owning or leasing vehicles are 89 percent between 1989 and
2001, and that the average number of vehicles per household remained below 2 during this period.
12Even amongst the top 25 household income percentile, they show that the share of used car purchases
is above 40 percent.
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2.2.3 Used durables are procyclical and volatile
It is well recognized that the spending of durables is procyclical and highly volatile. Here
I show that movements in the second-hand market for vehicles are procyclical and volatile
as well.
Using the quarterly PCE and GDP data from NIPA, I HP-filter the series and provide
business-cycle facts in table 2.1. The first column shows the share of each variable, and
the second column provides the correlation with output as a measure of cyclicality. The
third and fourth columns are the standard deviation relative to output and the first order
autocorrelation, respectively.
We confirm here that motor vehicles are highly volatile compared to overall durable
spending. Importantly, net purchases of used motor vehicles are also highly volatile compared
to overall durables. Focusing on its correlation with output, we observe that net purchases
of used vehicles are also procyclical. Hence the notion that used vehicle sales are high during
recessions does not hold in an absolute sense.
Within net purchases of used vehicles, the margin of used autos reflects more closely the
value-added component of second-hand market transactions.13 The business-cycle features
also remain for each type of margins. Margins for used vehicle transactions from household
to business and business to households are both procyclical and highly volatile.
2.2.4 Used durables decline with a contractionary monetary shock
To understand the conditional response of durables and motor vehicles to a monetary
policy shock, I estimate a 5 variable VAR analysis for the period 1967Q1-2007Q4.14 The
13Due to data availability, I neglect the margin related to government. Since government purchases of
motor vehicles are on average only 4 percent of the total motor vehicle sales, this will not affect the analysis.
14The most recent recession is excluded since monetary policy has been unconventional during this period.
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sectoral variables are decomposed from PCE, which include the logarithms of new motor,
net purchases of used motor, durables net of motor, and lastly nondurables and services.15
To identify monetary policy shocks, I include the level of the end-of-quarter federal funds
rate. VAR analysis is conducted with 4 lags and a constant, and monetary policy shocks are
identified with a standard Cholesky decomposition.
The result is depicted in figure 2.3. With respect to a 25 basis-point innovation to the fed-
eral funds rate, we observe that all the sectoral consumption variables contract. New motor
is the most sensitive, exhibiting a contraction twice as large compared to other components
of durables and ten times large compared to nondurables and services. Moreover, new motor
exhibits lower persistence relative to the other variables, since within 20 quarters it quickly
returns back to trend. Importantly, net purchases of used motor also show a cyclical pattern
that is similar to the other components of durables. Hence there seems to be less aggregate
evidence that the high sensitivity of new motor purchases is due to the increasing demand
for used motors during a bust. On the other hand, a monetary contraction implies both a
reduction in new motor and net purchases of used motor.16
2.3 Model: Consumers
This section extends a standard new Keynesian model with durables as in BHK by intro-
ducing household resale of used durables that is capable of reproducing the above business-
cycle facts on second-hand market transactions.
15‘Durables net of motor’ and ‘Nondurables and services’ are constructed by the Tornqvist method.
16The qualitative results remain when using auto margins instead of net purchases of used motor as the
variable for used car transactions. For robustness, I have also conducted analysis with different lags, different












Bt ≤ Bt−1 +WtHt +RKt K + Φt, (2.2)
Nt ≡ Pd,tDNt − Pu,tst(1− δt−1)Dt−1 + ADJt, (2.3)
Dt = (1− st)(1− δt−1)Dt−1 +DNt , (2.4)
and also a borrowing limit, taking as given the processes {Pc,t, Pd,t, Pu,t, Rt,Wt, RKt ,Φt}, and
initial values B−1, D−1, DN−1.
Households derive utility from consuming nondurables (Ct) and a service flow propor-
tional to the stock of durables (Dt), and disutility from hours worked (Ht). Hence the
period utility function U is strictly increasing in the first and second arguments, and strictly
decreasing in the third argument. It is also twice continuously differentiable and strictly
concave. Et is an expectations operator conditional on information available at time t, and
β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor.
Equation (2.2) shows the household budget constraint. Income for households consists
of maturing one-period nominal bonds Bt−1, labor income WtHt, rental payment of capital
RKt K where capital is assumed to be fixed as in a standard new Keynesian model, and
lump-sum nominal profits from firms Φt. Households purchase consumption goods Pc,tCt
and durable goods net of resales Nt. Asset markets are complete so households can buy
one-period nominal risk-free bonds Bt at a discounted price 1/Rt per unit.
The main focus of this paper is equation (2.3) which indicates net purchases of durable




income from selling a fraction st of the undepreciated used durable goods (1 − δt−1)Dt−1
at a price Pu,t. I allow the depreciation rate δt−1 to be time-varying. There is also a
convex adjustment cost of reselling used goods ADJt. Contrary to standard models where
households mechanically run down all their durable goods (Dt) once they make a purchase,
in this model they are allowed to resell a portion of their undepreciated used durable stock
every period. I call st the replacement rate of used durable goods. When st = 0, households
do not replace any of their durables which is equivalent to the set-up in BHK.
The durable stock accumulation equation (2.4) also reflects the fact that some portion
of the stock is being replaced. Durable stock evolves as the sum of the unreplaced durable
stock (1− st)(1− δt−1)Dt−1 and the purchase of new durable goods DNt .
Finally, nondurable consumption Ct and purchases of new durables D
N
t are CES aggre-



















The assumption that households purchase and resell the bundled durable good is not crucial.
I could assume alternatively that households purchase and resell each variety of the durable
good. However, in that case, I assume that the replacement margin is identical for all
varieties. The focus of this paper is on the cyclical properties of replacement rates, and
allowing for heterogeneous replacement rates across durable varieties will be an interesting
extension although not explored in this paper.
The two major departures from the standard model of durables are the non-constant
depreciation schedule and adjustment costs for replacement. I discuss these separately in
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the following sections.
2.3.2 Replacement adjustment cost
Adjustment costs for durable replacement enters the budget constraint. This cost cap-
tures the transaction cost of resales for used durables following the spirit of Stolyarov (2002).










In this form, ξ governs the quantitative degree of durable replacement. With ξ = 0, the
model is assumed to have no adjustment cost of resales.
By adding adjustment costs of this form, I nest the case without replacement dynamics
by setting ξ at infinity. In this case replacements occur at the steady state, but they are
constant over time.
2.3.3 Depreciation acceleration and replacement
I assume that the depreciation rate of a durable good depends on its vintage. New goods
and used goods follow different depreciation schedules. This implies that the effective (or
average) depreciation rate of the overall durable stock is not constant and depends on the
average vintage. The effective depreciation rate at time t is denoted as δefft−1 and is a function
of all the previous history of replacement and new durable purchases:
δefft−1 ≡ δ(st−1,DNt−1;D−1), (2.7)
where st−1 = {st−1, st−2, · · · , s0}, DNt−1 = {DNt−1, DNt−2, · · · , DN0 }.
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Importantly, the non-constant effective depreciation function is not an assumption but an
equilibrium result due to different depreciation rates for vintages and endogenous replace-
ment rates in the model.
For further analysis, I work with a quasi-geometric depreciation acceleration assumption
studied extensively in Hassler et al. (2008).17 Following their argument, assume that new
durables depreciate at a rate ρδd where ρ < 1. After one-period usage, the new durable is




t , and Dt as
the new, used, and total durables respectively, the following law of motion holds:






By netting out DUt , we can summarize the law of motion as the following stock accumulation
function for durables:
Dt = (1− st)(1− δefft−1)Dt−1 +DNt , (2.8)




17See Hassler et al. (2008) for their references on empirical evidence of depreciation acceleration. The
biggest problem of geometric depreciation for capital is that it implies a rapid decline in productive capacity
at the beginning. Penson, Hughes, and Nelson (1977) argue that this is not the case and rather shows that
depreciation is concave at the beginning. For automobiles in particular, see figure 2 of Greenspan and Cohen
(1999) where they plot the aggregate stock of automobiles for each vintage. A very small reduction in stock
is observed for the first several years, while in the later years the reduction in stock resembles a geometric
depreciation assumption. If law of large numbers holds for aggregate scrappage and idiosyncratic depreciation
of vehicles, then this shows that for automobiles a quasi-geometric depreciation rate is reasonable. On the
other hand, Hassler et al. (2008) discuss that measuring depreciation based on price data is problematic
since prices for used products reflect information as well as technology issues. These results tend to conclude
that the highest depreciation occurs at the beginning, since prices fall immediately as soon as the durable
good become used.
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We verify that the effective depreciation rate δefft−1 is a function of all previous histories of
st and D
N
t , by plugging in the previous history of Dt recursively. For example, plugging in
Dt−1 renders the following expression:
δefft−1 = δd −
δd(1− ρ)DNt−1
(1− st−1)[(1− δd)Dt−2 + δd(1− ρ)DNt−2] +DNt−1
.
By mathematical induction, the depreciation rate depends on all the lagged values of st and
DNt , which confirms (2.7). Moreover, it is easy to verify from the above expression that





With quasi-geometric depreciation rates, the benefit of replacing used durables by new
durables is defined as the lower depreciation of the aggregated durable stock that the house-
holds face in the future. This assumption makes it meaningful to introduce the replacement of
durable stocks within a representative-agent framework. By replacing 1 unit of used durable
with a new one, households maintain the same stock today, but obtain higher benefit tomor-
row captured by the lower depreciation rate. This gain in utility by replacement decisions is
distinguished from that of new purchases since new purchases also increase today’s utility.
2.3.4 Link to discretionary replacement demand
The model of replacement demand above is related to the literature on discretionary
replacement demand. In the traditional stock-adjustment model with constant depreciation
δ, demand for durables (DNt ) is written as follows:
DNt = (Dt −Dt−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
stock adjustment




Normal replacement demand is the demand for durables that makes up for the physical
depreciation of used durables, while the stock adjustment term accounts for the net addition
to stock. This equation is estimated by assuming the existence of some desired stock D∗t
and partial adjustment towards the desired stock. Hence, in any given period, the stock-
adjustment term is assumed as
Dt −Dt−1 = k(D∗t −Dt−1), (2.10)
where k ∈ [0, 1] is the parameter governing the partial adjustment towards it. The desired
stock is typically assumed as a function of current income and prices of durables.
Equation (2.4) can also be expressed in this form:
DNt = (Dt −Dt−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
stock adjustment
+ δefft−1Dt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
normal replacement demand
+ st(1− δefft−1)Dt−1.︸ ︷︷ ︸
discretionary replacement demand
(2.11)
Under the standard case of no replacements (st = 0) my model nests the stock-adjustment
framework. However, with depreciation acceleration and positive replacements (st > 0),
there is also an additional term on the right hand side which represents discretionary re-
placement demand.
This extra term distinguishes the discretionary replacement demand model from the
stock-adjustment framework. Using passenger car sales data, Westin (1975) shows that esti-
mating (2.9) with additional discretionary terms (e.g. change in unemployment rate) on the
right hand side fits better than the stock-adjustment model. Moreover, the contemporaneous
terms included have a positive sign, whereas the lagged terms have a negative sign.
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) discuss that this last property is the essential feature of the
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discretionary replacement model.18 In detail, the model explicitly considers the case when
durable replacement is postponed or advanced due to economic conditions. For example,
when there is an economic boom, the estimated result forecasts that beyond the pure demand
for new durables and normal replacement, consumers also advance their replacement of used
durables. The model also predicts that the advancement of replacement leads to a depressing
effect on the purchase of durables in the near future.19
Equation (2.11) has the same property as in Westin (1975) when the stock-adjustment
term (2.10) is plugged in. In particular, when D∗t is exogenous, a pure change in the re-
placement demand st that does not change the overall durable stock (∆Dt = 0) leads to an
increase in durable purchases today, but a decrease in the demand for durables in the next
period.20 The important implication of discretionary replacement demand is that it lowers
the persistence of durable spending. This feature will be further explored in section 2.7.
2.3.5 Optimal consumer behavior
Solving for the household optimization problem with quasi-geometric depreciation, we ob-
tain equilibrium conditions for the processes {Ct, Ht, Bt, Dt, DNt , st} and a transversality con-
dition for bonds. The full optimality conditions are standard and provided in the appendix.
Here I focus on the following three optimal choice of durables (stock/spending/replacement).
18A detailed discussion of the comparison between the stock adjustment model and the discretionary
replacement model is found in Westin (1975), Smith (1974), and Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).
19This aspect also connects to Mian and Sufi (2010)’s recent findings where they show that the “cash-for-





= (1− δt−1)Dt−1 > 0,
∂DNt+1
∂st




Denoting the shadow value of the durable stock as νt and the marginal utility of durables
and nondurables as Ud(t) and Uc(t) respectively, the first condition comes from the optimal
choice of durable stock:





st+1 + νt+1(1− st+1)
]
. (2.12)
This condition states that the value of the durable stock is the combination of both the
current marginal utility derived from the durable stock, and the expected future gain from
the undepreciated durable stock. In turn, the expected future gain from the undepreciated
durable stock consists of two parts: the market value of reselling the fraction st of the durable
stock at a price Pu,t+1, and the future shadow value of the durable stock that is not replaced.
The second condition comes from combining the optimal choice of new durable purchases
with the hours choice:
−Uh(t)Pd,t
Wt





st+1 + νt+1(1− st+1)
]
. (2.13)
The left hand side is the utility cost of purchasing an additional new durable by working an
additional hour. The right hand side is the value of purchasing a new durable, which consists
of two terms. The first term is the shadow value of the durable stock. By purchasing a new
durable, there is an increase in the overall stock of durables and this benefits the household by
the shadow value discussed above. The second term states the additional gain of purchasing
a new durable good due to its low depreciation rate. Note that in a standard model with
geometric depreciation, ρ = 1 and this term does not exist.
The third condition comes from the optimal choice of replacement rates. For simplicity
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In this condition, households set their replacement rate to equate the gain of reselling the
good on the left hand side and the cost of giving up their durable stock on the right hand
side.
Using these conditions, we can derive the following two equilibrium pricing dynamics of




+ (1− ρδd)EtΛt,t+1Pu,t+1, (2.15)
Pu,t = Pd,t − δd(1− ρ)EtΛt,t+1Pu,t+1. (2.16)
The nominal stochastic discount factor is Λt,t+1 = βUc(t+ 1)Pc,t/Uc(t)Pc,t+1.
Equation (2.15) shows the equilibrium pricing for new durable goods (Pd,t). The gain of
purchasing a new durable good is the current marginal utility of durable consumption relative
to nondurable consumption plus the future discounted price of this good net of depreciation.
Note that depreciation is low for the new durable good. However, the good becomes used in
the future, therefore the market valuation of this good is the used goods price Pu,t.
Equation (2.16) describes the resale price of a used durable good as the price of the new
durable good discounted by tomorrow’s benefit of the new durable good in terms of reducing
the overall depreciation. If the degree of depreciation acceleration is high (when ρ is close
to 0), then households are more willing to replace their used durables which drives its price
down relative to new durables. In the case of a constant depreciation (ρ = 1), I nest the
standard model where the selling and buying price are equalized (Pu,t = Pd,t).
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The underlying mechanism that generates optimal behavior for replacements can be easily
seen by a perturbation argument. Suppose that the household sell 1 unit of used durable
and replace it with 1 unit of new durable. Without convex adjustment costs, the cost of
this transaction is Pd,t − Pu,t > 0. There is no current benefit in this transaction since this
is a pure replacement (∆Ud(t) = 0). However, there is a future benefit of this transaction
since the depreciation of the durable stock becomes lower (∆Ud(t+1) > 0). Forward-looking
agents optimally balance the cost and benefit of replacing their durables.
2.4 Model: Firms
I move on to a detailed description of the supply side. It consists of two sectors: non-
durable goods sector and durable goods sector. The durable goods sector consists of new
goods producing sector and a second-hand sector.
2.4.1 Nondurables
The intermediate nondurable sector is monopolistically competitive with a linearly-homogeneous
production technology and facing the CES demand, derived from the consumer problem:







For each firm i, F (k, l) is the production function with capital k and labor l. c¯ is their
production level and C¯ is the aggregate demand for nondurables. Z is the productivity level
that is common across all firms.
The nondurable sector is mostly standard and many aspects are symmetric to the durable
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θc − 1 ,
where p∗c(i), mc
n
c are the price and nominal marginal cost of the nondurable sector, respec-
tively. Note that the markup is constant and falls with the elasticity of substitution θc.
There is also a competitive retail sector that bundles the good by the CES aggregator
with elasticity of substitution θc and sells it to the household. With Calvo sticky prices, the
new Keynesian Phillips curve is




where pic,t ≡ Pc,t/Pc,t−1 is the gross rate of inflation from period t − 1 to t, α is the price
stickiness parameter for nondurables, and mcc,t is the real marginal cost for nondurables.
Hatted variables represent log deviations from the noninflationary steady state.
2.4.2 Durables: New goods
The durable goods production sector is composed of new goods producing firms and a
second-hand sector. I start with the new goods producing firms.
The production function of each variety in the new durable good sector is symmetric to
that of the nondurables sector:
xt(i) = ZtF (kd,t(i), hd,t(i)).
Since the production function exhibits CRS with perfectly competitive factor markets, the
firm’s total cost of production is linear in the level of production. Hence the period-t nominal
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profit of each firm i, Φd,t(i), is the following:
Φd,t(i) = [pd,t(i)−mcnd,t]xt(i),
where mcnd,t is the common nominal marginal cost of all new durable producing firms.
Firms set prices and production subject to a demand function. The two key assumptions
I impose are that firms are not able to control the second-hand market and that firms are
not able to credibly commit to its future production. This leads to a static demand function
that depends also on its interaction with the second-hand market, which I now discuss.
2.4.3 Durables: Second-hand
The second-hand sector engages in three activities: purchasing used durables from house-
holds; refurbishing the used durable into a new one; selling back the used durable varieties. I
assume that the second-hand sector consists of second-hand firms and second-hand retailers,
where the former engage in the first two activities, and the latter the last one.
Second-hand firms
Second-hand firms purchase used goods from households and refurbish them to sell to
second-hand retailers. In detail, second-hand firms purchase the composite used durable Mt
from households at a price Pu,t per unit. They refurbish this good and sell it back to the
retailer at a price Pm,t. The overall process of purchasing and refurbishing the used durables
bears service activities f(Mt), which costs Pc,t per unit.
21 Therefore, a second-hand firm’s
21These service activities may represent not only the search and marketing activities that the dealer has
to provide in purchasing the used durable, but also the cost of refurbishing the goods.
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nominal profit Φu,t is:
Φu,t = Pm,tMt − Pu,tMt − Pc,tf(Mt). (2.19)
Each firm chooses Mt that maximizes its profit. Besides taking Pc,t as given, a firm also takes
Pm,t as given under a perfectly competitive output market. The equilibrium purchasing price
is determined as:
Pu,t = Pm,t − Pc,tf ′(Mt)− ∂Pu,t
∂Mt
Mt.
For further analysis, it is convenient to assume a functional form for f(·). I assume that
f(Mt) = Mt. Under this assumption,  summarizes the value-added role of a second-hand
firm in refurbishing its used durable. If  is high, a second-hand firm is required to consume
a large amount of resources to refurbish its purchased used durable. I call this parameter
the value-added parameter.
The determination of Pu,t depends on the market structure for purchasing used durables.
To be robust, I assume two extreme market structures. First, second-hand firms might be
perfectly competitive in purchasing used durables. In this case, they take Pu,t as given by
assuming ∂Pu,t/∂Mt = 0.
Second, each second-hand firm might have monopsony power in purchasing used durables.
With monopsony power, each firm recognizes that its choice of Mt will also change Pu,t.
22 In
the appendix I show that when the market structure for purchasing used durables exhibits
monopsony, a well-defined supply function for used durables is derived by combining the
durable accumulation function with the two household equilibrium conditions for durable
22I assume that each firm is randomly assigned to a partition of households when making purchase but
perfectly competitive when selling their refurbished goods into the retail market.
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purchases and resales. This supply function is shown to be well-behaved in the sense that
its slope is strictly positive under a general class of utility functions for durables.
Proposition 2.1 summarizes the pricing of used durables Pu,t under the two different
market structures assumed.
Proposition 2.1 (Equilibrium purchasing price of used durables). A second-hand firm
chooses Mt to maximize (2.19), taking as given Pm,t and Pc,t, and with f(Mt) = Mt. If
the market for purchasing used durables is competitive, then the equilibrium purchasing price
Pu,t is
Pu,t = Pm,t − Pc,t.
On the other hand, if the second-hand firm holds monopsony power in the purchasing market
by internalizing (2.8), (2.15), and (2.16), then the equilibrium purchasing price is
Pu,t = Pm,t − Pc,tm,t,
where m,t = − δd(1−ρ)1−ρδd
Udd(Ct,Dt)
Uc(Ct,Dt)
Mt. Note that m,t > .
The term (Pm,t − Pu,t)/Pc,t is the difference between the selling and purchasing price
of used durables in units of nondurable goods. I call this the real margin for second-hand
firms. When the market is perfectly competitive, the real margin equates the value-added
parameter . In other words, all the real margin of the second-hand firm is coming from
their value-added role in refurbishing the good. On the other hand, if the market exhibits
monopsony, the real margin m,t is stricty larger than the value-added parameter. Hence














Unbundled varieties {mt(i)}i∈[0,1] are provided back into the market. Retailers are perfectly
competitive in both the input and output markets, with free entry. Hence they take the
buying price Pm,t and selling prices {pd,t(i)}i∈[0,1] as given. The nominal profit of the second-





However, retailers are assumed to make entry decisions before observing the realized
selling prices {pd,t(i)}i∈[0,1]. Therefore, they base their decision on their expectations for
selling prices {Epd,t(i)}i∈[0,1]. Retailers enter if expected profits are nonnegative:
∫ 1
0
Epd,t(i)mt(i)di− Pm,tMt ≥ 0.
Given perfect competition with free entry, retailers that enter are expected to earn zero profit








2.4.4 Durables: Market structure










However, durables of each variety are supplied into the market both by the new firms,
and by the second-hand market. Incorporating the market structure in a price leadership
model, I assume that the market for each variety consists of a dominant leader (the new
durable producing firm) who sets prices, and a price-taking competitive fringe (second-hand
retailers), as in Judd and Petersen (1986). The timing of decisions at each period is as
follows:
1. Second-hand retailers observe the purchasing price Pm,t of the bundled good and de-
cide whether to enter or not, based on their expectations of the unbundled prices
{Epd,t(i)}i∈[0,1].
2. Each new durable producing firm i sets the price of its variety pd,t(i), taking into
account both the direct effect on the total demand function, and the indirect effect on
the response from the price-taking second-hand retailers who entered the market.
3. The entrant retailers observe the price that the leader sets and choose the supply of
the unbundled goods, given their pre-purchased bundled good when they entered the
market.
The subgame perfect equilibrium can be solved by backward induction.
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Retailer problem after entry
Solving backwards, assume that a price-taking representative retailer after entry holds
Mt of the bundle and sells each unbundled variety {mt(i)}i∈[0,1] at its respective price. As
far as the prices are positive, the retailer will always provide its maximum quantity for each
variety. Hence the supply for each variety is price-inelastic at a quantity {mt(i)}i∈[0,1], the
maximum capacity it holds after entry.
New durable producing firm
Since new durable producing firm of variety i recognizes that price-taking retailers will
always provide mt(i) into the market at the last stage, the demand function it recognizes is









It is worthwhile to mention that the new durable producing firm cannot credibly signal its
price when a second-hand retailer makes its entry decision. If it could, the new durable
producing firm would try to signal a lower price to drive the retailer out of the market.
However, if no retailer enters the market, then the firm will now raise its price up to the
monopoly level. Because the retailer recognizes this, the signal is not credible and the firm
is not able to deter entry.
Retailer entry problem
At the first stage, the retailer understands the price that each leading firm will set by
backward induction. Therefore, Epd,t(i) = pd,t(i) for all i ∈ [0, 1], and the equilibrium price
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Since the retailer realize that they will earn zero profit after entry, they enter the market.
We verify that the entry equilibrium is subgame perfect and the retailer enters the market
by purchasing Mt from the second-hand refurbishing firms.
2.4.5 Closing the model
Monetary policy is represented by a simple feedback rule
Rˆt = τpi[scpˆic,t + (1− sc)pˆid,t] + eRt ,
where sc is the steady state share of nondurables out of total output. The policy shock e
R
t
is assumed to be i.i.d. Goods markets clear for all i:
c¯t(i) ≡ ct(i) + Mt = ZtF (kc,t(i), hc,t(i)),
xt(i) = ZtF (kd,t(i), hd,t(i)).
As discussed, the nondurable goods also incorporate service activity of the dealers in the
second-hand market. Both labor and capital markets are mobile across sectors:







kj,t(i)di, j ∈ {c, d}.
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Bond market clears which induces zero bonds in equilibrium (Bt = 0). Second-hand market
also clears:
Mt = st[(1− δd)Dt−1 + δd(1− ρ)DNt−1].
Lastly, common technology follows an AR(1) process:
lnZt = ρZ lnZt−1 + eZt , e
Z
t ∼ i.i.d.
2.5 Durable sector pricing with second-hand markets
Prices are known to be frequently adjusted in the durable sector.23 Consistent with
this evidence, I assume that durable prices are flexibly priced and solve the new durable
producing firm’s problem.
2.5.1 The desired durable markup
Under flexible prices, optimal price setting of the new durable producing firm i is the












23For empirical evidence, see Bils and Klenow (2004), Nakamura and Steinsson (2008, 2010), Klenow and
Malin (2011).
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By the market clearing condition for the second-hand, mt(i) has the following functional
form:
mt(i) = st[(1− δd)dUt−1(i) + (1− ρδd)dNt−1(i)], (2.23)
where dUt−1(i) denotes the stock of used durable of variety i at period t− 1.
The demand function for new durable goods (2.22) consists of two parts: the first term
related to the relative price elasticity of the variety and the second term that is price-inelastic.



















From this equation, we observe that the usual relation between the elasticity of substitution
and markup no longer holds even under flexible prices due to the existence of durable stocks
of its own and the inability to commit to future production or prices. Rearranging under a











Hence, we now have time-varying markups under flexible prices.
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2.5.2 The Coase conjecture
At a symmetric steady state ([1− (1− s)(1− δd)]DU = (1− s)(1− ρδd)DN), the markup









Note that durability reduces the markup that the firm can charge. When the good becomes
nondurable (δd = 1, ρ = 1), we are back to the usual relation between the elasticity of
substitution and markup. Similarly, the higher the replacement rate, the lower the market
power of these firms.24 In the extreme case where durability is infinite (δd = 0, e.g. land),
the market is perfectly competitive, revisiting the Coase conjecture (Coase (1972)) in a
monopolistically competitive framework. For later reference, it is useful to summarize this
in a proposition.
Proposition 2.2. (Steady state markup of a durable good firm) Under a symmetric equi-
librium with the inability to internalize the dynamics of second-hand markets, the markup
of durable good firms is negatively correlated with both durability and the replacement rate.
When durability is infinite, the markup is zero (Coase Conjecture).
2.5.3 Relation to the deep-habit model
The relation between durability and markup can also be phrased in terms of the deep-
habit literature. The model description follows closely Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe
(2006, RSU henceforth). There is a continuum of identical households and each household
24The steady-state replacement rate s is discussed in the appendix.
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average level of consumption of variety i across all households in period t−1. γ is the degree
of habit persistence when it is positive. Under external deep habits, households take the
average level of consumption for each variety as exogenous. In this case, cost minimization


















X˜jt dj. Firm maximizes its revenue as in (2.21)
subject to this demand function. Solving the problem at the symmetric steady state, we










Note that the markup is an increasing function of γ. Hence the higher the habit persistence,
the higher the markup.
Within this framework, negative habits are interpreted as the durability of the good. This
is because with γ < 0, higher previous stock from the past decreases the demand for that
variety today, and this is likely to be the case with durable goods. Under this interpretation,
a smaller value of γ corresponds to a higher level of durability. In the steady state, therefore,
we have the same prediction on the negative relation between durability and the markup.
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However, comparing (2.25) with (2.22), we observe that in the deep-habit model, the price-
inelastic term is a constant at period t. On the other hand, the price-inelastic term in the
durables replacement model is proportional to the period-t replacement rate in (2.22) by
(2.23).
Thus, although the deep-habit framework delivers similar predictions to the durables
replacement model at the steady state, there is an important difference in the dynamics
since the price-inelastic term in the demand function changes contemporaneously for the
durables replacement model.
2.5.4 The price-elasticity effect and dynamics














(θd − 1)(δd + s(1− δd)) + s(1− ρδd) , B =
1− ρδd − δd(1− ρ)(δd + s(1− δd))
1− ρδd .























δd + s(1− δd) (xˆt − sˆt) + lagged terms
)
,
where D,DN , X represent the steady state values of the stock, purchases, and production of
durables, respectively. Note that replacements have a negative impact on markups. Hence
if replacement is procyclical, there would be a countercyclical pressure on the markup.
The distinction from RSU is apparent in (2.22). In the deep-habit demand function
(2.25), an increase in the term representing aggregate demand X˜t leads to a higher weight
on the first, price-elastic term. Since the second, price-inelastic term is constant at period t,
prices become more elastic and this channel induces countercyclical markups. In (2.22), the
price-inelastic term decreases when replacement is procyclical. Hence the relative weight on
the price-elastic term increases and leads to a countercyclical pressure on markups. In the
end, the price-elasticity effect discussed in RSU is also included in the durables replacement
model, but for a different reason. In the deep-habit model, the price-elastic term becomes
high due to an aggregate demand effect. In the durables replacement model, the price-
inelastic term decreases which makes the price-elastic term relatively highly weighted.
Consistent with the argument that higher replacement rate leads to higher price elasticity,
a higher replacement rate implies a lower price markup for durables. The exact dynamics
will be discussed after calibration.
2.6 The comovement puzzle
When durables are flexibly priced relative to nondurables in a two sector new Keynesian
model, BHK show that durables and nondurables move in opposite direction with regards
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to a monetary policy shock. Since durables and nondurables comove with monetary shocks
in the data, they claim this as a puzzling feature of new Keynesian models.
In this section, I show that the durables replacement model can resolve the comovement
puzzle. Because the results are numerical, the functional form for utility and production
as well as parameter calibrations are first discussed and the model impulse responses are
displayed next.
2.6.1 Functional form and calibration
The utility function is set as additively separable with possibly different utility weights.
In particular, log utility is assumed for both nondurables and durables, with constant Frisch
elasticity of labor supply:





The functional form for both the nondurable and durable production are Cobb-Douglas:




j,t , j ∈ {c, d}.
Calibration is at quarterly frequency and summarized in table 2.2. Most parameters are
within the range of business-cycle studies, with price rigidity for nondurable goods set at
0.50, which implies an average duration of price change for 2 quarters. Steady state markups
for nondurables and durables are set at 10 percent each. However, θd is not the same as θc
since the relation between markup and the elasticity of substitution is no longer the same
with replacements.
The nonstandard parameters to calibrate are the used durable depreciation rate δd, new
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good depreciation discount ρ, and  which represents the relative service activity in the
second-hand market. Since automobile data is the most reliable source of statistics for used
durables, I use these to calibrate the parameters of interest. In the numerical analysis, I
assume a perfectly competitive second-hand market. In this case, the margin over used car
sales is matched to the size of the value-added component of used car sales in the overall
consumption basket. Hence , δd, and ρ are calibrated to match the margin over used car
sales, the average depreciation for consumer durables, and the relative transaction for used
cars.25 The calibration and numerical analysis for the monopsony second-hand market are
in the appendix.
The adjustment cost parameter governs the quantitative dynamics of the model. With
perfectly competitive second-hand markets, I consider four benchmarks, ξ = [0.001, 0.002,
0.003, ∞].26 Infinite adjustment cost corresponds to a model with no discretionary replace-
ment demand.
2.6.2 Monetary policy shock and the comovement puzzle
Figure 2.4 shows the economy’s response to a 25 basis point increase in the nominal
interest rate. First, when ξ = ∞, replacements are constant. The impulse response of
this model without cyclical replacements exhibits a comovement puzzle of nondurables and
25For the relative transaction of used to new cars, I take the average transaction of used and new car
sales for 1990-2010 in the National Transportation Statistics published by RITA, BTS. The margin over used
car sales is computed from NIPA table 7.2.5U. The depreciation for consumer durables is calibrated on the
higher end. In my model, lowering the depreciation rate also limits the role of second-hand markets, since
recovering the depreciation rate of the used good is the only value-added role of second-hand markets. That
is, by setting a high margin over used car sales, the average depreciation rate is also required to be high.
The results in this section are robust to an alternative calibration with low margin over used sales and a low
depreciation rate.
26The qualitative effects are the same for small ξ, but without any adjustment costs, the movement of
replacement is very volatile to monetary shocks.
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durables production. The relative size of production increases in the durable sector and
decreases in the nondurable sector adjusted with the relative size of each sector restates the
BHK result that monetary shocks have only a mild effect in overall output when the durables
sector exhibits flexible prices.
Instead, with a low adjustment cost of ξ = 0.001, we observe that the replacement rate
drops with an increase in the interest rate. This leads to an increase in the markup for the
durable goods sector, resulting in a decrease in the production of durable goods. Overall,
consumption expenditures in both sectors decrease, attaining comovement as in the VAR
evidence. Hence the model generates procyclical replacement and countercyclical markup
with regards to a monetary policy shock.
When higher adjustment costs are considered (ξ = [0.002, 0.003]), comovement remains
but the relative interest elasticity of durable to nondurable consumption expenditures be-
comes small compared to the VAR evidence. Hence, adjustment cost around 0.001 and 0.002
delivers an empirically reasonable relative response of durables and nondurables to monetary
shocks.
2.6.3 Inspecting the mechanism
BHK argue that the near constancy of the shadow value of long-lived durables is the
reason why we observe the comovement puzzle with flexible prices on durables. By combining







where Ud(t + i) is the marginal utility of the durable stock in period t + i. Following the
argument of BHK, νt is almost a constant with regards to a temporary shock when δd is close
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to zero. This is because the stock of durables Dt becomes very large when δd is small so that
the curvature of the utility function at Dt becomes flat. Hence the marginal utility stays
relatively constant. Moreover with small δd, νt depends heavily on the remote future. Since
with temporary shocks the future marginal utilities should not change much, the change in
the shadow value must also be limited. Hence the shadow value of durables remains to be
near constant (νt ≈ ν).
Next, combining (2.13) and (2.14), and using the near constancy of the shadow value of
durables, we get the following:
−Uh(t)Pd,t
Wt
= νt + βδd(1− ρ)Etνt+1 ≈ ν[1 + βδd(1− ρ)].
Moreover, note also that Pd,t = µd,tmc
n
d,t and that with mobile factor markets, the nominal







Plugging this into the above, we have
−Uh(t) µd,t
FH(K,Ht)
≈ ν[1 + βδd(1− ρ)].
The left hand side is a function of hours Ht and the durable markup µd,t, while the right
hand side is a constant. Hence, the cyclical movement of durable markups are important for
hours to move cyclically with monetary shocks. Moreover, plugging in the functional form





In sum, countercyclical durable markups imply procyclical aggregate labor response with
regards to monetary shocks. Since my model generates countercyclical durable markups
even without nominal rigidities, the model is successful in solving the comovement puzzle
by increasing aggregate labor supply and hence aggregate output.
2.7 Durables over the business cycle
In this section, I show that the durables replacement model is also capable of delivering
two desirable features in explaining the dynamics of durables over the business cycle. First,
the model amplifies the spending for durables because durable replacements are procyclical.
Second, as the second-hand market expands, the persistence of durable spending declines.
The first point improves on the weak internal propagation of standard business-cycle
models of durables. The standard model does not deliver the high volatility of durable
spending observed in the data, as pointed out by Baxter (1996).
The second point suggests an explanation of Ramey and Vine (2006)’s findings on the
decline in persistence of motor vehicle sales after 1984. The decline in persistence after
1984 is also true in the broader category of durable spending as shown below. At the same
time, second-hand markets expanded over time as observed in figure 2.1. Connecting these
two facts, my model shows that an expansion in the second-hand market is one possible
explanation of the declining persistence of durable spending.
2.7.1 More facts on durables
In the data, durables are highly volatile and less persistent than nondurables. HP filtering
the same NIPA data as in section 2.2, table 2.3 compares the volatility and persistence of
durables with that of nondurables including services. In the full sample, the relative standard
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deviation of durables and nondurables is 5.02.
Focusing on persistence, we observe that durables are less persistent compared to non-
durables. Splitting the series into two periods by 1984, we see that the first order autocorre-
lation of durables is smaller after 1984, whereas that of nondurables in this period remains
similar or slightly higher. In particular, the last row shows that the decline in persistence is
highly pronounced in the motor vehicle sector, as analyzed in Ramey and Vine (2006).27
In figure 2.5, we observe that the decline in persistence is prominent in higher order
autocorrelations as well. For all 5 lags considered, durables and motor vehicle sales are less
persistent after 1984. Looking into nondurables and services separately, we observe that
the decline in persistence is only true for durables. For service expenditures, persistence
increased by a small amount in all lags.
2.7.2 Additional calibration
Besides monetary policy shocks, my model also considers technology shocks. Hence
persistence of the technology shock process should also be calibrated. Since the persistence
of durable spending is an object of interest, I target this statistic in calibrating the persistence
of the technology process. By this criterion, ρZ = 0.88 is chosen which delivers the persistence
of durables close to 0.78 conditional on technology shocks.28
To compute the unconditional moments, the relative standard deviation of the technology
and monetary innovation should also be calibrated. Ireland (2004) estimates it to be around
3.5, while Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2010) estimate the posterior mode around
27Ramey and Vine (2006) conduct a statistical test on the changing nature of sales persistence in the
motor vehicle sector before and after 1984 and find that there is a significant change.
28As will be shown in table 2.4, the persistence of durable spending in the model is not sensitive to the
replacement adjustment cost parameter. Even when monetary shocks are considered, the persistence of
durables remain similar.
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5. I consider a range of values that cover these estimates.
2.7.3 Volatility of durables is higher with cyclical replacements
Figure 2.6 shows the impulse responses of durable spending to a negative technology
shock with different replacement adjustment costs considered. The black dotted line is the
case with no cyclical replacements. In this case, durable spending is 6 times more sensitive
than nondurable consumption on impact. The three other lines are cases with households
replacing their durables. Since replacements are procyclical to technology shocks, durables
decline even more on impact.29 The relative sensitivity of durable spending is 9 times more
sensitive then nondurable consumption for all three replacement adjustment costs considered
that are consistent with resolving the comovement puzzle for monetary policy shocks.
This amplification channel is reflected in the second moments of the model. The first
panel of table 2.4 computes the moments conditional on technology shocks. The relative
standard deviation of durables to nondurables is only 3.91 without replacements, but as
high as 4.93 with replacements which is close to 5.02 observed in the data.30 Therefore, the
amplification of durable spending due to cyclical replacements delivers a 25% increase in the
relative standard deviation.
The remaining panels of table 2.4 present the statistics when monetary shocks are also
considered. The second panel is the case when monetary shocks are as volatile as technology
shocks. Starting with the last column again, the relative standard deviation is 3.94, far below
the data. When replacements are allowed, durables become more volatile and the relative
standard deviation becomes as high as 4.95.
29The decline in nondurable consumption becomes slightly smaller.
30Note that the relative standard deviation of durables was not the target in calibrating the persistence
of the technology shock process.
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The third and fourth panel compute the moments with the relative standard deviation
of technology and monetary innovations as 3 and 5. The results again suggest that the
amplification channel is robust to different combinations of the two shocks in the model.
Cyclical replacement is not unique in generating amplification for durable spending.
Gomes, Kogan, and Yogo (2009) model the durable sector as uniquely holding inventories
and also generate highly volatile durable spending. However, in their model, finished-good
durable inventories are used as factors of production. Hence the asymmetry between the two
sectors comes not only from the durable sector holding inventories, but also from the sector
using these inventories as intermediate inputs. The exact mechanism that generates the rel-
ative volatility of durables and nondurables is still under question, but cyclical replacement
demand is one answer to it outside of the input-output structure.
2.7.4 The decline in durable persistence and second-hand markets
As pointed out by Ramey and Vine (2006) and also verified above, the Great Moderation
is also a period of lower persistence in durable spending. In section 2.3, I have shown that
the discretionary replacement demand model leads to lower persistence of durable spending
due to the advancement and postponement of replacement. For example, when replacements
are advanced, households in the next period tend to decrease their demand for new durables
since the average age of the goods have declined. I argue here that this channel remains true
in general equilibrium.
Since figure 2.1 suggests that the second-hand market expanded during this period, the
experiment in this section compares the persistence of durable spending by changing the
target value-added of second-hand markets in the model. The key parameter related to the
value-added of the second-hand market is the margin of used goods . I consider two different
scenarios in changing  to target the value-added of the second-hand market.
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First, the value-added of second-hand markets could have expanded due to improvements
in the durability of new durable goods. In this scenario, higher durability of new durable
goods gives more room for second-hand markets to play a value-added role. I call this the
supply side expansion of second-hand market. In the model, I hold fixed the steady state
replacement rate and change the second-hand market margin parameter  by changing the
new durable goods depreciation discount parameter ρ.
Second, the value-added of the second-hand market could have expanded due to higher
replacement demand from the households. In this scenario, higher replacement demand of
households leads to higher transactions in the second-hand market. Since each transaction
involves a value-added role of the second-hand market, I call this the demand side expansion
of the second-hand market. In the model, I hold fixed all the parameters and change the
margin parameter  by changing the steady state replacement frequency of durables.
With adjustment cost set at 0.001, the persistence for durables and nondurables condi-
tional on technology shocks are plotted in figure 2.7. The x axis is the value-added of the
second-hand market. Recall that the benchmark value-added of the second-hand market
calibrated in the model is 10 percent. Experimenting with different sizes of the second-hand
market from 1 to 20 percent, we observe that the persistence of durable spending declines as
the second-hand market expands, whether it be due to the supply side or the demand side.31
In particular, a supply side second-hand market expansion from 1 percent to 13 percent
induces as high as a 0.035 decline in the persistence of durables. Note that in the data, we
observe a 0.07 decline in the persistence of durables before and after 1984. Hence nearly
half of the decline in the persistence of durables could be explained by the expansion of the
second-hand market.
31The supply side expansion does not go up to 20 percent in the model since the new durables discount
parameter ρ becomes negative above 13 percent.
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The persistence of nondurables only slightly increases. The maximum increase in persis-
tence is 0.01 when the expansion of the second-hand market is purely driven by the supply
side. Again, this corresponds to the small increase in the persistence of nondurables observed
before and after 1984.
The qualitative results remain with different adjustment costs. As figure 2.8 shows,
adding monetary shocks with the relative standard deviation close to the estimated values
do not change the result. Hence, the model suggests that the expansion of the second-hand
market is a potential candidate of the factors that lead to the observed decline in persistence
of durable spending during the Great Moderation.
2.8 Empirical evidence
Section 2.5 states the two key mechanisms of the model. First, that when replacements
are procyclical, markups for durables are countercyclical. Second, that markup decreases
with durability and replacement frequency as in proposition 2.2. In this section, I look
for empirical evidence for both. The first point has been widely discussed and I briefly
summarize the literature in the next section. The second point has been less investigated so
section 2.8.3 presents new evidence.
2.8.1 The cyclicality of durable markups
An extensive survey on the cyclicality of the markup for overall goods is presented in
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). They show that markup dynamics measured in vari-
ous empirical methods leans towards countercyclical markups. Domowitz, Hubbard, and
Petersen (1988) as well as Bils (1989) compare markup cyclicality between durables and
nondurables and show evidence that markups are more countercyclical for the durable sec-
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tor. Lastly, Parker (2001) and Bils, Klenow, and Malin (2012) work with industry-level data
to show that markups are more countercyclical for infrequently purchased durable goods.
2.8.2 Markup and durability: Empirical strategy and data de-
scription
The goal of this section is to provide an empirical exercise on the relation between markup
and durability. To estimate markups for each industry, I follow the framework of Hall (1988).
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale for three inputs (labor (N), capital (K),
and materials (M)), Hall (1988) suggests a method for estimating the average markup of a
















where ζt is the purely exogenous technology component of the firm, µ is the average markup,
and sN,t, sK,t, sM,t are the previous period factor share of labor, capital and materials, re-
spectively. Under the constant returns to scale assumption, sN,t + sK,t + sM,t = 1. Hence we
can subtract capital from each side to get
∆yt = µ(sN,t∆nt + sM,t∆mt) + ζt,
where yt = ln(Yt/Kt), nt = ln(Nt/Kt), mt = ln(Mt/Kt), sN,t = (wt−1Nt−1)/(pt−1Yt−1), and
sM,t = (vt−1Mt−1)/(pt−1Yt−1).32 Y,w, p, v refers to output, total compensation per worker,
output price, and materials cost respectively. To estimate µ for each industry, we need
to take an instrumental variable approach since the technology component is likely to be
32Log approximation is used.
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correlated with the input variables. Assume that the technology shock of an industry can be





issue is to find an appropriate instrument that is positively correlated with both input and
output, while exogenous to technology. Following Hall (1988), I use the difference of real
national defence expenditures, domestic crude oil price, and the political indicator when the
president is from the Democratic party. These instruments are claimed to be demand shifters
without having any significant correlation with the pure technology shock component. Using
a similar approach as described and estimating the markup rate at the 1-digit SIC level,
Hall (1988) shows that the markup for durable goods (2.058) are lower than the markup for
nondurable goods (3.096).33
Here I use a more detailed 4-digit SIC industry group specified in Parker (2001) and
Bils and Klenow (1998), because they have the measure of durability of the goods for 58
consumer goods at the 4-digit SIC level. Since 5 of these are specified as nondurables, I drop
them. Also, Parker (2001) and Bils and Klenow (1998) use the 1972 SIC codes, while the
data I use are the 1987 SIC codes. Hence 3 additional industries are dropped since they are
merged in the 1987 SIC codes.34 This leaves us with 50 industry groups.
I use the NBER manufacturing productivity database.35 For Y I used the value of ship-
ments. For N , I use production worker hours. Capital is also provided in the dataset. For
wN , total payroll is used. For vM and v, materials cost and price deflator for materials are
used. Since the industry is more detailed than what Hall uses, the 3 Hall-Ramey instru-
33Hall (1988) does not consider materials as inputs in his basic calculation of average markups.
34Woven carpets and rugs, tufted carpets and rugs, and carpets and rugs, nec. are all merged to carpets
and rugs in SIC87. Similarly, men’s trousers and men’s work clothing are merged to men’s and boy’s trousers
and slacks in SIC87.
35This database contains annual information of over 400 4-digit manufacturing industries from 1958 to
2005. A full description of the dataset can be found in Bartelsman and Gray (1996). The usage of this
dataset is similar to Parker (2001), except that I include more recent time series.
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ments turn out to be only weakly correlated with the input and output variables. Hence I
also use the log difference of the aggregate personal consumption expenditure and its lag as
additional instruments to capture demand shifts. If we assume that the technology shock
for each industry consists of both industry-specific and aggregate shocks, then it is reason-
able to assume that to the industry level (4-digit SIC), the variability of industry-specific
shocks dominate aggregate shocks (std(ζ it) > std(ζ
a
t )). Hence, any variation of the aggregate
variables will be less correlated with the technology shocks at the industry level. Therefore,
including aggregate consumption as an additional demand shift instrument is a compro-
mise that is likely to solve the weak instrument problem while less affecting the exogeneity
assumption to the technology shock component.36
2.8.3 Markups and durability: Results
Column 2 of table 2.5 provides the regression result. The t-statistic is 2, hence in line
with proposition 2.1. One critical assumption that I am making is the inability of firms to
internalize the interaction with the second-hand market. If the market is concentrated so
that firms might be more likely to internalize their activities with the second-hand market,
this is unlikely to be the correct assumption. To control this effect, I also add a concentration
ratio variable which measures the concentration of 4 big firms. The concentration ratio for
4-digit SIC industries are taken from 1992 Census of Manufacturers Report.37 The regression
coefficients indicate that the higher the concentration ratio, the higher the markup, as is ex-
pected to be the case. Controlling for the concentration ratio, we still observe that durability
is negatively correlated with markup. Including an interaction term between durability and
36Including gross domestic output or its lags make small difference.
37For reference, http://www.census.gov/mcd/historic/mc92cr.txt.
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concentration ratio in the next regression, we observe that this coefficient is slightly positive,
implying that the negative relation between durability and markup is less pronounced in a
highly concentrated market. This could justify the higher possibility of concentrated mar-
kets to internalize the second-hand market for used durables. However, the coefficients are
less significant to draw any decisive conclusion. As a robustness check due to concerns that
an outlier is driving most of the results, I exclude SIC 3914 (silverware) which has a high
durability of 27.5 years. The qualtitative results still hold, although the significance levels
are less dramatic as before. I have also conducted these regressions with different subsample
periods and the qualitative results are robust in this dimension illustrating that as for the
current empirical strategy, the choice of a sample period is less of a concern. However, given
its limited success in statistical significance, future work is required to identify the precise
relation between the two variables.38
2.9 Conclusion
This paper proposes a general-equilibrium model with discretionary replacement of durables
for households and a well-functioning second-hand market. At the steady state, markup is
inversely related to durability and replacement frequency. For the dynamics, the model gen-
erates procyclical replacement and countercyclical markup. These features help improve the
movements of durables in standard business-cycle models towards the data. Although there
seems to be feeble evidence of nominal rigidities in the durable goods production sector, I
argue that real rigidities with regards to pricing decisions are important considerations es-
pecially at the durable goods sector. As an empirical test of one feature of my model, I also
show that durability and markups are negatively correlated, although more work is required
38Controlling for the elasticity of substitution for each good might be another direction.
104
to identify their precise relation.
There is a rich avenue of research in this direction. In the recent recession with interest
rates hitting the zero lower bound, a relative price distortion policy has been conducted as
a way to boost the durable goods sector production. In particular, the “cash-for-clunkers”
program was conducted in 2009 and its macroeconomic effectiveness is yet an open question,
since no general-equilibrium model with second-hand markets and consumer replacement
exists. A further extension of my model would be to analyze this policy. Moreover, I
abstracted from the firm’s dynamic considerations when they interact with second-hand
markets. In the industrial organization literature, Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) and Porter
and Sattler (1999) study the dynamic decision of firms allowing commitment to their own
products, while Esteban and Shum (2007) assume that firms follow Markovian strategies.
By allowing firms to dynamically interact with the second-hand market, interesting business-
cycle dynamics might also arise.
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Variable (x) share (%) corr(x,y) std(x)/std(y) corr(x, x−1)
Durables 0.81 2.81 0.78
Motor vehicles 39.5 0.66 4.62 0.64
New motor 63.8 0.61 6.36 0.61
Net used motor 21.6 0.48 3.42 0.44
(Used car margin 1) (7.0) 0.32 3.54 0.62
(Used car margin 2) (0.3) 0.43 4.11 0.67
(Used truck margin 1) (3.3) 0.37 5.72 0.59
(Used truck margin 2) (0.6) 0.40 5.89 0.61
Table 2.1: Business cycle facts of durable consumption expenditures
Notes: Quarterly HP filter, 1967Q1-2011Q2. y is real GDP. New motor and net used motor do
not add up to 100% since auto parts are excluded. Parentheses are share relative to motor
vehicles. Used car margin 1 and used truck margin 1 refer to margin of used vehicles from
business (and government) to household. Used car margin 2 and used truck margin 2 refer to
margin of used vehicles from household (and government) to business. Used truck margin 1 and 2
start from 1983Q1.
Parameter Value Description
β 0.995 annual discount rate 2%
ψd/ψc 0.23 durable share 0.15
φ 1 Frisch elasticity 1
χ 6.50 hours 0.33
η 0.35 labor intensity 0.65
θc 11 nondurable markup 10%
θd 2.97 durable markup 10% (with second-hand)
α 0.50 nondurable price change duration 2 quarters
τpi 1.5 Interest rate feedback coefficient
δd 0.057 used good depreciation
ρ 0.32 new good depreciation discount
 0.037 second-hand value-added (competitive)
Table 2.2: Quarterly calibration
Notes: The parameters δd, ρ,  are determined by the three moments: quarterly durable
depreciation 5%, relative transaction of used vs news cars 2.7, value-added of second-hand over
durable spending 10%.
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Statistic Full sample Before 1984 After 1984 Description
σD/σND 5.02 5.31 4.57 Relative standard deviation
ρD 0.784 (0.041) 0.805 (0.058) 0.737 (0.062) Durable persistence (standard error)
ρND 0.902 (0.035) 0.897 (0.058) 0.908 (0.040) Nondurable persistence (standard error)
ρM 0.639 (0.060) 0.687 (0.083) 0.525 (0.089) Motor vehicle persistence (standard error)
Table 2.3: Business cycle facts
Statistic ξ = 0.001 ξ = 0.002 ξ = 0.003 ξ =∞ Description
Conditional on technology shock
ρD 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.79 Durable persistence
ρND 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.92 Nondurable persistence
σD/σND 4.93 4.90 4.88 3.91 Relative standard deviation
Technology and monetary shocks (σeZ
σeR
= 1)
ρD 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.73 Durable persistence
ρND 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.87 Nondurable persistence
σD/σND 4.95 4.89 4.85 3.94 Relative standard deviation
Technology and monetary shocks (σeZ
σeR
= 3)
ρD 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.78 Durable persistence
ρND 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.91 Nondurable persistence
σD/σND 4.93 4.90 4.88 3.92 Relative standard deviation
Technology and monetary shocks (σeZ
σeR
= 5)
ρD 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.78 Durable persistence
ρND 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.92 Nondurable persistence
σD/σND 4.93 4.90 4.89 3.91 Relative standard deviation
Table 2.4: Model second moments
107
(obs=50) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
constant 1.321 1.397 1.329 1.341 1.365 1.296 1.296
(0.128) (0.056) (0.065) (0.105) (0.057) (0.064) (0.064)
durability −0.004 −0.012 −0.014 −0.016 −0.008 −0.010 −0.018
(0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) (0.007) (0.013)
concentration 0.195 0.171 0.198 0.027
(0.171) (0.319) (0.169) (0.341)
interaction 0.003 0.019
(0.030) (0.031)
R-squared 0.003 0.087 0.119 0.120 0.029 0.065 0.075
F-statistic 0.090 3.970 2.470 2.250 1.360 1.260 1.490
Table 2.5: Linear regression results (dependent variable: estimated markup)
(1): 3 instruments (Hall-Ramey)
(2), (3), (4): 5 instruments (Hall-Ramey + PCE)
(3): regression including concentration ratio (4 big firms)
(4): regression including concentration ratio and its interaction with durability
(5), (6), (7): same regression as in (2), (3), (4) excluding SIC 3914 (silverware)
*Errors are heteroskedasticity robust.
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new motor relative to durable consumption
used motor relative to durable consumption
Figure 2.1: Relative composition of new and net used motor purchases to durable spending
Figure 2.2: Annual sales of new and used vehicles (Thousands of vehicles)
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Figure 2.3: Empirical impulse responses to a monetary policy shock
Notes: 1967Q1-2007Q4, 90% centered bootstrap interval






































































Figure 2.4: Impulse responses to an increase in the nominal interest rate
Notes: With different adjustment cost parameters. In all figures, replacement rate is level changes.
All other variables reflect percentage changes. Replacement rate at the steady state is 14.2%.
110








































Figure 2.5: Autocorrelation before and after 1984











































Figure 2.6: Impulse responses to a negative technology shock
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Figure 2.7: Model persistence with technology shocks (ξ = 0.001)




























Figure 2.8: Model persistence with monetary and technology shocks (ξ = 0.001, σeZσeR = 3)
Chapter 3
Targeted Transfers and the Fiscal




After many years of neglect, the positive implications of government spending for business-
cycle dynamics are again at the center of research. In part, there is a pressing real-world
motivation behind this interest. All over the developed world, fiscal spending increased
rapidly between 2007 and 2009 and, in the United States, the ratio of government expendi-
tures to GDP increased by 4.4%, the largest two-year increase since 1950-52. New theoretical
research on the topic has characterized the circumstances under which an increase in gov-
ernment consumption can lead to a significant increase in output in neoclassical and new
Keynesian DSGE models.1 Recent empirical studies have used a variety of econometric
techniques and data sources to identify the impact of changes in government purchases on
output and employment.2
Many lessons have come out of this recent work, but there is a discomforting disconnect
between the motivation and the research that has sprung from it. While in the world,
government expenditures have increased, the research has been mostly about increases in
government purchases (consumption plus investment). Expenditures are the sum of pur-
chases with two other components, one small—interest payments—and another that is very
large—transfers.
The first contribution of this paper is to describe empirically the components of the
increase in fiscal expenditures during the great recession. Section 3.2 shows that, from
the end of 2007 until the end of 2009, only one quarter of the increase in U.S. government
1Just in the last two years, see Cogan et al. (2010), Christiano et al. (2011), Hall (2009), Woodford
(2011), Erceg and Linde (2010) Monacelli and Perotti (2008), Uhlig (2010), Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011),
Iltzezki et al. (2010), Mertens and Ravn (2010a).
2In the recent past, see Perotti (2008), Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Corsetti et al. (2012), Mertens and
Ravn (2010b), Barro and Redlick (2011), Ramey (2011), Nekarda and Ramey (2011), Krenn and Gordon
(2010), Monacelli et al. (2010), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), Fishback and Kachanovskaya (2010)
Shoag (2010), Serrato and Wingender (2011).
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expenditures is accounted for by government purchases. Three quarters of the increase are
due to increases in transfers, of which, in turn, three quarters are social transfers. Looking
across a sample of 22 countries in the OECD and Europe, the United States does not stand
out in this regard. In every country where spending increased, at least 30% of the increase
was driven by transfers. The median share of transfers in the increase in spending is 64%.
In one particular government program that has attracted some attention, the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act, the share of government purchases is even smaller.
Looking in more detail at the components of the U.S. increase in social transfers, the
three categories of retirement spending, medical care and income assistance alone account
for a 2% increase in expenditures over GDP. This increase is as large as the increase in
government purchases plus unemployment insurance. Trying to explain what is behind the
rise of social transfers, we show that a few variables (the fraction of the population over 65,
the unemployment rate, and the price of health care) can account for about half of the total
increase during 2007-2009.
Most macroeconomic models of business cycles assume a representative agent, so that
lump-sum transfers from one group of agents to another have no effect on aggregate employ-
ment and output. Many also assume that the conditions for Ricardian equivalence hold,
so that government transfers across time are likewise neutral. The second contribution of
this paper is to propose a new model that merges the emphasis on incomplete markets and
social insurance that is typical in studies of public finance with the emphasis on intertem-
poral labor supply and nominal rigidities that is common in studies of the business cycle.
We propose a new model in section 3.3 where lump-sum transfers, directed from one group
in the population to another, can boost employment and output. The key ingredients of
the model are idiosyncratic, uninsurable uncertainty about income and health, and nominal
rigidities in price setting. Under different parameter configurations, our model nests three
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conventional models: the neoclassical growth model, the Aiyagari incomplete markets model,
and a sticky-information new Keynesian model.
Lump-sum directed transfers boost output and employment through two new channels in
our model. The first is a neoclassical channel, whereby the marginal worker is more willing
to work to pay for higher transfers to those less fortunate. The second is a Keynesian
channel, whereby transferring resources from households with low marginal propensity to
consume (MPC) to those with a high MPC boosts aggregate demand.
Sections 3.4 and 3.5 make a first attempt at quantitatively evaluating the roles of these
channels. According to the model, targeted increases in transfers are expansionary, raising
both employment and output, and while their gross impact is smaller than that of government
purchases, the net impact on private consumption and investment is significantly larger. In
the baseline calibration in this paper, the overall effect of either form of government spending
is small. However, we should note from the start that our simple model ignores many of the
ingredients that the recent literature has shown can significantly boost spending multipliers,
so our quantitative results should be interpreted with caution. A more enduring lesson that
we take from our quantitative experiments is that transfer programs that are targeted at
different groups can have very different aggregate impacts.
Section 3.6 offers some brief conclusions. The main message of the paper can be sum-
marized in one sentence: Future macroeconomic research on fiscal policy should focus more
on social transfers.
3.2 The weight of transfers in the fiscal expansion
Over the last 60 years, fiscal spending has continuously increased and its share of U.S.
GDP in 2007 was about double what it was in 1947. At the same time, there has been a
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dramatic compositional shift away from purchases and towards transfers, which more than
tripled as a ratio of GDP over the past 50 years, and by 2007 accounted for 39% of the total
budget.
Between the last quarter of 2007 and the last quarter of 2009, U.S. government spending
increased by 14.2%, or 4.4% of GDP.3 This refers to the integrated government spend-
ing, including both federal, state and local governments. Looking at the components of
spending, government investment accounts for 5.6% of that increase, while government con-
sumption was responsible for 21.1%. Transfers alone account for 75.3% of the total increase
in spending, or 3.4% of GDP.4
One may wonder whether this increase in transfers is unusual, relative to recent trends.
To address this issue, we compute the following statistic: we add nominal GDP growth to
the trend increase in the years prior to the crisis, using a linear trend fit to the data between
1998Q4 and 2006Q4.5 According to this measure of the “normal” increase in transfers,
taking growth and the usual trend into account, transfers were predicted to increase by only
2.8% during the two years. Instead they increased by 27.4%.
Another concern is that many tax deductions can be seen as negative transfers (e.g.,
tax credits for tuition). These tax expenditures, as they are sometimes called, have grown
significantly in the last two decades but it is difficult to measure their size in the U.S. budget.
3We start our sample in the last quarter of 2007 because the National Bureau of Economic Research
determined December 2007 as the start of the recession. We stop at the end of 2009 for two reasons. First,
because especially in countries other than the United States, there was a reversal in the policy towards fiscal
austerity in 2010. Second, because we will supplement the data on U.S. total spending with more detailed
data on the components of spending, but this is only available anually.
4Our data comes from NIPA table 3.1, and our categories match those in that table as follows: total
spending is the sum of consumption expenditures, gross investment, capital transfers, net purchases of assets
minus consumption of fixed capital; consumption equals consumption expenditures minus consumption of
fixed capital; transfers equals government social benefits plus subsidies plus capital transfers; and investment
is the residual.
5We chose 8 years but starting in 1996 or 2000 does not make a large difference.
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The 3.4% of GDP increase in transfers calculated above assumed that there are no such tax
expenditures. If one takes the opposite view, that all taxes and social security contributions
are negative transfers, then the increase in transfer rises to 6.6% of GDP.
3.2.1 International comparison: is the U.S. fiscal expansion un-
usual?
Using quarterly data for 22 developed countries between 2007Q4 and 2009Q4, table 3.1
reports the growth of expenditures and transfers.6 Starting with the second column in the
table, in only one country, Hungary, have government expenditures fallen and, in most of
them, spending has increased well above their trend in the past decade. The increase in
spending in the United States may be very large compared to its history, but it is only the
6th largest in the sample.
The following two columns have the share of the increase attributed to either transfers or
purchases.7 The dominance of transfers is true for many countries. In 13 out of the other
20 countries for which expenditures increased, transfers accounted for a larger share of the
increase than purchases. In no country were transfers responsible for less than 30% of the
total increase in expenditures.
The fifth column presents the “unusual growth” in transfers defined in the previous
section: the proportional increase in transfers minus the proportional increase in GDP over
the same period, and the 8-quarter predicted increase in total spending from a linear trend
fit to the years between 1998Q4 and 2006Q4. By this measure, the United States is only
6We obtained data for as many countries as we could find, from two sources, the OECD Economic
Outlook and Eurostat. The construction of the series followed the same guidelines as used in NIPA, and
we used the U.S. series in the OECD to ensure that the definitions of the categories of government spending
matched.
7The two do not add up to one because of the omission of the change in interest payments.
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beaten by Ireland, Slovakia and Finland. Moreover, in only two out of the twenty two
countries did transfers grow less than what would be expected. Everywhere else, transfers
grew at an extraordinary rate, often by more than 10%.
3.2.2 The 2009 stimulus package
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was a federal program explicitly
designed to provide fiscal stimulus to the U.S. economy. In work parallel to ours, Cogan and
Taylor (2012) looked at the components of $862 billion spending within the ARRA. Their
first conclusion is that, halfway through 2010, only $18 billion had been spent on federal
purchases. A large part of the program consisted of transfers to state and local governments.
Yet, purchases at these levels of the government have also barely changed since 2008. Rather,
at the local and state level, it is transfers that increased at a rapid rate absorbing, together
with payment of past debt, almost the entire ARRA funds. Moreover, 52% of the ARRA
grants to state and local government in 2009 were accounted for by Medicaid. Therefore,
the discretionary response to fiscal spending was even more dominated by transfers than the
overall change in spending.
3.2.3 Looking at the components of transfers: where is the in-
crease?
Table 3.2 uses the annual data from table 3.12 of NIPA to group social transfers into
four categories. First is social transfers associated with retirement and disabilities, most
prominently through pensions paid by the Social Security system.8 Second is spending
8Concretely, this category includes the sum of spending on: old-age, survivors, and disability insur-
ance; railroad retirement; pension benefit guaranty; veterans’ life insurance; veterans’ benefits pension and
disability; and state and local government’s temporary disability insurance.
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driven by medical reasons, the bulk of which is accounted for by Medicare and Medicaid.9
Third is unemployment insurance, perhaps the transfer that first comes to mind as increasing
during a recession. The last group includes all other transfers, mostly from income support
programs.10
The broad trends in these categories are well-known: health has been rising steadily at the
expense of retirement in terms of the overall budget, and unemployment insurance spikes
up in recessions. In the period between 2007 and 2009, the largest share of the increase
in social transfers, 29.5%, is in medical expenses. The second largest share is spending
on retirement and disabilities, which accounts for 24.0% of the increase in total transfer
spending. Unemployment insurance actually only appears in third place accounting for
23.6% of the increase, and only slightly more than other categories, which account for the
remaining 22.8%.
From reading the press or following the political debate, one may not have guessed this:
between 2007 and 2009, government expenditures on medical care, retirement and disabilities
have grown as much as government purchases.
3.2.4 Discretionary social transfers?
Some of the increase in transfers was predictable and probably would have occurred even
without a recession.
For instance, retirement and disabilities spending increased by 15.5% between 2007 and
2009. Taking out the population growth rate and inflation (measured using the GDP
9This category includes spending in: hospital and supplementary medical insurance; workers’ compen-
sation; military medical insurance; black lung benefits; state and local government workers’ compensation;
and state and local government’s medical care.
10Half of this is accounted for by three categories: the earned income tax credit, the supplemental nutrition
assistance program, and various supplemental security income programs.
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deflator), the increase in real per capita transfers was 9.8%. To gauge how much of this
increase was discretionary, we estimated a linear regression with the log of real spending per
capita as the dependent variable and as independent variables: a constant, the share of the
total population that is not on the labor force and is more than 65 years old, and the share
of the population that is older than 65. We ran the regression in first differences to deal
with the clear trends in the sample between 1977 and 2006. Using the actual values for
2008 and 2009 in this fitted equation, the total residual for these two years is 5.6%. That
is, a little over one half of the total increase in transfers is accounted for by inflation, aging
of the population, and a larger fraction of those over 65 leaving the labor force.
Turning to medical spending, the consumer price index for medical care increased by
7.0% while the non-medical component of the headline consumer price index increased by
only 3.2%. As a result, of the 13.3% increase in medical transfers between 2007 and 2009,
7.0% was accounted for by higher prices and the remainder by more quantity. Therefore,
the increasing cost of health care in the United States can account for more than half of
the increase in the largest category of spending. Looking at the breakdown between price
and quantity in the last twenty years (not reported), the recent increase in quantity is above
usual, as typically prices account for only about half of the increase in spending. Finally,
spending on Medicaid has increased proportionately less than spending on all medical care,
so we cannot account for this increase in transfers solely as a result of more people satisfying
the means test to be admitted to the program.
Turning to unemployment insurance, total per capita real spending increased by 276%
between 2007 and 2009. Dividing by the number of unemployed, the real amount per
number of unemployed increased by only 69%. Using data until 2006, we regressed the first
differences of the log of this variable on a constant and two variables: the unemployment rate
to capture systematic increases in the generosity of the system as more people lose their jobs;
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and the median duration of unemployment to capture changes in benefits as people remain
unemployed for longer. The two residuals in 2008 and 2009 add up to only 13.2%. That
is, even though one of the anti-crisis measures was extending the duration of unemployment
benefits, this so far seems to have led to a modest increase in government spending on the
program.
3.2.5 Bringing the facts together
All over the developed world, the large fiscal expansions of 2007-09 have been mostly
about increasing social transfers. This is also true in the United States, a leading example
of a country with simultaneously large increases in government expenditures primarily due
to transfers. While public works and other purchases dominate the public debate, it is
medical care, retirement and disability that account for the bulk of this increased spending.
A handful of variables can account, almost mechanically, for about half of the increase in
social transfers, with the remainder perhaps due to discretionary fiscal stimulus.
3.3 A model to understand the positive effects of trans-
fers
Most models of economic fluctuations assume a representative agent and lump-sum taxes
and transfers. As a result, these models predict that government transfers across agents
or across time do not affect any aggregate quantities, so the fiscal expansion in transfers in
2007-09 should have been neutral with respect to employment and output.
There are two existing economic channels in the literature through which transfers are
not neutral. One assumes that transfers are not lump-sum, but distort marginal rewards
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and relative prices. This is certainly realistic as many transfer programs are progressive
in order to provide social insurance. It is well understood that, if a change in transfers
lowers the returns to working and saving, it will reduce employment and output. It is much
less clear whether the expansion in social transfers in 2007-09 increased or lowered marginal
rewards.
The second mechanism works through increases in the public debt raising the supply of
assets that agents can use to self-insure against shocks. Woodford (1990) and Aiyagari and
McGrattan (1998) provide two different models to capture this effect. In Woodford (1990),
increasing transfers raises investment and output by loosening liquidity constraints, whereas
in Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), transfers lower capital and output by reducing the need
for precautionary savings. Not only in theory, but also in practice, it is far from clear
in which direction this effect played out in 2007-09. During this period, U.S. public debt
increased but private debt fell, so that the total amount of domestic nonfinancial debt grew
at the slowest rate in the past decade. Whether there are more or fewer assets available for
households to smooth shocks is a matter of interpretation.
In this paper, we propose a third, new mechanism through which lump-sum transfers
have aggregate effects: targeting. Transfers across different groups of households will raise
consumption and increase labor supply for some, while lowering it for others. If the transfer
is well-targeted, the effect on the former can exceed the countervailing effect on the latter,
leading to an increase in employment and output. Our model has two key ingredients.
First, as in public finance studies of transfers, households face borrowing constraints and
suffer idiosyncratic shocks to income and health against which they cannot insure. By
redistributing wealth across agents, transfers increase the labor supply of households and
boost consumption for those who could not borrow. Second, as in models of economic
fluctuations, there are nominal rigidities as producers only update their information and
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prices sporadically. Transfers raise aggregate demand, thereby raising production by firms
that are stuck with low prices. The model merges the work on incomplete markets and
on nominal rigidities, recently surveyed in Heathcote et al. (2009) and Mankiw and Reis
(2010) respectively. For different particular parameter configurations, it nests three well-
known models: the neoclassical growth model with government spending of Baxter and King
(1993), the incomplete-markets model of Aiyagari (1994), and the sticky-information model
of Mankiw and Reis (2002).
3.3.1 The households
There is a continuum of households that in each period are characterized by a triplet
{k, s, h} where k is their capital, s their individual-specific salary offer, and h is their health
affecting the relative disutility of working. The problem of each agent is:
V (k, s, h) = max
c,n,k′
{
ln(c)− χ(1− h)n+ β
∫ ∫
V (k′, s′, h′)dF (s′, h′)
}
, (3.1)
n ∈ {0, 1}, c ≥ 0, and k′ ≥ 0, (3.2)
c+ k′ = (1− δ + r)k + swn+ d− τ + T (s, h) + z(k, s, h), (3.3)
ln(s′) = − σ
2
2(1 + ρ)
+ ρ ln(s) + ε′ with ε′ ∼ N(0, σ2) i.i.d., (3.4)
h =
 1 with probability pidraw from U [0, η] with probability 1− pi and i.i.d. (3.5)
The variables and functions are: V (.) is the value function, c is consumption, n is the
choice to work or not, r is the gross interest rate, w is the average wage, d are dividends, τ are
lump-sum taxes, T (.) are non-negative lump-sum transfers, and z(.) are insurance payments.
As for the parameters: χ is the disutility from working with the worst possible health, β
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is the discount factor, δ is the depreciation rate, ρ and σ2 are the persistence and variance
of shocks to salary offers, pi is the probability that the person is healthy and η controls the
average utility gap between the healthy and the unhealthy. Throughout the paper, F (.) will
denote cumulative density functions, and a prime in a variable denotes its value one period
ahead.
Going through each expression in turn, equation (3.1) states that households wish to
consume more and suffer from working if they are unhealthy. They live forever and face
uncertainty about their future health as well as their future salary. There could also be
additional terms attributing utility directly from both government spending as well as from
health regardless of whether the household works or not. The implicit assumption is not
that these terms do not exist, but rather that they enter utility additively. While they
would affect welfare characterizations, they are irrelevant for the positive properties of the
model that we will focus on.
We include health shocks for two separate reasons. First, because, as documented in
section 3.2, medical care is the largest government expense on social transfers. Second,
because there is extensive evidence that health is a major source of shocks to household
wealth. Surveys of people entering personal bankruptcy have found that 62% claim that
medical expenses were an important factor in leading to bankruptcy (Himmelstein et al.
(2009)). Closer to our model, 40% of the survey respondents answer that recent health
shocks led them to lose more than two weeks of work to care for themselves or others. Our
goal was to capture, in the simplest possible way, the uninsurable health uncertainty that
people face, the effects that its shocks have on people’s income, and the large amount of
social transfers that are contingent on health status.11
11Our model of health is admittedly stark. First, we do not introduce health as a separate good, but
interpret the utility function as the value function derived from optimal choices of health and final goods
consumption. Second, we do not model in kind health transfers because, as long as households do not
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The conditions in (3.2) impose that households can choose whether to work or not, and
that they face a borrowing constraint so that they cannot leave a period with negative
assets. Equation (3.3) is the budget constraint stating that consumption plus savings, on
the left-hand side, must equal the income from interest on capital, wages from working,
dividends from firms, transfers from the government, and insurance payments, minus paid
taxes. Importantly, note that transfers are lump-sum: they depend only on the exogenous
characteristics of the household.
Equations (3.4) and (3.5) put strong assumptions on the stochastic processes for the
two shocks. These keep the solution of the model simple, but they could be relaxed while
keeping the model computationally feasible. The two shocks are independent across agents
and independent of each other, so at any period in time, the cross-sectional distribution of
salary offers is log normal with an average salary equal to E(sw) = w. The cross-sectional
distribution of health has point-mass at healthy people with h = 1, and then a uniform
distribution over how unhealthy other people are. A restrictive assumption is that health
shocks are independent over time. The time period in our model is one year, and the health
shocks are not meant to capture disability or old age, but rather temporary illness that
affects the ability to work and earn a wage.
The solution to this problem is a set of functions c∗(k, s, h), n∗(k, s, h), and k′∗(k, s, h)
that solve the Bellman equation determining how much each household consumes, works and
saves.
receive more in health transfers than they wanted to consume or, if they can sell part of the transfer, then
this would not make too much of a difference to our model and conclusions. A potentially more problematic
assumption for our model would be to allow people to invest in accumulating a stock of health, which could
compete with monetary savings, then it would matter to the effects that transfers have. We chose not to
follow this route because it would require careful modelling of the health-producing sector of the economy,
which was not our focus in this paper.
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3.3.2 The firms
There is a representative competitive firm that produces the consumption good by com-
bining capital K and intermediate goods x(j) according to the production function:






This firm rents capital from households paying r per unit, and buys intermediates at prices
























There is also a continuum j ∈ [0, 1] of monopolistic firms producing intermediate goods.
They are equally owned by all household, making profits d(j), which they immediately
distribute as dividends. Each firm operates a linear technology:
x(j) = l(j), (3.9)
where l(j) is the effective labor hired by firm j.
All of the prices and returns so far have been denominated in real terms, in units of the
final consumption good. Firms that produce intermediate good choose instead the nominal
price of their product, p(j)q where q is the price of the consumption good. These firms have
sticky information: each period, a fraction λ of the firms learn about the current state of the
world, while the remaining 1− λ have old information. Following an unexpected change in
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period 1, then in period t there is a group of firms with measure Λt = λ
∑t−1
i=0(1 − λ)i that
know about it, and a second group with measure 1− Λt that does not know and so has not
changed their price. Their optimal prices are then:
p(j) = µw if attentive, (3.10)
p(j) = µw0q0/q if inattentive, (3.11)
where w0 and q0 are the steady-state wages and prices, which firms that are unaware of the
change still expect to be in place. The resulting profits are







wx(j) if inattentive. (3.13)
3.3.3 The government
The focus of this paper is on fiscal policy. Leaving for future work the interactions of
fiscal and monetary policy, we simply assume that the monetary authority keeps the price
of the consumption good q = 1, a strict form of price-level targeting.
The fiscal authority chooses lump-sum transfers subject to the budget constraint:
G+
∫ ∫
T (s, h)dF (s, h) = τ, (3.14)
where G is exogenous government spending and τ is lump-sum taxes. There are two im-
portant assumptions about fiscal policy. First, transfers T (.) depend only on exogenous
characteristics of the households, so they do not distort optimal choices. Second, the bud-
get is balanced at every period in time, so there is no public debt outstanding. Therefore,
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we neutralize the two previously studied mechanisms behind aggregate effects of changes in
transfers, so that we can focus on the new mechanism we propose.
There is no aggregate uncertainty in our economy, but we will consider unanticipated
shocks to G or T (.). We do so using perfect-foresight comparative statics: starting from a
steady-state that agents expected would persist forever, in period 1 they learn that there has
been a change to some exogenous aggregate variables. There are no further changes from
then on, and agents can foresee all of the future path for aggregate variables. This greatly
simplifies the numerical analysis and the experience with the neoclassical growth model is
that these perfect-foresight comparative statics are often not too far from the first-order
approximate solutions of stochastic models.
3.3.4 Market clearing, equilibrium and shocks
Households enter each period with different wealth k as a result of different shocks and
decisions about savings and work. Combining household optimal behavior with the exoge-
nous distribution of household characteristics gives the endogenous distribution F (k, s, h) of
households in the economy.
Both the capital market, where households rent capital to the firm that produces final









k′∗(k, s, h)dF (k, s, h) = K ′. (3.16)
Because the firms are equally held by all households, total dividends paid equal dividends
129
received per capita: ∫
d(j)dj = d. (3.17)
Finally, this is a closed economy, so the insurance payments must add to zero:
∫
z(k, s, h)dF (k, s, h) = 0. (3.18)
We will focus on three aggregate variables in this model: aggregate output Y , aggregate
consumption C =
∫
c∗(k, s, h)dF (k, s, h), and total employment E =
∫
n∗(k, s, h)dF (k, s, h).
An equilibrium in these variables is characterized by households and firms behaving optimally
and markets clearing, as defined by equations (3.1)-(3.18).
3.3.5 The relation of our model to the literature
The two key ingredients in our model are imperfect insurance, present as long as the
payments z(.) do not reproduce the Pareto optimum allocation of consumption and labor
across ex ante identical households, and nominal rigidities, present as long as λ < 1 so that
following an aggregate shock firms take time to learn about it and adjust their prices.
The following three results provide a map between our model and three popular models
in the literature:
Proposition 3.1. With full insurance, there is a representative household capturing con-
sumer choices, that solves the problem





E(s2) [L− pi + (1− pi)(1− η)]2
2
+ βV (K ′)
}
s.t. (3.19)
C +K ′ = (1− δ + r)K + wL+M, (3.20)
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taking wages, interest rates, and M, as given.
Proposition 3.2. Without nominal rigidities, there is a representative firm solving:
max {Y − rK − (1 + τ)wL} s.t. Y = AKαL1−α, (3.21)
taking taxes τ = µ− 1, wages and interest rates as given.
Proposition 3.3. If there is full insurance and no nominal rigidities, the aggregate equilib-
rium is the set {Yt, Ct, Lt} such that the representative household in proposition 3.1 behaves
optimally, the representative firm in proposition 3.2 behaves optimally, and in equilibrium:
M = τwL−G. Equilibrium employment is:
E =
L+ [pi − (1− pi)(1− η)](E(s2)− 1)
E(s2)
.
Proof. See the appendix.
Combining these results covers three cases. First, with both complete insurance and
perfect price flexibility, the model reduces to a standard neoclassical growth model with
a payroll tax, as used to study fiscal shocks in Baxter and King (1993). The aggregate
technology is a standard Cobb-Douglas function and the payroll tax captures the inefficiency
brought about by markups in the intermediaries sector. The preferences of the representative
agent are separable over time and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is one. As for
labor supply, if everyone is healthy, then E = pi = 1 and all households work all the time, so
the model becomes identical to the textbook Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model. At the other
extreme, if pi = 0 and η = 1, then health is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, and the
implied Frisch elasticity of labor supply is exactly 1.
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Second, if there is full insurance together with nominal rigidities, then the model is similar
to the sticky-information model of Mankiw and Reis (2002) with two main differences. First,
there is capital and investment. Second, the labor market is similar to that in Gali (2011),
with the difference that unemployment is the result not only of low salary offers, but also of
poor health.
Third, if prices are flexible but there is no private insurance, then the model is close to
the version of the Aiyagari model in Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson (2010), expanded to have
health shocks. Without insurance, transfers move wealth across agents and affect their
willingness to work and consume.
From now onwards, we will assume that z(.) = 0, so there is no private insurance, and that
there are nominal rigidities so λ < 1. Our model differs from the standard new Keynesian
model because there is no representative agent. Closest to our study is Zubairy (2010), who
studies the fiscal multiplier of transfers and other fiscal policies in a new Keynesian DSGE
model. Transfers are lump-sum in her model as in ours, but they are deficit-financed. She
also assumes that debt is repaid in part by raising distortionary taxes. Increasing transfers
leads to higher future taxes, raising investment and labor supply today, a mechanism that
is absent from our model.
Our model differs from the work on incomplete markets because aggregate demand policy
has real effects. Moreover, we focus on transfers, unlike almost all of that literature, as well
as on the positive predictions of the model in response to shocks rather than on welfare
in the steady state.12 Closer to our paper is Heathcote (2005) who studies the effect of a
temporary tax cut on consumption in an incomplete markets economy. There are two key
differences between our setup and his. First, he obtains a link between wealth and labor
supply because consumption and leisure are substitutes, so transfers that raise wealth will
12Floden (2001) also studies transfers but focuses on welfare at the steady state.
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both increase consumption and labor supply. Instead, we assume that consumption and
leisure are separable in the utility function and focus on the wealth effect of transfers on labor
supply, whereas Heathcote (2005) assumes preferences for which labor supply is independent
of wealth. Second, he focuses on the effects of fiscal policy on the stock of available debt,
similarly to Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), which we neutralized by assuming a balanced
budget.
3.4 Targeting and the impact of transfers on aggregate
activity
Having set up the model, we now turn to the central question of the paper: What is the
effect on output and employment of an increase in transfers?
3.4.1 The neoclassical growth benchmark
A first answer is provided by two of the benchmark models described in the previous
section. In both the neoclassical growth model and in the baseline new Keynesian model
there is full insurance. Accordingly, as an immediate consequence from proposition 3.1:
Corollary 3.1. With full insurance, the choice of T (s, h) is irrelevant for aggregate output
and employment.
Because there is a representative agent, any rearrangement of wealth across households
is undone by equivalent insurance payments. Changes in transfer payments are neutral with
respect to economic activity.
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3.4.2 Choosing parameter values
Without insurance payments, the model must be solved numerically. The appendix
describes the algorithm we used. We picked the parameter values described in table 3.3 to
calibrate the steady state of the neoclassical growth model to a few moments.
The first section of the table has conventional targets and parameter choices for the
production technology and household preferences. The second section has the parameters
linked to the behavior of the firms producing intermediate goods: the average markup is 25%,
while 50% of firms update their information every year. This extent of imperfect competition
and nominal rigidities is on the high side, but not out of line with usual values. For the
idiosyncratic shocks hitting households, we assume that salary offers are quite persistent in
line with the estimates in Storesletten et al. (2004). The choice of σ is at the top range
of their estimates, because they considered only continuously employed males, whereas in
our model, s are salary offers that may be turned down. For the health shocks, we set
pi to match the share of U.S. households in the labor force without any disability, from
Kapteyn et al. (2010). We set η so that the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is 0.7, the
value suggested by Hall (2010) in his recent synthesis of micro and macro estimates in the
literature. Finally, the third section has one parameter χ that was hard to calibrate and
requires a brief explanation. This parameter is pinned down by the average value of G/Y .
However, for high values of G/Y and corresponding high values of lump-sum taxes τ , it was
possible that sometimes an agent with a bad salary and health draws did not have enough
wealth to pay the tax bill. In other words, the natural debt limit is tighter than zero.
Instead, we calibrate to the case where G = 0, avoiding this problem.13
13Alternatively, to target the average G/Y in the post-war leads to χ = 3.00. The corresponding figures
for the alternative calibration are available from the authors, and lead to a somewhat larger effect of fiscal
policy on aggregate activity.
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3.4.3 Targeted transfers: The neoclassical channel
With imperfect insurance, transfers from healthy high-salary households to those with
low wealth and low salaries boost employment and output through what we call a neoclassical
channel. Since the marginal worker pays more in taxes than she receives in transfers, more
generous transfers imply she has less wealth and so has a stronger incentive to work.
To understand this channel, panel A of figure 3.1 plots the threshold hˆ(s) =
∫
h∗(k, s)dF (k),
where h∗(k, s) is the optimal threshold function such that people work if and only if h ≥
h∗(k, s). The locus is downward-sloping, and those above it are working, while those below
it are not working. Consider then a carefully targeted transfer from the population in the
middle box to the population in the corner box.14 Crucially, those receiving the transfers are
very far from ever working. Therefore, the extra wealth barely changes their work decision.
In contrast, those paying the transfer are at the margin between working or not. As their
wealth has fallen, they are more willing to take a job, boosting employment.
The other panels of figure 3.1 have the impulse responses to this shock. To isolate
the neoclassical channel, we set λ = 1, so there are no nominal rigidities. In the top right
diagram, we see the increase in employment among the marginal workers, and the very slight
fall among other groups in the population. The bottom panels show that employment and
output both increase by about 0.8% of GDP for a 3.4% increase in transfers.
3.4.4 Targeted transfers: The Keynesian channel
Since the recipients of transfers have on average a higher MPC than the payees, transfers
boost aggregate demand, which firms with rigid prices satisfy by hiring more workers and
producing more. This is an eminently Keynesian channel.
14We consider a large increase in transfers, of 4.4% of GDP, the total increase in government expenditures
during 2007:4 to 2009:4. Our goal in this section is still to just gauge the effects qualitatively.
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Panel A of figure 3.2 plots the marginal propensities to consume out of cash on hand as
a function of the salary offer for the healthy. That is, it plots m(s) =
∫
[∂c∗(k, s, 1)/∂[(1−
δ + r)k]]dF (k, 1). Since this group of the population always chooses to work, there is no
wealth effect on labor supply and no neoclassical channel, so we can focus on the Keynesian
channel. Consider then a transfer from the group in the box on the right to the group in the
box on the left. This will boost aggregate consumption, and if some price plans are fixed,
the increased demand will induce firms to increase hiring and production.
Panels B to D of figure 3.2 plot the impulse responses. As expected, the increase in
consumption from the transfer recipients is higher than that from the transfer payees, leading
to an expansion. The overall impact is about one-tenth of the neoclassical experiment, and
because consumption increases by relatively more, there is also a deeper slump after impact
due to decumulation of capital.
3.5 The quantitative effect of the 2007-09 fiscal expan-
sion
Section 3.2 documented that, between 2007:4 and 2009:4, transfers and government pur-
chases increased by 3.4% and 1% of GDP, respectively. What was the effect of these changes
on output and employment according to our model?
3.5.1 The effect of transfers
There is no study on how U.S. transfers, as a whole, are distributed across different
groups in the population. We proceed by considering two approximations.
First, we assume a discretionary increase in transfers, from the luckiest members of
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society to the least lucky, in terms of their health and salary offer. We engineer a transfer
from those in the top 17% of the health-salary offer distribution to the bottom 14%, where
the thresholds were determined to make the transfer as focussed as possible, but not so much
that it would turn the rich into poor and vice-versa.
Second, we consider instead an increase in the generosity of a systematic policy rule for
transfers. In our rule, we want to capture two features of the U.S. system. First, that those
hit by low salary offers or disease receive more, so T (.) is decreasing in both arguments.
Second, that the healthy do not receive transfers associated with health. Towards this goal
we use the following simple linear function










I(h ≤ η), (3.22)
where I(x) is the indicator function, equal to 1 if x is true, and equal to zero otherwise. The
parameter γs measures the money transfer to the person with the worst salary offer in the
economy, and γh is the money transfer to the least healthy. The upper threshold for the
salary offer s¯ is at the 95th percentile of the distribution of s, and serves to keep transfers
bounded above. As for the 3/4 fraction, it ensures that the healthiest of the unhealthy
still receive a positive transfer (of γh/4), but which is four times smaller than the transfer
received by the most unhealthy.
The two parameters γs and γh are chosen to hit two calibration targets at the steady
state: the average ratio of total transfers to GDP between 2003 and 2007, and the average
share of medical care transfers in total transfers. The third section of table 3.3 reports the
choices. The fiscal expansion of 2007-09 is then captured by an increase in both γs and γh
in the same proportion unexpectedly for one period.
Panels A and B of figure 3.3 show marginal propensities to consume as well as the hˆ(s)
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threshold for work decisions. Also in the picture is the function g(s) defined as T (s, g(s)) = τ .
Those above this threshold are, on net after taxes, paying the government, whereas those
below are receiving a net positive transfer. Because g < h in most of the domain, increasing
the scope of systematic transfers still generates the neoclassical effect discussed earlier. And,
because the marginal propensities to consume for the less healthy and the less fortunate are
higher, the Keynesian effect will also be in place.
The impulse responses of employment and output are in panels C and D. Both employ-
ment and output increase, although by small amounts. Depending on how we model the
increase in transfers, the increase in output is only between 0.02% and 0.06% of GDP.
3.5.2 Multipliers and government purchases
Panels E and F of figure 3.3 plot instead the effect of the increase in government purchases
during 2007-09, again assuming a one-time transitory increase in G. Employment rises, as
consumers work more to compensate for the lost wealth, and this raises output by a little
more than 0.06% of GDP. However, savings fall, lowering the capital stock and output from
the second period onwards.
Much of the debate on fiscal spending has revolved around multipliers. It is tempting to
conclude from the figure that the purchases multiplier is larger than the transfers multiplier.
But it is not correct to compare the increase in output from an increase in transfers vis-a`-
vis an increase in purchases. Whereas a dollar spent on government purchases subtracts
from dollars available for private consumption, the same dollar in social transfers does not
use up any resources. A more appropriate comparison uses the net purchases multiplier,
measuring the increase in private consumption and investment. From this perspective, in
our model transfers are a significantly more effective way of boosting output than government
purchases.
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Both multipliers are nonetheless quite small. Our model has a gross purchases multiplier
of 0.06, a small number when compared to the recent literature cited in footnote 1. There
are many reasons for the discrepancy, all of which are related to the simplicity of our model.
To name a few, our fiscal shock is purely transitory, there are no adjustment costs that mute
the crowding-out effect on capital, and nominal interest rates are positive. Adding many of
these ingredients to our model may similarly increase the effect of transfers by as much as
an order of magnitude.
Our goal in this paper is to present the mechanism in the simplest possible way, and
the particular set of functional forms and parameters were chosen mostly so that the model
would nest three other existing models. We did not exhaustively search for modifications
of the model that would both add realism and possibly boost the impact of transfers. The
next subsection describes our exploration of alternatives.
3.5.3 Sensitivity analysis and the value of the marginal propensity
to consume
First, we made the shock persistent rather than one-period lived making sure that the
cumulative impact was the same. This lowered the initial impact of the shock, but it
reduced the negative posterior effect, leading output to often converge to its steady state
value from above. Second, we saw whether assuming that there are systematic transfers
in the steady state or not affected the responses of output and employment to shocks to
transfers or purchases. The differences were barely noticeable. Likewise, we replaced the
price-level targeting rule with nominal-income targeting and a Wicksellian interest-rate rule,
without any appreciable quantitative change. Fourth, the response to a purchases shock is
similar in our model to what it would be in the neoclassical model covered in proposition
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3.3. Finally, since the model is non-linear we explored varying the size of the initial shock.
Doubling the shocks more than doubles the impact, but the qualitative dynamics are similar.
Two facts lead us to suspect that our model underestimates the size of the transfers effect.
First, because there are no adjustment costs of investment, the capital stock falls significantly
in response to the fiscal programs, leading to a large negative effect that dominates even a
few periods after the shock. Yet, Burnside et al. (2004) and others have typically found
that investment falls only little, if at all, in response to fiscal shocks. Second, the average
MPC in our model is 11%. Yet, Parker et al. (2011) in their thorough study of the effect of
tax rebates on consumption found average marginal propensities to consume between 12%
and 30%.
To address these two pitfalls, we made two coarse modifications to the model. First, we
fixed the aggregate capital stock K and set the depreciation rate to zero, so that consumers
now save in shares of this fixed amount, and the marginal return to capital is paid as
dividends to these shares. This eliminates the crowding-out of capital entirely. Second, we
lowered β to 0.85 so that consumers are more impatient, hit the borrowing constraint more
often and so have higher propensities to consume, close to the ones estimated by Parker
et al. (2011). Panels E and F of figure 3.3 show the impulse response to a discretionary
untargeted increase in transfers. The effect on output and employment is two to three times
larger than before.
3.6 Conclusion
Almost all of the research on the short-run positive impact of government expenditures
has focussed on government purchases. Yet, both the past trends in public finances across
the OECD, as well as the more recent responses to the great recession, have been dominated
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by increases in social transfers. Perhaps these changes in transfers have no effects on employ-
ment and output, as is implicit in representative-agent models with Ricardian equivalence.
But just as likely, this is just a fertile area of new research for macroeconomics.
This paper tried to move forward by building a model where social transfers are expan-
sionary through the two leading mechanisms that are routinely used to explain the expan-
sionary impact of government consumption. The neoclassical channel emphasizes the effect
of lowering wealth of marginal workers, thus inducing them to increase labor supply. The
Keynesian effect relies instead on transferring resources from households with a low marginal
propensity to consume to those with a high marginal propensity to consume, thus boosting
consumption, aggregate demand and output. The two ingredients that give rise to these
effects are incomplete insurance markets against income shocks, and nominal rigidities in
setting prices.
Fiscal policy of the United States in 2007-09 seemed to involve a large discretionary
increase in transfers. Using our model to assess the quantitative effect of this policy, we
found that it likely boosted output and employment, albeit by relatively modest amounts.
Our quantitative conclusions must still be taken as a first step. The jury is still out on
whether it is possible to get quantitatively large transfer multipliers. It took almost thirty
years to go from the initial small purchases multipliers in Barro (1981) and Barro and King
(1984) to the large ones in Christiano et al. (2011). Perhaps the same will happen as
the study of the macroeconomic effects of government expenditures shifts towards social
transfers.
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Country Percentage Fraction of Fraction of Growth in
change in total increase in increase in transfers in excess
expenditures expenditures expenditures of GDP and trend
due to transfers due to purchases spending growth
United States 14.2% 75% 27% 25.4%
Ireland 2.5% 232% −206% 37.9%
Italy 1.0% 147% 32% 6.9%
Luxembourg 4.3% 145% −60% 12.6%
Portugal 7.4% 101% 4% 12.7%
Japan 5.3% 86% 9% −9.3%
Sweden 6.5% 69% 52% 19.9%
Greece 17.2% 75% 22% 24.3%
France 6.0% 74% 46% 9.5%
Slovakia 20.7% 64% 34% 37.5%
Netherlands 15.9% 63% 41% 23.8%
Belgium 13.3% 60% 42% 15.4%
Germany 9.2% 59% 44% 11.2%
UK 17.3% 52% 47% 24.4%
Spain 11.1% 47% 50% 17.1%
Finland 11% 43% 56% 25.7%
Poland 30.2% 40% 52% 21.9%
Denmark 14.2% 36% 56% 19.8%
Austria 5.4% 35% 65% 6.8%
Czech Republic 10.3% 34% 62% 3.7%
Canada 11.2% 31% 76% 4.2%
Hungary −4.3% 78% 44% −9.9%
Table 3.1: Government expenditures and their components from 2007Q4 to 2009Q4
Notes: The data are quarterly and from the integrated government accounts from NIPA, Eurostat
and the OECD. The fractions due to purchases and transfers do not add up to 100 because
interest payments are omitted.
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Dollar change in Change in
billions percentage of GDP
Social Transfers 409 2.72%
Retirement and disabilities 98 0.63%
Medical 121 0.78%
Unemployment insurance 97 0.68%
Income assistance and others 94 0.63%
Capital transfers 131 0.91%
Total transfers 522 3.50%
Government purchases 219 1.33%
Government expenditures 710 4.57%
Table 3.2: Dollar increase in government expenditures in the US from 2007 to 2009
Notes: Annual data from tables 3.12 and 3.2 of NIPA. Purchases plus transfers do not equal
expenditures because interest payments are omitted. Total transfers do not equal capital plus
social transfers in part because subsidies are omitted.
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Moments targeted: interest rate 4%, capital share of income 36%, ratio of
consumption of nondurables and services to investment and spending of durables 3.








Moments targeted: average markup in the US economy 25%, fraction of
population inattentive 12 months after the shock 50%, serial correlation of income
shocks 0.9, standard deviation of salary offers 0.25, fraction of US workforce that
reports no disability affecting their work 0.51,Frisch elasticity of labor supply 0.7,
ratio of employment to population 59%.
Third group: Parameters related to the size of the government
Parameter Value
χ 2.20
τ 0 without steady state transfers
0.11 with systematic transfers
γs 0.12
γh 0.17
Moments targeted: government spending over GDP 0, transfers over GDP 12.6%,
medical care transfers as a share of total transfers 0.45.
Table 3.3: Parameter values
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Figure 3.1: Impulse responses to a transfer targeted to enhance the neoclassical channel
Notes: Panel A shows the optimal policy function for working by those hit by health shocks:
those about and to the right of the downward-sloping curve choose to work, while those to the left
and below do not. The rectangles show the areas of the distribution of skill and health that
receive and pay for the transfer. Panel B shows the impulse response of work to the transfer for
the five quintiles in the population. Panels C and D show the impulse responses of aggregate
employment and output to the transfer.
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Figure 3.2: Impulse responses to a transfer targeted to enhance the Keynesian channel
Notes: Panel A shows the optimal marginal propensity to consume an extra dollar of assets for
the healthy households as a function of their skills. The rectangles show the ares of the
distribution that receive and pay for the transfer. Panel B shows the impulse response of
consumption to the transfer for the five quintiles in the population. Panels C and D show the
impulse responses of aggregate employment and output to the transfer.
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Figure 3.3: The response of the model economy to the 2007-09 fiscal expansion
Notes: Panel A shows the optimal policy function h(s) for working by those hit by health shocks,
so that only those above and to the right of the curve choose to work, and the threshold g(s) for
receiving net transfers, so that only those above and to the right of the curve pay net transfers.
Panel B shows the marginal propensity to consume an extra unit of assets for the healthy and
averaging across the sick. Panels C to F show impulse responses of macroeconomic aggregates.
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Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 The inventory model for estimation
Here, we lay down the stock-elastic inventory model, allowing for trends and both station-
ary and nonstationary shocks as in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2012). We start by defining
the trend components of the model.
A.1.1 Trends in the model
The two sources of nonstationarity in the model of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2012) are
neutral and investment-specific productivity. Aggregate sales St can be written as
St = Ct + Z
I
t It +Gt,
where ZIt is the nonstationary investment-specific productivity. From this equation and
balanced growth path, we observe that ZIt It/St is stationary. Letting the trend of aggregate
158
sales to be XYt and the trend of It to be X
I






Moreover, from the capital accumulation function, capital and investment should follow the































We are now ready to write the stationary problem. It will be useful to write the stationary





























































With these stationary variables, we can express the problem in terms of stationary variables.
We start with the household problem.
A.1.2 Household problem












Ht = (Ct − bCt−1)γhH1−γht−1 .
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1− σ + Λm,t
[






+Λh,t[Ht − (Ct − bCt−1)γhH1−γht−1 ]










+ (1− δ(ut))Kt −Kt+1
]}
.
Hence the household first order conditions are characterized by the following:
[Mt] : ζh,tM
−σ
t = Λm,t, (A.4)




= βEtΛh,t+1(Ct+1 − bCt)γhH−γht (1− γh), (A.5)
[Ct] : Λm,t − Λh,tγh(Ct − bCt−1)γh−1H1−γht−1 − βbEt[Λm,t+1 − Λh,t+1γh(Ct+1 − bCt)γh−1H1−γht ] = Λt,
(A.6)



































[Kt+1] : Λk,t = βEt[Λt+1Rt+1ut+1 + Λk,t+1(1− δ(ut+1))], (A.9)
[ut] : ΛtRt = Λk,tδ
′(ut), [ut = 1 if not allowed to vary], (A.10)









[Λh,t] : Ht = (Ct − bCt−1)γhH1−γht−1 , (A.13)









+ (1− δ(ut))Kt. (A.14)
and the household budget constraint. We also want private spending Spt and total absorption
St as
Spt = Ct + Z
I
t It, (A.15)
St = Ct + Z
I
t It +Gt. (A.16)




−σ , λh,t =
Λh,t
(XYt )
−σ , λt =
Λt
(XYt )











Using these expressions as well as the ones defined in the previous section, we rewrite the
household first order condition in terms of stationary variables:
[mt] : ζh,tm
−σ
t = λm,t, (A.17)




= βEtλh,t+1(µYt+1)−σ(ct+1µYt+1 − bct)γhh−γht (1− γh), (A.18)
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[nt] : λtwt = λm,tψtn
ξ−1
t ht, (A.20)





































[kt+1] : λk,t = βEt(µYt+1)−σµAt+1[λt+1rt+1ut+1 + λk,t+1(1− δ(ut+1))], (A.22)
[ut] : λtrt = λk,tδ
′(ut), [ut = 1 if not allowed to vary], (A.23)






























+ (1− δ(ut)) kt
µIt
, (A.27)
[spt ] : s
p
t = ct + it, (A.28)




Now, in log-linearized form:
[mt] : ζˆh,t − σmˆt = λˆm,t, (A.30)
[ht] : λˆh,t −
[
1− β(1− γh)(µY )1−σ
] [
λˆm,t + ψˆt + (1 + ξ
−1)nˆt
]
= β(1− γh)(µY )1−σ
[
Etλˆh,t+1 + (1− σ)EtµˆYt+1 + Ethˆt+1 − hˆt
]
, (A.31)




λˆh,t + hˆt − µ
Y
µY − b cˆt +
b












EtµˆYt+1 − βb(µY )−σλmEtλˆm,t+1




Etλˆh,t+1 + Ethˆt+1 − µ
Y
µY − bEtcˆt+1 +
b








[nt] : λˆt + wˆt = λˆm,t + ψˆt +
1
ξ
nˆt + hˆt, (A.33)
[it] : λˆk,t = λˆt − zˆkt + µIφ′′I (ˆit − iˆt−1 + µˆIt )− β
µA
(µY )σ
(µI)3φ′′I (Etiˆt+1 − iˆt + EtµˆIt+1), (A.34)
[kt+1] : λˆk,t = EtµˆAt+1 − σEtµˆYt+1 + β(µY )−σµA(1− δk)Etλˆk,t+1
+
[
1− β(µY )−σµA(1− δk)
]
(Etλˆt+1 + Etrˆt+1 + Etuˆt+1)− β(µY )−σµAδ′kEtuˆt+1, (A.35)
[ut] : λˆt + rˆt = λˆk,t +
δ′′k
δ′k
uˆt, [uˆt = 0 if not allowed to vary], (A.36)
[bt+1] : Etqˆt,t+1 = Etλˆt+1 − λˆt − σEtµˆYt+1, (A.37)















[λh,t] : hˆt =
γhµ
Y
µY − b cˆt − b
γh




t + (1− γh)hˆt−1 − (1− γh)µˆYt , (A.39)















































αK − 1 µˆ
A
t , (A.43)




t − µˆAt , (A.44)




t−1 − µˆYt . (A.45)
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A.1.3 Firm problem without inventories
This section is only for completeness. The readers should skip this section and read
the firm problem with stock-elastic inventories. The firm side is subject to monopolistic
competition. As you will see, this aspect itself will introduce no changes in the dynamics




















As is well known, the last constraint is the demand constraint when no inventory adjustment
is allowed. Letting the multiplier on this constraint to be the marginal cost, we can state



































[mct(j)] : Yt(j) = St(j),
and a technology constraint: Yt(j) = zt(ut(j)Kt(j))
αKnt(j)
αN l1−αK−αNX1−αKt .















[mct] : Yt = St,
[tech] : Yt = zt(utKt)
αKnαNt l
1−αK−αNX1−αKt .


















[mct] : yt = st,





In a log-linear setup, we can rewrite these conditions as
[pt] : m̂ct = 0, (A.46)
[nt] : m̂ct + yˆt − nˆt = wˆt, (A.47)
[utkt] : m̂ct + yˆt − uˆt − kˆt = rˆt − µˆIt , (A.48)
[mct] : yˆt = sˆt, (A.49)
[tech] : yˆt = zˆt + αK uˆt + αK kˆt + αN nˆt − αK µˆIt . (A.50)
A.1.4 Computing the steady state in the no-inventory model
First of all, by targeting the markup µ, we get θ = µ/(µ − 1). Also, mc = 1/µ. The
other targets we want to force are labor supply n, steady-state output growth rate µY , and
steady-state investment growth rate µI .
Now from the capital investment condition, we get that λ = λk. Hence the capital stock
condition tells us that r = (µY )σ(µAβ)−1 − 1 + δk. With u = 1, the utilization condition
forces the depreciation acceleration due to utilization to be δ′k = r. Using the capital rental









Therefore, output is y = kαKnαN l1−αK−αN (µI)−αK and investment is i = (1− (1− δk)/µI)k.
Real wage is w = αNmcy/n and consumption is therefore c = y − i− xGg.
With these pillars, we also get the household utility aspects. The stock of habit is
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h = c(µY − b)(µY )−1/γh . We have the following steady-state conditions:
m−σ = λm,



































The first thing to pin down is ψ. Using the second to fourth conditions above, we can obtain
ψ:











(1 + ξ−1)(1− β(µY )1−σ(1− γh))
]
.
Once you pin down ψ, you can also obtain m as above. Then, from the first condition, you
also get λm. Therefore λh and λ are also obtained and we are done.
A.1.5 Writing down all the equilibrium conditions for the no-
inventory model
The 21 endogenous variables are
mt, λm,t, λh,t, nt, ct, ht, λt, wt, λk,t, it, rt, ut, r
f
t , kt+1, s
p







and the 7 exogenous processes are ζh,t, ψt, zt, z
k




t . The 21 endogenous equations
are:
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[mt] : ζˆh,t − σmˆt = λˆm,t, (A.51)
[ht] : λˆh,t −
[
1− β(1− γh)(µY )1−σ
] [
λˆm,t + ψˆt + (1 + ξ
−1)nˆt
]
= β(1− γh)(µY )1−σ
[
Etλˆh,t+1 + (1− σ)EtµˆYt+1 + Ethˆt+1 − hˆt
]
, (A.52)




λˆh,t + hˆt − µ
Y
µY − b cˆt +
b












EtµˆYt+1 − βb(µY )−σλmEtλˆm,t+1




Etλˆh,t+1 + Ethˆt+1 − µ
Y
µY − bEtcˆt+1 +
b








[nt] : λˆt + wˆt = λˆm,t + ψˆt +
1
ξ
nˆt + hˆt, (A.54)
[it] : λˆk,t = λˆt − zˆkt + µIφ′′(µI)(ˆit − iˆt−1 + µˆIt )− β
µA
(µY )σ
(µI)3φ′′(µI)(Etiˆt+1 − iˆt + EtµˆIt+1),
(A.55)
[kt+1] : λˆk,t = EtµˆAt+1 − σEtµˆYt+1 + β(µY )−σµA(1− δk)Etλˆk,t+1
+ [1− β(µY )−σµA(1− δk)](Etλˆt+1 + Etrˆt+1 + Etuˆt+1)− β(µY )−σµAδ′kEtuˆt+1, (A.56)
[ut] : λˆt + rˆt = λˆk,t +
δ′′k
δ′k
uˆt, [uˆt = 0 if not allowed to vary], (A.57)
[bt+1] : − rˆft = Etλˆt+1 − λˆt − σEtµˆYt+1, [written in terms of the real interest rate], (A.58)















[λh,t] : hˆt =
γhµ
Y
µY − b cˆt − b
γh




t + (1− γh)hˆt−1 − (1− γh)µˆYt , (A.60)
















































αK − 1 µˆ
A
t , (A.64)




t − µˆAt , (A.65)




t−1 − µˆYt , (A.66)
[pt] : m̂ct = 0, (A.67)
[nt] : m̂ct + yˆt − nˆt = wˆt, (A.68)
[utkt] : m̂ct + yˆt − uˆt − kˆt = rˆt − µˆIt , (A.69)
[mct] : yˆt = sˆt, (A.70)
[tech] : yˆt = zˆt + αK uˆt + αK kˆt + αN nˆt − αK µˆIt . (A.71)
A.1.6 Firm problem with stock-elastic inventories






































INVt(j) = At(j)− St(j).
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The firm problem now has an active dynamic margin by storing more goods and selling
in the future, at the same time by being able to create more demand by producing more





St(j)−Wtnt(j)−Rtut(j)Kt(j) + τt(j){zt(ut(j)Kt(j))αKnt(j)αN l1−αN−αKX1−αKt − Yt(j)}
+mct(j)
{




























The first order conditions turn out to be the following:




































































1For quantitative issues on matching the smoothness of the aggregate stock of inventories, we also allow
for adjustment costs for inventories. As we noted in the main paper, the smoothness of the stock of inventories
relative to sales remains a challenge on inventory models. We leave this as future research and approximate
that aspect by allowing for adjustment costs. However, we believe that the moment we focus on (which is
the comovement property between inventories and components of sales) is not sensitive to the smoothness





























































[INVt(j)] : INVt(j) = At(j)− St(j).
In a symmetric equilibrium, the following conditions hold:
[τt] : Yt = zt(utKt)
αKnαNt l
1−αK−αNX1−αKt ,
















[pt] : 1 = θtςt,

















































































































[INVt] : INVt = At − St.
Note that ςt = 1/θt. Hence simplifying the above notation we get the following 8 conditions:










































































































































[INVt] : INVt = At − St.
Expressing these into stationary variables (with At = atX
Y
t and INVt = invtX
Y
t ):











































































































































































[INVt] : invt = at − st.
Writing µt = θt/(θt − 1), the 8 log-linearized conditions are the following:
[τt] : yˆt = zˆt + αK uˆt + αK kˆt + αN nˆt − αK µˆIt , (A.72)
[mct] : aµ
Y aˆt + aµ
Y µˆYt = (1− δi)aaˆt−1 − (1− δi)ssˆt−1 + yµY yˆt + yµY µˆYt , (A.73)
[st] : (µ
Y )2φ′′inv(învt − învt−1 + µˆYt )
= β(µY )−σ(1− δi)[µˆt − rˆft + Etm̂ct+1] + β(µY )3−σφ′′inv[Etînvt+1 − învt + EtµˆYt+1], (A.74)
[yt] : τˆt = m̂ct + β(µ
Y )3−σφ′′yEtyˆt+1 − (µY + β(µY )3−σ)φ′′y yˆt + µY φ′′y yˆt−1
+ β(µY )3−σφ′′yEtµˆYt+1 − µY φ′′yµˆYt , (A.75)
[nt] : τˆt + yˆt − nˆt = wˆt, (A.76)
[utkt] : τˆt + yˆt − uˆt − kˆt = rˆt − µˆIt , (A.77)
[at] : m̂ct + (µ
Y )2φ′′inv[învt − învt−1 + µˆYt ] + (µY )2φ′′a[aˆt − aˆt−1 + µˆYt ]
= (1− β(µY )−σ(1− δi))
(
ζˆt + sˆt − aˆt + 1
µ− 1 µˆt
)
+ β(µY )−σ(1− δi)(−rˆft + Etm̂ct+1)
+ β(µY )3−σφ′′inv[Etînvt+1 − învt + EtµˆYt+1] + β(µY )3−σφ′′a[Etaˆt+1 − aˆt + EtµˆYt+1], (A.78)
[invt] : invînvt = aaˆt − ssˆt. (A.79)
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A.1.7 Computing the steady state in the stock-elastic inventory
model
Again, we target directly the markup µ and in the inventory model, note that mc =
[µβ(µY )−σ(1− δi)]−1. The values for n, µY , µI , r, u, δ′k, k, y, i, and w are all obtained in the
same manner as in the no-inventory model.
The new parameters and steady-state values we compute are ζ, δi, a, inv, τ . First, δi is
calibrated directly and τ = mc. To obtain ζ, we target the steady-state stock-sales ratio a/s











From this, we also get
s =
µY y













Therefore, c = s − i − xGg. The same procedure follows in getting the values for h, ψ, m,
λm, λh, λ, λk.
A.1.8 Writing down all the equilibrium conditions for the stock-
elastic inventory model
The 24 endogenous variables are
mt, λm,t, λh,t, nt, ct, ht, λt, wt, λk,t, it, rt, ut, r
f
t , kt+1, s
p








The 3 endogenous variables τt, at, invt are newly added in the inventory model. The 9
exogenous processes are ζh,t, ψt, zt, z
k




t , ζt, µt. The 24 endogenous equations are:
[mt] : ζˆh,t − σmˆt = λˆm,t, (A.80)
[ht] : λˆh,t − [1− β(µY )1−σ(1− γh)]
[
λˆm,t + ψˆt + (1 + ξ
−1)nˆt
]
= β(µY )1−σ(1− γh)[Etλh,t+1 + (1− σ)EtµˆYt+1 + Ethˆt+1 − hˆt], (A.81)




λˆh,t + hˆt − µ
Y
µY − b cˆt +
b












EtµˆYt+1 − βb(µY )−σλmEtλˆm,t+1




Etλˆh,t+1 + Ethˆt+1 − µ
Y
µY − bEtcˆt+1 +
b








[nt] : λˆt + wˆt = λˆm,t + ψˆt +
1
ξ
nˆt + hˆt, (A.83)
[it] : λˆk,t = λˆt − zˆkt + µIφ′′(µI)(ˆit − iˆt−1 + µˆIt )− β
µA
(µY )σ
(µI)3φ′′(µI)(Etiˆt+1 − iˆt + EtµˆIt+1),
(A.84)
[kt+1] : λˆk,t = EtµˆAt+1 − σEtµˆYt+1 + β(µY )−σµA(1− δk)Etλˆk,t+1
+ [1− β(µY )−σµA(1− δk)](Etλˆt+1 + Etrˆt+1 + Etuˆt+1)− β(µY )−σµAδ′kEtuˆt+1, (A.85)
[ut] : λˆt + rˆt = λˆk,t +
δ′′k
δ′k
uˆt, [uˆt = 0 if not allowed to vary], (A.86)
[bt+1] : − rˆft = Etλˆt+1 − λˆt − σEtµˆYt+1, [written in terms of the real interest rate], (A.87)















[λh,t] : hˆt =
γhµ
Y
µY − b cˆt − b
γh




t + (1− γh)hˆt−1 − (1− γh)µˆYt , (A.89)
















































αK − 1 µˆ
A
t , (A.93)




t − µˆAt , (A.94)




t−1 − µˆYt , (A.95)
[τt] : yˆt = zˆt + αK uˆt + αK kˆt + αN nˆt − αK µˆIt , (A.96)
[mct] : aµ
Y aˆt + aµ
Y µˆYt = (1− δi)aaˆt−1 − (1− δi)ssˆt−1 + yµY yˆt + yµY µˆYt , (A.97)
[st] : (µ
Y )2φ′′inv(învt − învt−1 + µˆYt )
= β(µY )−σ(1− δi)[µˆt − rˆft + Etm̂ct+1] + β(µY )3−σφ′′inv[Etînvt+1 − învt + EtµˆYt+1], (A.98)
[yt] : τˆt = m̂ct + β(µ
Y )3−σφ′′yEtyˆt+1 − (µY + β(µY )3−σ)φ′′y yˆt + µY φ′′y yˆt−1
+ β(µY )3−σφ′′yEtµˆYt+1 − µY φ′′yµˆYt , (A.99)
[nt] : τˆt + yˆt − nˆt = wˆt, (A.100)
[utkt] : τˆt + yˆt − uˆt − kˆt = rˆt − µˆIt , (A.101)
[at] : m̂ct + (µ
Y )2φ′′inv[învt − învt−1 + µˆYt ] + (µY )2φ′′a[aˆt − aˆt−1 + µˆYt ]
= (1− β(µY )−σ(1− δi))
(
ζˆt + sˆt − aˆt + 1
µ− 1 µˆt
)
+ β(µY )−σ(1− δi)(−rˆft + Etm̂ct+1)
+ β(µY )3−σφ′′inv[Etînvt+1 − învt + EtµˆYt+1] + β(µY )3−σφ′′a[Etaˆt+1 − aˆt + EtµˆYt+1], (A.102)
[invt] : invînvt = aaˆt − ssˆt. (A.103)
A.2 Model estimation
The estimation strategy will be Bayesian, and mostly follow section 5 of Schmitt-Grohe´
and Uribe (2012). Readers should refer to that section for a detailed discussion. In table A.1,
we present the calibration in estimating the above illustrated stock-elastic inventory model
as described in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2012), with our own calibrations for inventories
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as discussed in the main paper.
The period of data we use are 1955Q2-2006Q4. For the measurement equation, we use
the same 7 observables (output growth, consumption growth, investment growth, hours
growth, government consumption growth, productivity growth, investment price growth) as
in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2012), where measurement errors are only allowed on output
growth. On top of that, we also use the per capita real growth rate of inventories as an
additional observable, with measurement errors also allowed on this series. The source of
measurement error on inventories is due to different valuations in GDP computation and
inventory measurement. That is, real stock of inventories in NIPA are computed by taking
the average price during the period, using various valuation methods (FIFO, market value).
On the other hand, inventory investment used to produce GDP is computed by the end-of-
period price of inventories.2 We allow for persistence in the measurement error for inventories.
It is important to notice that adding data on inventories as an observable is not crucial
to our estimation purpose. Inventory investment is implicitly included in the existing ob-
servables used for estimation (output, consumption, investment and government spending)
by the resource constraint (output net of consumption, investment, and government spend-
ing is inventory investment in a closed economy). However, in the actual output data, net
exports are also included and may potentially mask the dynamics of inventories. By directly
including the stock of inventories as an observable, the inventory adjustment mechanism is
likely to be more precisely estimated.
Table A.2 summarizes the priors and posteriors in the model. Notice that for the priors
on the standard deviations, we set the contemporaneous shock to account for 75 percent of
the total variance of the shocks. That is, priors are set such that news shocks account for
25 percent of the total variance.
2We thank Michael Cortez at the Bureau of Economic Analysis for clarifying this.
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Table A.3 summarizes the prediction of the model. For standard deviations, most values
are close to the data, but for fixed investment and inventories, the standard deviations are
about 50 percent higher. Second, the model also predicts that inventories are positively
correlated with output growth, with a correlation of 0.21. Lastly, we observe that the model
autocorrelation is quite similar to the data, with hours (N) showing the most trouble, which
is also discussed in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2012).
A.3 News shocks in the stockout-avoidance inventory
model
In this appendix, we describe a Real Business Cycle version of the stockout-avoidance
models of Kahn (1987) and Kryvtsov and Midrigan (2013), and analyze its impact response
to news shocks.
A.3.1 Model description
The economy consists of a representative household and monopolistically competitive
firms, where again firms produce storable goods. We start with the household problem.
Since many aspects of the model are similar to the stock-elastic model, we will frequently
refer to chapter 1.
Household problem A representative household maximizes (1.1), subject to the house-
hold budget constraint (1.2), capital accumulation rule (1.3), and the resource constraint
(1.4). The aggregation of goods {st(j)}j∈[0,1] into xt is given by (1.5), where vt(j) is the
taste-shifter for product j in period t.
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In stockout-avoidance models, in contrast to the stock-elastic demand models, this taste-
shifter is assumed to be exogenous. In particular, we assume it is identically distributed
across firms and over time according to a cumulative distribution function F (·) with a support
Ω(·):
vt(j) ∼ F, vt(j) ∈ Ω. (A.104)
For each product j, households cannot buy more than the goods on-shelf at(j), which is
chosen by firms:
st(j) ≤ at(j), ∀j ∈ [0, 1]. (A.105)
Although (A.105) also holds for the stock-elastic model, it has not been mentioned since
it was never binding. Households observe these shocks, and the amount of goods on shelf
at(j), before making their purchase decisions. Firms, however, do not observe the shock
vt(j) when deciding upon the amount at(j) of goods that are placed on shelf, so that (A.105)
occasionally binds, resulting in a stockout.
Again, a demand function and a price aggregator can be obtained from the expenditure











which states that when vt(j) is high enough so that demand is higher than the amount of











The variable p˜t(j) is the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (A.105). It reflects the household’s
shadow valuation of goods of variety j. For varieties that do not stock out, p˜t(j) = pt(j),
whereas for varieties that do stock out, p˜t(j) > pt(j).
Firm problem Each monopolistically competitive firm j ∈ [0, 1] maximizes (1.7) with
pit(j) defined as
pit(j) = pt(j)s˜t(j)−Wtnt(j)−Rtkt(j). (A.108)
As explained before, firms do not observe the exogenous taste-shifter vt(j) and hence their
demand st(j) when making their price and quantity decisions. Therefore, they will have to
form expectations on sales st(j), conditional on all variables except νt(j). This conditional
expectation is denoted by s˜t(j).
The constraints on the firm are (1.9), (1.10), (1.11) and the demand function (A.106) with
a known distribution for the taste-shifter vt(j) in (A.104). Notice that this distribution is
identical across all firms and invariant to aggregate conditions. By the law of large numbers,














Market clearing The market clearing conditions for labor, capital, and bond markets are
identical to the stock-elastic model and are given by (1.13), (1.14) and (1.15). Sales of goods
181
also clear by the demand function for each variety.
A.3.2 Equilibrium
A market equilibrium of the stockout-avoidance model is defined as follows.
Definition A.1 (Market equilibrium of the stockout-avoidance model). A market equilib-
rium in the stockout-avoidance model is a set of stochastic processes:
ct, nt, kt+1, it, Bt+1, xt, {at(j)}, {vt(j)}, {st(j)}, {s˜t(j)}, {yt(j)}, {invt(j)}, {pt(j)},Wt, Rt, Pt, Qt,t+1
such that, given the exogenous stochastic process zt and initial conditions k0, B0, and {inv−1(j)}:
 households maximize (1.1) subject to (1.2) - (1.4), (A.104) - (A.105), and a no-Ponzi
condition,
 each firm j ∈ [0, 1] maximizes (1.7) subject to (1.9) - (1.11), (A.108) - (A.109),
 markets clear according to (1.13) - (1.15).











In stockout-avoidance models, a market equilibrium is not symmetric across firms. In-
deed, because of the idiosyncratic taste shocks {νt(j)}, realized sales {st(j)}, and therefore
end of period inventories {invt(j)} differ across firms. However, it can be shown that all
firms make identical ex-ante choices. That is, firms’ choice of price pt(j) and amount of
on-shelf goods at(j) depends only on aggregate variables, and not on the inventory inherited
from the past period invt−1(j). We therefore denote pt = pt(j) and at = at(j). The ex-ante
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symmetric choices of price and on-shelf goods imply that there is a unique threshold of the
taste shock, common across firms, above which firms stock out. Using (A.106), this threshold
is given by:










A.3.3 The stockout wedge and firm-level markups
The fact that those firms with a taste shifter νt(j) ≥ ν∗t run out of goods to sell implies
that pt 6= Pt. Indeed, as emphasized in (A.107), the aggregate price level Pt depends on the
household’s marginal value of good j, p˜t(j). This marginal value equals the (symmetric) sales
price pt for all varieties that do not stockout. However, for varieties that do stock out, firms
would like to purchase more of the good than what is on sale. Therefore, the household’s
marginal value of the good is higher than their market price: p˜t(j) > pt. Thus, the standard





The relative price can be thought of as a stockout wedge. It is smaller when the household’s
valuation of the aggregate bundle of goods is large relative to the market price of varieties,
that is, when stockouts are more likely. Formally, it can be shown that the wedge dt is a
strictly increasing function of ν∗t , and therefore a decreasing function of the probability of
stocking out, 1− F (ν∗t ).
Due to the stockout wedge, firm-level markup µFt differs from the definition of aggregate






µFt = dtµt. (A.111)
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A.3.4 An alternative log-linearized framework
There are two important differences between stock-out avoidance models and the stock-
elastic demand model described in section 1.2. The first difference is the occurence of
stockouts, which implies the existence of the stockout wedge and hence the departure of
firm-level and aggregate markups as described above. The second difference is that, even in
our flexible-price environment, firm-level markups are not set at a constant rate over future
marginal cost, as they did in the stock-elastic demand model. These two differences mean
that unlike stock-elastic demand models, we cannot exactly map this class of models into the
log-linearized framework we described in section 1.3. We need a more general framework,
which we provide in the following lemma.
Lemma A.1 (The log-linearized framework for the stockout-avoidance model). In an equilib-
rium of the stockout-avoidance model, if productivity zt is at its steady-state value, on impact,
up to a first order approximation around the steady-state, equations (1.20) and (1.21) hold,
along with:
ˆinvt − sˆt = τ µˆFt + ηγˆt, (A.112)











In this approximation, the parameters ω and κ are given by (1.25) and (1.26), while the
parameters η > 0, τ > 0, d > 0, and µ differ and are given in section A.3.8.
We discuss (A.112)-(A.115), which are new to this framework. First, the optimal choice
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of inventories (A.112) depends on the firm-level markup µˆFt that is not equal to the aggregate
markup µˆt. The parameters expressed as τ and γ also have a different expression that will
be discussed later.
Second, in equation (A.113), aggregate markups and firm-level markups are linked with
the stockout wedge dˆt. This follows from the definition of firm-level markup and stockout
wedge given in (A.111).
Third, note that the framework of lemma A.1 now includes (A.114), an equation linking
the stockout wedge to the aggregate IS ratio. As we argued previously, the stockout wedge
is negatively related to the probability of stocking out. In turn, one can show that there
is a strictly decreasing mapping between the stockout probability, or equivalently a strictly












A lower probability of stocking out (a higher ν∗t ) implies that firms will, on average, be left
with a higher stock of inventories relative to the amount of goods sold. Combining these two
mappings, we obtain that the stockout wedge is increasing in the aggregate IS ratio, so that
d > 0.
Lastly, the framework of lemma A.1 includes variable firm-level markups, as described
in equation (A.115). This is because in stockout-avoidance models, the desired firm-level
markup is not constant. Instead, it depends on the ratio of goods on-shelf to expected
demand, which itself is linked to the probability of stocking out. One can show that for
log-normal and pareto-distributed idiosyncratic demand shocks, µFt is a strictly decreasing
function of ν∗t , and therefore an increasing function of the probability of stocking out. Thus,
the elasticity µ is typically negative. Intuitively, this is because when firms are likely to
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stock out, the price-elasticity of demand is lower, and therefore markups are higher. Indeed,
with a high stockout probability, demand is mostly constrained by the amount of goods
available for sale, and does not vary much with price changes. The converse intuition holds
when the stockout probability is low.
Before moving on, note that this framework reduces to the framework of section 1.3 when
the stockout wedge is absent and firm-level markups are constant, so that dˆt = µˆ
F
t = µˆt = 0.
Hence the framework is a generalized version of the basic framework given in section 1.3,
nesting it as a particular case with d = µ = 0.
A.3.5 The impact response to news shocks
We now turn to discussing the effects of a news shock using our new log-linearized frame-
work. We again maintain the assumption that the shock has the effect of increasing sales,
sˆt > 0, while leaving current productivity unchanged, zˆt = 0, so that we can indeed used
the log-linearized framework of lemma A.1. Combining the equations of lemma A.1, it is
straightforward to rewrite the optimality condition for inventory choice as:
ˆinvt = −η˜ωm̂ct + sˆt.
In this expression, the elasticity of inventories to relative marginal cost, η˜ is given by:
η˜ =
1
1− ηd + (η − τ)µη (A.116)
In contrast to the stock-elastic demand model, η˜ does not purely reflect the intertemporal
substitution of production anymore. The relative marginal cost elasticity η is now compen-
sated for markup movements (the terms τ and µ)and for movements in the stockout wedge
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(the term d).
Unlike in the stock-elastic demand model, the sign of η˜ cannot in general be established.3
This is because its sign depends on the distribution of the idiosyncratic taste shock. However,
for a very wide range of calibrations and for the Pareto and Log-normal distributions, η˜ is
negative. We document this in Table A.4. There, we compute different values of η˜, for
different pairs of values of σd, the standard deviation of the shock, and different values of
the steady-state markup. In all cases, we constraint the shock to have a mean equal to
1. The standard deviations we consider range from 0.1 to 1, and the markups range from
1.05 to 1.75. In all cases, η˜ is negative. In table A.5, we perform the same exercise for
Pareto-distributed shocks, and results are similar.
These results can be understood using (A.116). First, as discussed before, since µ < 0
for standard distributions, markups fall when the IS ratio increases. With a higher IS ratio,
a stockout is less likely for a firm, so that its price elasticity of demand is high, and its
charges low markups. Second, because (η − τ)µ > 0, markup movements tend to attenuate
the intertemporal substitution channel; that is, if we were to set d = 0, then η˜ < η. Lower
markups signal a higher future marginal cost to the firm, thereby leading it to increase
inventories (for fixed current marginal cost). At the same time, higher markups lead the
firm to increase its sales relative to available goods, leaving it with fewer inventories at the
end of the period. On net, the first effect dominates, leading to higher inventories at the
end of the period, and reducing thus the inventory-depleting effects of the shock. Finally,
ηd − (η − τ)µ > 1, so that η˜ < 0. Therefore, movements in the stockout wedge change the
sign of the elasticity of inventories to marginal cost.
With η˜ < 0, the following results hold for the impact response of news shocks in the
3In the variant of this model considered by Wen (2011), it can however be proved that the analogous
reduced-form parameter η˜ is strictly negative regardless of the shock distribution. The proof is available
from the authors upon request.
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stockout avoidance model.
Proposition A.1 (The impact response to news shocks in the stockout-avoidance model).
In the stockout-avoidance model with η˜ < 0, after a news shock:
1. inventory-sales ratio and inventories move in the same direction;





The first part of this proposition is by itself daunting to news shocks, since it implies
a counterfactual positive comovement between the IS ratio and inventories in response to
a news shock. The second part states the condition under which inventories could be pro-
cyclical. This condition is similar to that of proposition 1.2, with −η˜ taking place instead
of η on the left hand side, and κ/ω multiplied by δi/(κ− 1) on the right hand side. Again,
inventories are procyclical if the degree of real rigidities represented by the inverse of ω is
high compared to the absolute value of the elasticity of inventories to relative marginal cost
−η˜. We turn to a discussion of the numerical values of the parameters for this condition to
hold.
A.3.6 When do inventories respond positively to news shocks?
The second part of proposition A.1 provides a condition under which inventories are
procyclical. Much as in the case of the stock-elastic demand model, this condition for
procyclicality of inventories implies a lower bound for the degree real rigidities (alternatively,
an upper bound for ω). We now provide a numerical illustration of this bound, by setting
β = 0.99 and considering the same range of steady-state IS ratios, 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75, as
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in section 1.3. Given these values and a depreciation rate of inventories δi, the value ω was
uniquely pinned down in section 1.3. However, in the stockout-avoidance model considered
above, the three variables are not sufficient to determine ω. Hence we also target the steady-
state gross markup µ at 1.25, which is within the range of estimates considered in the
literature.4
In figure A.1, we plot the upper bound of ω for inventories to be procyclical, assuming
a log-normal distribution for the taste-shifter. We observe that inventories are procyclical
only with low levels of ω. For a quarterly depreciation of 2 percent, the upper bound of ω is
below 0.07, much lower than the existing measures. Hence with reasonable numerical values,
the model still implies that inventories fall with regards to news shocks.
A.3.7 Is the response of inventories dominated by intertemporal
substitution?
The inequality condition in proposition A.1 does not hold because −η˜ is large. An
immediate question is whether this large value is due to the high intertemporal substitution,
as was the case in section 1.3. Since the reduced-form parameter η summarizes the intensity
of the intertemporal substitution motive, we need to verify whether η is large and positively
related to −η˜.







(1− Γ(1 + IS)) 1
H(Γ)
.
4It should be noted that with given values of the steady-state markup, the steady-state IS ratio, and
the rate of depreciation of inventories, a unique steady-state stockout probability is implied. Indeed, in this
model, a higher IS ratio implies a lower stockout probability, while at the same time, it is linked to a higher
markup. The IS ratio and the markup thus cannot be targeted independently of the stockout probability.
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Here, Γ denotes the steady-state stockout probability. Note that this expression is similar
to the relative marginal cost elasticity in the stock-elastic demand model, save for the two
terms that depend on the stockout probability Γ. The function H(Γ) is related to the hazard
rate characterizing the cumulative distribution function of taste shocks F . For the type of
distributions considered in the literature, H(Γ) is typically larger than 1. Thus in general,
η ≤ ηSE, where ηSE is the expression for η in the stock-elastic demand model discussed
in section 1.3. That is, the intertemporal substitution channel is weaker in these models
than in the stock-elastic demand model. The fact that some firms stock out of their varieties
prevents them altogether from smoothing production over time by storing goods or depleting
inventories.
However, setting the targets at IS = 0.5 and µ = 1.25, and assuming that the taste-
shifter follows a log-normal distribution, η is computed to be two thirds of the value in
the stock-elastic demand model. Given that the lower bound for ηSE was above 30, η in the
stockout-avoidance model is above 20, implying that a 1 percent increase in the present value
of future marginal cost leads firms to adjust more than 20 percent of inventories relative to
sales. Hence the intertemporal substitution motive remains large in the stockout-avoidance
model.
Second, we need to verify whether a large η implies a large −η˜. However, both parameters
are in reduced form, and therefore the link between the two cannot be directly measured.
Instead, we show whether the two values are positively correlated with γ = β(1−δi). Setting
the benchmark targets at IS = 0.5 and µ = 1.25, we fix the structural parameters, assuming
that the taste-shifter follows a log-normal distribution. Given the structural parameters,
we vary γ and plot the implied value of η and −η˜ on the right panel of figure A.1. Note
that both values are increasing in γ as γ approaches 1. This suggests that the value of −η˜
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is again dominated by the value of η in (A.116), especially when γ is close to 1.5 In this
sense, the strong intertemporal substitution channel again dominates the overall response of
inventories to news shocks.
A.3.8 Additional results for the stockout avoidance model
List of additional equilibrium conditions
The following equations are consitute an equilibrium of the stockout avoidance model:






























µFt = dtµt (A.120)(∫
ν≤ν∗t






























dF (ν) + 1− F (ν∗t )
st = xt. (A.122)
Condition (A.117) determines the optimal choice of stock in the stockout avoidance
model. Here, ν∗t is related to the aggregate IS ratio through (A.119). Condition (A.118)
is the optimal markup choice in the stockout avoidance model which also depends on the
5The same result holds for a wide range of distributions for the taste-shifter.
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IS ratio through (A.119), reflecting the dependence of the price elasticity of demand on the
stock of goods on sale in this (not iso-elastic) model. The firm markup µFt and the aggregate
markup µt are linked by the stockout wedge dt in equation (A.120). The stockout wedge
itself is given by (A.121). Finally, condition (A.122) reflects market clearing when some
varieties stock out.
Equilibrium symmetry
Because some firms stock out while others do not, the equilibrium of the stock-elastic
demand model is not symmetric across firms. We define the aggregate variables st and invt








However, the choices of price pt(j) and goods on shelf at(j) are identical across firms. To
see this, note first that for the same reason mentioned for the stock-elastic demand model,
marginal cost is constant across firms. Second, the first-order conditions for optimal pricing











(1− δi)Et [qt,t+1mct+1] ,
pt(j)/Pt
(1− δi)Et [qt,t+1mct+1] =
θ




where mct denotes nominal marginal cost deflated by the CPI, Pt. Here, s˜t(j) denotes firm
j’s expected sales. Following equation (A.109), expected sales of firm j depend only on
price pt(j) and on-shelf goods at(j), and aggregate variables. In turn, the above optimality
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conditions can be solved to obtain a decision rule for at(j) and pt(j) as a function of current
and expected values of aggregate values, so that the choices of individual firms for these









is also symmetric across firms.
Expressions for the reduced-form coefficients of lemma A.1
In what follows, we denote the steady-state stockout probability by:
Γ = 1− F (ν∗).
First, note that the log-linear approximation of equation (A.119) is:
învt − sˆt = (1− Γ(1 + IS))1 + IS
IS
νˆ∗t
This implies that the IS ratio and the stockout threshold move in the same direction. Indeed,
the restriction:
1 > Γ(1 + IS)



















dF (ν) > 0.
Second, it can be shown that the log-linear approximations to equations (A.117), (A.118)
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(1− Γ(1 + IS))∆νˆ∗t .

























1− Γ(1 + IS) .
Combining these equations, one arrives at the following expressions for the different




(1− Γ(1 + IS))1 + IS
IS
µF




(1− Γ(1 + IS))1 + IS
IS
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1− Γ(1 + IS)
µF − 1
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1− Γ(1 + IS)(µ










A.4 Robustness of the empirial sign restriction VAR
First, we checked whether our result is sensitive to the long-run properties of the data.
Towards that, we focus only on variations at the business-cycle frequency component by
applying an HP filter to each series. In figure A.2, we observe that the impulse responses
are quickly mean reverting. With this series, the same picture still remains. Moreover, our
result on the forecast error variance is also similar to our benchmark since in the very short
run, the shock accounts for 10 percent of output variation on average, and 30 percent of that
in the long run. Comparing the result with no restrictions on inventories, we see that the
short run (1 quarter) output variation becomes significantly more precise with a downward
shift in the mean.
Second, in our benchmark estimation, we considered output as real GDP. To be consistent
with our model definition of output y = c+ i+ δinv, we have also constructed an alternative
output series which subtracts government spending and net exports from the GDP series.
That is, the alternative output measure is nominal GDP net of government spending and net
exports, deflated by the GDP deflator, expressed in per capita terms. Figures A.4 and A.5
again confirm that our result is not sensitive to this extension. In figure A.7, we see that by
imposing 2 period restrictions, the mean output variation explained by the identified shock
shifts significantly downwards in all horizons.
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Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 Subjective discount factor
σ 1 Household intertemporal elasticity of substitution
αK 0.225 Capital share
αN 0.675 Labor share
δk 0.025 Capital depreciation rate
u 1 Capacity utilization rate
µY 1.0045 Gross per capita GDP growth rate
µA 0.9957 Gross investment price growth rate
G/Y 0.2 Government consumption to GDP
n 0.2 Hours
µ 1.15 Price markup
δi 0.025 Inventory depreciation rate
IS 0.75 Inventory-sales ratio




Parameter Distribution Median 5% 95% Median 5% 95%
1/ξ Gamma 3.92 2.51 5.77 1.70 1.13 2.25
γh Uniform 0.50 0.05 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.01
φ′′I Gamma 3.92 2.51 5.77 9.23 7.34 10.35
δ′′k/δ
′
k Igamma 0.75 0.32 0.96 0.31 0.24 0.38
b Beta 0.50 0.17 0.83 0.92 0.91 0.94
ρxg Beta 0.73 0.32 0.96 0.79 0.64 0.91
φ′′y Gamma 3.67 1.37 7.75 0.52 0.20 0.87
φ′′inv Gamma 3.67 1.37 7.75 2.68 2.02 3.28
φ′′a Gamma 3.67 1.37 7.75 0.65 0.21 1.13
ρz Beta 0.73 0.32 0.96 0.95 0.92 0.97
σ0z Gamma 1.15 0.27 3.06 0.64 0.54 0.74
σ4z Gamma 0.66 0.16 1.76 0.12 0.00 0.26
σ8z Gamma 0.66 0.16 1.76 0.09 0.00 0.21
ρµA Beta 0.50 0.17 0.83 0.46 0.37 0.55
σ0µA Gamma 0.24 0.06 0.64 0.18 0.01 0.33
σ4µA Gamma 0.14 0.03 0.37 0.15 0.04 0.24
σ8µA Gamma 0.14 0.03 0.37 0.24 0.10 0.32
ρg Beta 0.73 0.32 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.99
σ0g Gamma 0.81 0.19 2.15 0.71 0.24 1.01
σ4g Gamma 0.46 0.11 1.02 0.73 0.48 0.92
σ8g Gamma 0.46 0.11 1.02 0.25 0.00 0.70
ρµX
∗ Beta 0.23 –0.18 0.46 0.30 0.17 0.47
σ0µX Gamma 0.35 0.08 0.94 0.47 0.30 0.63
σ4µX Gamma 0.20 0.05 0.53 0.08 0.00 0.18
σ8µX Gamma 0.20 0.05 0.53 0.09 0.00 0.18
ρψ Beta 0.73 0.32 0.96 0.99 0.98 1.00
σ0ψ Gamma 0.92 0.22 2.45 1.42 0.90 1.80
σ4ψ Gamma 0.53 0.13 1.42 1.57 1.24 1.91
σ8ψ Gamma 0.53 0.13 1.42 0.31 0.00 0.84
ρζh Beta 0.50 0.17 0.83 0.19 0.11 0.30
σ0ζh Gamma 4.82 1.15 12.87 6.03 1.15 9.13
σ4ζh Gamma 2.78 0.66 7.43 6.10 1.08 8.51
σ8ζh Gamma 2.78 0.66 7.43 3.77 1.17 6.10
ρzk Beta 0.50 0.17 0.83 0.85 0.77 0.93
σ0zk Gamma 13.14 3.14 35.07 6.41 4.25 7.89
σ4zk Gamma 7.59 1.81 20.26 0.68 0.00 1.69
σ8zk Gamma 7.59 1.81 20.26 1.62 0.01 3.30
ρµ Beta 0.50 0.17 0.83 0.77 0.71 0.83
σ0µ Gamma 0.86 0.20 2.29 2.85 2.34 3.31
σ4µ Gamma 0.50 0.12 1.33 0.63 0.26 0.93
σ8µ Gamma 0.50 0.12 1.33 0.22 0.00 0.47
σmegy Uniform 0.15 0.02 0.29 0.27 0.25 0.30
ρmeginv Beta 0.50 0.17 0.83 0.21 0.09 0.33
σmeginv Uniform 0.15 0.02 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.30
Table A.2: Parameter Estimation on US Data
Notes: Posterior is the result of estimation with using inventories as an additional observable.
Hence 8 observable series (output, consumption, fixed investment, government spending, hours
worked, TFP, investment price, inventories) are used. All numbers are rounded. A transformed
parameter ρµX + 0.5 is estimated for ρµX .
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Statistic Y C I N G TFP A INV
Standard Deviations
Data 0.91 0.51 2.28 0.84 1.14 0.75 0.41 0.88
Model 0.89 0.63 3.56 0.82 1.08 0.77 0.38 1.39
Correlations With Output Growth
Data 1.00 0.50 0.69 0.72 0.25 0.40 –0.12 0.44
Model 1.00 0.45 0.59 0.53 0.20 0.47 0.01 0.20
Autocorrelations
Data 0.28 0.20 0.53 0.60 0.05 –0.01 0.49 0.55
Model 0.39 0.39 0.75 0.21 0.02 0.06 0.46 0.80
Table A.3: Model Predictions
Model estimation result is based on posterior median estimates. The columns are output (Y),
consumption (C), fixed investment (I), hours (N), government spending (G), total factor
productivity (TFP), relative price of investment (A), and inventories (INV) all in growth rates.
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Value of η˜
σd ↓ ||µ→ 1.05 1.1 1.25 1.5 1.75
0.1 -729.12 -278.08 -121.98 -77.39 -61.87
0.25 -307.22 -116.94 -51.42 -32.71 -26.20
0.5 -167.04 -63.17 -27.66 -17.57 -14.06
0.75 -120.68 -45.25 -19.59 -12.35 -9.85
1 -97.75 -36.33 -15.51 -9.66 -7.66
Implied IS ratio
σd ↓ ||µ→ 1.05 1.1 1.25 1.5 1.75
0.1 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.18 0.21
0.25 0.12 0.23 0.39 0.50 0.57
0.5 0.23 0.47 0.83 1.13 1.32
0.75 0.32 0.69 1.31 1.88 2.26
1 0.41 0.90 1.81 2.73 3.36
Table A.4: Value of η˜ when idiosyncratic demand shocks follow a log-normal distribution with mean 1
Notes: Different lines correspond to different standard deviations of the associated normal




σd ↓ ||µ→ 1.05 1.1 1.25 1.5 1.75
0.1 -1959.13 -297.78 -62.89 -27.02 -18.16
0.25 -926.82 -142.18 -30.44 -13.30 -9.06
0.5 -598.66 -92.85 -20.20 -8.98 -6.20
0.75 -499.86 -78.04 -17.14 -7.69 -5.35
1 -456.12 -71.51 -15.80 -7.13 -4.97
Implied IS ratio
σd ↓ ||µ→ 1.05 1.1 1.25 1.5 1.75
0.1 0.03 0.07 0.15 0.22 0.26
0.25 0.05 0.15 0.34 0.51 0.63
0.5 0.09 0.25 0.57 0.90 1.13
0.75 0.10 0.30 0.71 1.15 1.48
1 0.11 0.33 0.80 1.31 1.70
Table A.5: Value of η˜ when shock follow a Pareto distribution with mean 1
Notes: Different lines correspond to different standard deviations for the Pareto distribution, and
different columns to different steady-state markups. Values are for β = 0.99 and δi = 0.011.
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Figure A.1: Implied parameter values for the stockout avoidance model
Notes: The left panel provides the upper bound on ω for procyclical inventories, derived from
targeting the steady-state IS ratio and µ = 1.25. The right panel provides the value of −η˜ and η




































Figure A.2: Robustness of impulse responses 1
Notes: Median and 80% credible set impulse responses of the identified shock with impact (1
period) restriction for the HP filtered series.
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Figure A.3: Robustness of forecast error variance 1
Notes: Posterior probability density and median (vertical line) for the share of forecast error
variance of output at each horizon explained by identified shocks for the HP filtered series, with 1
period restriction. Solid line: 1 period negative comovement between ∆invt and (ct, it). Dashed




































Figure A.4: Robustness of impulse responses 2
Median and 80% credible set impulse responses of the identified shock with 1 period restriction
for the alternative output series (without government spending and net exports), with 1 period
restrictions applied on inventories, consumption and investment.
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Figure A.5: Robustness of forecast error variance 2
Posterior probability density and median (vertical line) for the share of forecast error variance of
output at each horizon explained by identified shocks for the alternative output series (without
government spending and net exports), with 1 period restriction. Solid line: 1 period negative




































Figure A.6: Robustness of impulse responses 3
Median and 80% credible set impulse responses of the identified shock with 1 period restriction
for the alternative output series (without government spending and net exports), with 2 period
restrictions applied on inventories, consumption and investment.
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Figure A.7: Robustness of forecast error variance 3
Posterior probability density and median (vertical line) for the share of forecast error variance of
output at each horizon explained by identified shocks for the alternative output series (without
government spending and net exports), with 2 period restriction. Solid line: 2 period negative
comovement between ∆invt and (ct, it). Dashed line: 2 period positive comovement between ct
and it.
Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Equilibrium conditions










Bt−1 +WtHt +RKt K + Pu,tst[(1− δd)Dt−1 + δd(1− ρ)DNt−1] + Φt












(1− st)[(1− δd)Dt−1 + δd(1− ρ)DNt−1] +DNt −Dt
]}
.
Hence the household equilibrium conditions are the following:
[Ct] : Uc(t) = λt,


















st+1 + νt+1(1− st+1)
]
,
[DNt ] : λt
Pd,t
Pc,t



















































[νt] : Dt = (1− st)[(1− δd)Dt−1 + δd(1− ρ)DNt−1] +DNt ,






and also the household budget constraint set at equality.












where mcnc,t = Pc,tmcc,t.


















The second-hand firm equilibrium condition for each market structure is:
Pu,t =

Pd,t − Pc,t, if market is competitive,
Pd,t − Pc,tm,t, if market is monopsony,






Monetary policy and market clearing conditions after aggregation are:
Rˆt = τpi[scpˆic,t + (1− sc)pˆid,t] + eRt ,
Ct + Mt ≈ ZtF (Kc,t, Hc,t) (“=” up to first order approximation starting at a steady state),
DNt −Mt = ZtF (Kd,t, Hd,t),
Mt = st[(1− δd)Dt−1 + δd(1− ρ)DNt−1],
Ht = Hc,t +Hd,t,
K = Kc,t +Kd,t.
Finally, the technology shock process is
lnZt = ρZ lnZt−1 + eZt .
B.2 Monopsony second-hand market
I assumed in the benchmark that second-hand firms are price-takers in purchasing the
used good. In this section, I consider the other extreme where second-hand firms hold
monopsony power and derive the second part of proposition 2.1. Since second-hand firms
are competitive in the output market (i.e. they take Pm,t as given), justification is required for
the different market structure for inputs and outputs. I assume that second-hand firms are
representative and atomic, and each representative second-hand firm gets randomly assigned
to a representative household in purchasing their used durables. In this case, second-hand
firms are assumed to hold monopsony power while the output market remains perfectly com-
petitive.
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The monopsony second-hand firm now recognizes that the supply of used goods is a func-
tion of the price that it sets in purchasing these goods. In particular, the firm should be able
to recognize that the higher price they set in purchasing used goods, the more goods house-
holds are willing to resell. The supply curve that the firm takes into account should come
from the household equilibrium conditions. Assuming zero replacement adjustment costs,





Pu,t = Pd,t − δd(1− ρ)EtΛt,t+1Pu,t+1.
Combining these two,
Pu,t = Pd,t − δd(1− ρ)
(













Moreover, from the law of motion for durables can be expressed as follows:
Dt = (1− st)[(1− δd)Dt−1 + δd(1− ρ)DNt−1] +DNt
= (1− δd)Dt−1 + δd(1− ρ)DNt−1 − st[(1− δd)Dt−1 + δd(1− ρ)DNt−1] +DNt
= (1− δd)Dt−1 + δd(1− ρ)DNt−1 −Mt +DNt .
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For convenience, I summarize the above law of motion as the following function:
Dt = D(Mt, D
N
t , Dt−1, D
N
t−1).
I assume that household utility is additively separable with respect to the three arguments.
Hence, the household pricing function for used durables can be written as follows:
Pu,t = Pd,t
1− δd










This is an inverse supply curve for used durables that the monopsony recognizes as far as the
monopsony takes Pd,t, Pc,t, Ct, D
N
t as exogenous at time t. For this to hold, it is sufficient to
assume that the monopsony firm cannot internalize the household budget constraint. The
following lemmas show that this inverse supply curve is well-defined.



















> 0 [∵ Udd(Dt) < 0]
Lemma B.2. The slope of the inverse supply curve is increasing, if the utility function for










For example, when the utility function is CRRA for durables, households are prudent in
their consumption for durables.
With this inverse supply curve, the monopsony’s problem is the following:
max
Mt
Pm,tMt − Pu,t(Mt)Mt − Pc,tf(Mt),
which delivers the equilibrium condition:
Pm,t − Pu,t − Pc,tf ′(Mt)− ∂Pu,t
∂Mt
Mt = 0.
With f(·) being linearly homogeneous as above, the price of used durables becomes:
Pu,t = Pm,t − Pc,t − ∂Pu,t
∂Mt
Mt,
which leads to propostion 1. Given their monopsony power, second-hand firms are able charge
a lower purchase price for used durables compared to the perfectly competitive market.
With log separable utility function, the equilibrium condition can be written in a handy
manner:











= Pm,t − m,tPc,t.
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B.3 Calibration details
There are three nonstandard calibration targets: δd, ρ, . For these targets, we aim at
the three moments: the average depreciation rate for consumer durables, the steady state
transaction rate of used and new durables, and the rate of used durable margin to durable
spending. Note that the model’s steady state relative transaction of used to new durable
goods is
s[(1− δd)D + δd(1− ρ)DN ] : X.
Note that the following holds:
DN =
δd + s(1− δd)
1 + δd(1− s)(1− ρ)D, X =
δd(1− s(1− ρ))
δd + s(1− δd) D
N .






1 + δd(1− s)(1− ρ) .





δd(1− s(1− ρ)) .
Lastly, the nominal margin for used durable sales is assumed to be (Pd−Pu)M . I define the
real margin for used durable sales by deflating this by the price index Pc, so that the real
cost that the dealers pay for dealership and refurbishment f(M) does not include a price
term. Under the linear homogeneity assumption (f(M) = M), the rate of real margin to
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Hence, it is straightforward to calibrate : take the rate of the empirical real margin over
new durables, over the empirical used to new durable transactions. After calibrating , we
have two parameters δd, ρ to calibrate. However, we have 3 unknowns, due to the existence
of s, the steady state replacement rate. Hence we need to come up with a third equation by
utilizing the following household durable replacement decision
1 = Qr − δd(1− ρ)β,
where Qr(= Pd/Pu) is the relative price of new durables over used durables. It remains
to express Qr as a function of the 3 unknowns. This comes from the second-hand pricing
condition, which depends on the market structure. We consider 2 polar cases: perfect
competition and monopsony.
B.3.1 Perfect competition
Since the second-hand pricing equation is Pu = Pd−Pc in a perfectly competitive market,








1 + δd(1− ρ)β ,
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where Q(= Pd/Pc), the relative price of durables over nondurables, comes straightforwardly
from the markup of durables. Hence, we have the following three equations with three
unknowns ρ, δd, s:
δempirical =
δd(1− s(1− ρ))







δd(1− s(1− ρ)) ,
calibrated = Q
δd(1− ρ)β
1 + δd(1− ρ)β .
B.3.2 Monopsony









Plugging this in the pricing equation:








= Pd − mPc.










Since m = Q(1− 1/Qr), plugging in the household condition gives the following equation:
 = Q
δd(1− ρ)β










Hence we need to figure out ψDC/ψCD and M/D.


































where Q = Pd/Pc and Qr = Pd/Pu. From the household optimality condition for replacement













1 + δd(1− ρ)β
]
.










implying that this is given by the two targets (relative used to new transaction rate and the





1 + δd(1− s)(1− ρ) .
Plugging these values back into the margin equation:
 = Q
δd(1− ρ)β





1 + δd(1− ρ)β
]
s(1− ρδd)
1 + δd(1− s)(1− ρ)
Hence we are back to three equations and three targets which solves the system.
However, margin in the data is no longer directly linked to the pure value-added com-
ponent when dealers hold monopsony power. Hence instead of matching the margin, I take
an alternative calibration strategy to fix δd, ρ, s calibrated from the perfectly competitive
second-hand market. With this strategy, depreciation and relative transaction of used and
new durables remain identical for both market structure. Since the steady state replacement
rate s is pinned down, we can obtain  and the implied value-added component of second-
hand markets. In this case, the implied value-added margin of the second-hand market is
less then what is assumed in the perfectly competitive benchmark.
B.4 Numerical analysis with a monopsony second-hand
market
Most of the calibrations follow section 2.6, but when second-hand markets are assumed
as monopsony, I calibrate  differently as explained above. For clear comparison, all other
parameters and the steady state replacement rate is held to be the same as in the perfectly
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competitive environment. The parameter  is now smaller than the perfectly competitive
case since some portion of the margin in data should also reflect firms’ monopsony rent.
Figure B.1 shows the impulse response of monetary shocks when the second-hand market
is assumed as a monopsony. For quantitative comparison, the two cases with competitive
second-hand markets are plotted again. We observe that the dynamics for the monopsony
second-hand market are similar to the case of a competitive second-hand market with ad-
justment costs. Hence the second-hand market structure is not crucial in resolving the
comovement puzzle. Moreover, similarity of the the quantitative dynamics in the monop-
sony market without adjustment costs and the perfectly competitive market with adjustment
costs suggests that adjustment costs in the perfectly competitive case may reasonably reflect
market frictions.
B.5 Calibration of the counterfactual second-hand mar-
ket in section 2.6
In the model, value-added of the second-hand market at the steady state is M . Since the
value-added of the new durable market is X, the rate of the value-added in the second-hand









δd(1− s(1− ρ)) ,
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= (1 + µd)
mcnc
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θd(δd + s(1− δd))











θd(δd + s(1− δd))










= g(s, ρ, δd, θd, θc, β).
That is, the value-added is a function g(·) of 5 parameters {ρ, δd, θd, θc, β} and the steady
state replacement rate s. Hence, changing the calibration of the value-added component
amounts to changing these 6 parameters/variable. I fix θd, θc, β since these are not directly
linked to the structure of the second-hand market. Moreover, since both ρ and δd govern
the depreciation of the durable good, I fix δd and vary ρ. Hence the two parameter/variable
that I allow to change is ρ and s.
1. Supply side: Fixing s, all changes in the value-added is mapped into changes in
the depreciation discount of new durables ρ. In this scenario, all the change in size
of the second-hand market comes from the improvement of durability of new durable
goods in the supply side. For example, if ρ shifts downwards, new goods are less
depreciated then before, and hence second-hand markets expand. In this case, new
durable markup declines and the relative transaction of second-hand market to new
durable market M/X increases. Lastly, the steady-state depreciation of the durable
goods declines.
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The numerical strategy is to set M/X and obtain ρ by holding other parameters/variable
fixed. Compute M/X with the newly obtained ρ (M/X is a function of s, ρ, δd). Obtain
 from this. Compute Q, the net markup µd, and the steady state depreciation rate.
Using these newly computed statistics, obtain the steady state of the other variables
in the model and conduct analysis based on these.
2. Demand side: Fixing ρ, all changes in the value-added is mapped into changes in
the steady state replacement frequency of the households s. In this scenario, all the
change in the size of the second-hand market comes from the households replacing their
durables more often. This could be due to a better opportunity of second-hand market
transactions or a higher preference for replacements not specified. In the model, these
are all loaded on changes to .
In this case, a higher value-added corresponds to a higher replacement frequency. The
relative transactions itself increases and the average depreciation also declines.
The numerical strategy is similar to the above case: set M/X and obtain s by holding
the other parameters fixed. Compute M/X with the newly obtained s and  from this.
The rest is the same.
3. Mixture: The two motivations can also be mixed and I can also consider that. For
example, using the value obtained in 1, I can also take the average value of ρ before
and after the change in value-added, and use the average ρ to compute s. Using
this, I repeat the same step to basically get the effect of the change in the value-
added component of second-hand due to both the supply and the demand side. These
turn out to deliver expected results which is a combination of the results from both
motivations.
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Figure B.1: Impulse responses to an increase in the nominal interest rate in a monopsony second-hand
market
Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Proof of proposition 3.1





βt [ln cit − χ(1− hit)nit] di,
where each household receives the same weight since they were all ex ante identical at the
start of time. The family can choose any value for cit ≥ 0 and nit ∈ {0, 1} it wishes for each
agent at each period in time, since it can transfer resources across members freely through
the insurance payments. Integrating over all household’s budget constraints in equation (3)
in the main text gives the constraints of this maximization:
Ct +Kt+1 = (1− δ + rt)Kt + wtLt + dt −Gt,∫
citdi = Ct and
∫
sitnitdi = Lt,
for each period t.
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Building the Lagrangian for this problem, with Lagrange multipliers ζ1t, ζ2t, ζ3t for the






[ln cit − χ(1− hit)nit] di












The variables with respect to which to maximize are: {Ct, Lt, Kt+1, cit, nit}.
The first-order conditions with respect to individual and aggregate consumption are:
1
cit
= ζ2t and ζ1t = ζ2t.
Multiplying both sides by cit, and integrating gives the solution for the multipliers: ζ1t =
ζ2t = 1/Ct, as well as the sharing rule for individual consumption: cit = Ct. All consume
the same, since all were ex ante identical and they are all fully insured.
The optimality condition with respect to capital is:
ζ1t = βζ1t+1(1− δ + rt+1).
Replacing the Lagrange multiplier gives the Euler equation:
Ct+1
Ct
= β(1− δ + rt+1).
Finally, turn to the labor supply decision. It is clear from the structure of the problem
that if hit = 1, then nit = 1 as there is no utility loss and only a positive wage gain from
working. If hit < 1, it should also be clear that nit = 1 if and only if hit > h
∗(sit), a
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threshold that depends on the salary offer of the agent. But then:
∫



















(1− h∗)2dF (st)− (1− η)2
]
.
Using this result in the Lagrangian, the first-order conditions with respect to h∗ and Lt
are, respectively:
χ(1− h∗(sit)) = ζ3tsit and ζ1twt = ζ3t.
Using the first-order condition for consumption to eliminate the Lagrange multipliers gives
the optimal labor supply defining the h∗(.) function:
1− h∗(sit) = wtsit
χCt
.





= pi + (1− pi)
∫
sit (η − h∗(sit)) dF (s)












Collecting all the results, we are left with the Euler equation and the aggregate labor
supply equation. These are identical to the two optimality conditions from the representative
consumer problem in proposition 3.1, proving the result.
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C.2 Proof of proposition 3.2












Defining µ = 1 + τ gives immediately the result.
C.3 Proof of proposition 3.3
Combining propositions 3.1 and 3.2, all that remains is to check the market clearing
condition: Mt = dt−Gt. But with flexible prices dt = (µ− 1)wtLt. Using the definition of
taxes in proposition 3.2, Mt = τwtLt −Gt. Finally, to solve for employment:
Et =
∫
nitdi = pi + (1− pi)
∫
(η − h∗(sit)) dF (s)






= pi − (1− pi)(1− η) + (1− pi)wt
χCt
.
Combining with the expression for Lt in the proof of proposition 3.1 gives the expression for
Et.
C.4 Numerical solution of the full model
We solve the household problem in the Bellman equations (3.1)-(3.5) in the main chapter
numerically by value function iteration. For the first few iterations, we discretize the state
space, but once we are close to the solution, we switch to interpolating the value function
226
linearly, and using a golden section search algorithm for the maximization. It is possible
to reduce the dimension of the state space from 3 to 2, by re-defining variables, but after
extensive experimentation we found that surprisingly this did not materially speed up the
calculations.
As for the production sector, the optimality conditions were described in section 3.3.2.
In the steady state, where all firms are perfectly informed of the current state of affairs that
has been lasting for an indefinitely long time, given values for X0 and r0, we can sequentially














L0 = X0 and d0 = (µ− 1)w0L0.
Following a shock in period 1, only a fraction Λt of the firms know about it in period t.
Since prices are being set according to equations (3.10)-(3.11) in the main chapter, the price

















where the second equality comes from equation (3.7).
In turn, letting XAt be the output of attentive firms, that have learned about the change,





t + (1− Λt)XI1/µt .
Of the following two expressions, the first comes from combining the production function in
equation (3.9), with the labor market clearing condition in equation (3.15), and the second
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from dividing the demand functions in (3.8):
Lt = ΛtX
A

























As for dividends, note that:
dt = Λtd
A
t + (1− Λt)dIt









where the second equality comes from equation (3.17). Again, we can replace for XAt and
XIt just as in the previous paragraph.
Combining all of the previous results then, given values for Xt and rt the variables in the
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Combining all of the results gives the following algorithm, drawn from the original work
of Aiyagari (1994) to find the steady state:
1. Guess values for X and r.
2. Compute sequentially K, w, l, d using the steady-state optimality conditions for the
production sector.
3. Solve the decision problem of the household to obtain k′∗(k, s, h) and n∗(k, s, h).
4. Use this decision function and the exogenous transition function for s to build F (k, s, h).
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5. Obtain new guesses for X and r sequentially from:
X =
(∫









and iterate until convergence.
For the transition dynamics to shocks, we follow the approach of Conesa and Krueger
(1999) starting from the programs of Heer and Maussner (2005). We adapt this previous
work to deal with transitory shocks (they had permanent shocks) as follows. First, we pick
a finite T and assume that by that time the transitory shock to the exogenous variables has
disappeared and all of the endogenous variables have converged back to their steady state.
In the implementation, T = 120, and increasing it led to no noticeable differences in the
paths. Then, start by guessing the path: {rt, Xt}Tt=1. The optimality conditions in the
production sector in section 3.3.2 deliver the implied paths for {Kt,wt,lt,dt}Tt=1. Knowing
that the value function at period T + 1 is the one at the steady-state, applying steps 2-4 of
the algorithm for the steady state above gives the decision rules and value functions at date
T . Repeating this gives the decision rules at date T − 1, and so on until date 1. Finally,
we use the decision rules to calculate {Xt, rt}Tt=1 as in step 5 of the steady-state algorithm.
Iterating this procedure until convergence gives the transitional dynamics.
